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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the years, scholarly interest in the role of business models to unlock the value of latent 
technology has increased. It is argued that the commercialisation of new technology requires 
business models that respond to a myriad of challenges and market needs. However, limited 
attention has been paid to understand how early-stage business models are developed to 
commercialise new university technology. Specifically, there are limited studies scrutinising 
the early-stage business models developed by University Spin-Offs (USOs), despite the fact 
that these are breeding grounds for new technology with commercial potential. Therefore, this 
thesis examines how USOs develop early-stage business models to commercialise new 
technology for the cleantech industry. 
 
To achieve this, an in-depth case study of four cleantech USOs at the University of Cambridge 
in the United Kingdom was performed. Sixty interviews with multiple stakeholders were 
conducted, and effectual logic and the concept of opportunity creation were adopted to inform 
the investigation. The findings, presented in a conceptual framework, suggest that USOs 
develop early-stage business models through three interlocking mechanisms. First, value is 
created through flow-field control, which is achieved by taking active control over a firm’s 
resources and capabilities. Second, value is captured through pragmatic kinesis, defined as 
being sensible when moving towards profit. Third, value network is managed through 
deliberate temperament, which is used to align stakeholders’ expectations. Along with these 
findings, the thesis also advances COPE principles (i.e. take control, create opportunities, forge 
partnerships and embrace contingencies) as parameters for the development of early-stage 
business models. 
 
The empirical evidence offers a critical logical shift in our understanding of early-stage 
business models development for commercialising university technology in the cleantech 
industry. The conceptual framework responds to scholarly inquiries to improve the theoretical 
grounding and construct clarity of business models. The thesis also informs policymakers about 
the pitfalls and opportunities associated with new technology commercialisation in the 
cleantech industry, where uncertainties are ubiquitous. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1  Phenomenon of Interest 
Following the landmark 1980 passage of the Bayh-Dole Act1 in the United States (US) and 
Margaret Thatcher’s 1987 abolition of the monopoly on British academic inventions in the 
United Kingdom (UK), universities in both countries have been very active in commercialising 
their academic research through the formation of University Spin-Offs (USOs) (Avnimelech 
& Feldman 2015; Fini et al. 2017). Over the years, the reported number of new USOs increased 
dramatically. Between the years 2003 and 2013, an average of 197 USOs were reported being 
spun annually across UK universities2. In the US, more than 11,000 USOs were established 
from 1995 until 20163. 
 
Two decades later, USOs have been acknowledged to fuel regional economy, shape new 
industries, create jobs and promote innovation (Lambert 2003; Breznitz & Feldman 2012; Fini 
et al. 2018). In the US, researchers claimed that well-known new industrial clusters, such as 
Silicon Valley in California, Route 128 in Massachusetts and Research Triangle in North 
Carolina, were developed in part due to USOs’ activities (Saxenian 1996; Link & Scott 2003). 
In the UK, USOs’ activities are the backbone of the Silicon Fen in Cambridgeshire and the 
Oxford Cluster in Oxfordshire (Kirk & Cotton 2012). 
 
Since 2000, the academic entrepreneurship model has spread to the emerging nations. 
Governments in developing countries support the establishment of USOs in the hopes of 
benefitting in the same way as the US and the UK (Stevens 2017). Policy instruments, research 
and development (R&D) investments, seed funds, Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) and 
incubators have been enacted to promote the transfer of research results through the 
establishment of USOs. Today, university technology commercialisation through the formation 
of USOs has become a significant global phenomenon and occupies a prominent position in 
governments’ agendas (Siegel & Wright 2015; Fini et al. 2017). 
                                                
1	The Bayh–Dole Act or Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (Pub. L. 96-517, December 12, 1980) is the US 
legislation dealing with IP arising from federal government-funded research which allows universities to retain title to 
inventions made under federally-funded research program. 
2	Report on the Higher Education Business and Community Survey 2013/14 by the Higher Education Founding Council for 
England (HEFCE). Available at: http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/HEFCE,2014/Content/Pubs/2015/201513/2015-13.pdf 
3	Licensing Activity Survey 2016 by the US Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM). Available at: 
https://www.autm.net/resources-surveys/research-reports-databases/licensing-surveys/fy2016-licensing-survey/ 
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Despite the rapid proliferation of and strong policy interest in the establishment of USOs, only 
a handful of USOs successfully monetised new technology and became sustainable in the long 
run (Vohora et al. 2004; Markman et al. 2008). The success of USOs’ commercialisation is 
disproportionately skewed to occur mostly in high-tech clusters with strong technology transfer 
profiles. However, commercial underachievement is still prevalent in most USOs (Hewitt-
Dundas 2015). Many attempts to commercialise new technology take longer than they 
should, resulting in marginal profit or failure (Mustar et al. 2008). 
 
According to the Enterprise Research Centre’s most recent database, the number of UK USOs 
that survived three years after being established has not improved since 2009 (Hewitt-Dundas 
2015). Measures of innovation output—the proportion of firms introducing new or 
significantly improved goods and services to the market—also show a decline from 24% to 
18% between 2008 and 2012, and a slight rise to 19% in 20154. Further, USOs are commonly 
associated with low sales growth (Wennberg et al. 2011) and low employment growth (Cantner 
& Goethner 2011). 
 
Scholars argue that an increase in the number of USOs occurs at the expense of their quality 
(Fini et al. 2017), commercial viability (Lambert 2003) and long-term impact (Grimaldi et al. 
2011). Herein lies the perpetual paradox: too much emphasis on the USO phenomenon when 
too many USOs are struggling to commercialise. Harrison and Leitch (2010) claim that USOs 
often start and remain small instead of becoming dynamic high-growth firms. Although USOs 
are assumed to be the catalysts for the economy, they are far less effective for generating 
economic benefits, particularly for national markets (Markman et al. 2008). In addition, 
Alvimelech and Feldman (2015) state that USOs’ performance in enabling technology-
intensive growth trajectories could be better. 
 
Overall, bringing new technology from the university laboratory to the market is a daunting 
endeavour. The phenomenon invokes growing concern about one of the greatest challenges 
that precludes USOs from effectively responding to the business challenges: development of 
the early-stage business model (Morris et al. 2005; Bigdeli et al. 2016; Stevens 2017). While 
radical governmental support does not appear to have eliminated the barriers to 
                                                
4	House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Report 2017: Managing IP and technology transfer. Available at: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/science-and-technology-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/managing-intellectual-property-inquiry-16-17/publications/ 
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commercialising  university technology, USOs are under pressure to adopt exhaustive business 
models at the early-stage of commercialisation to monetise university inventions (Lubik & 
Garnsey 2016). 
 
A report by the McMillan Group claims that weak customer adoption and inability to surpass 
the barrier to market entry due to poorly devised business models are some of the key issues 
hindering commercialisation of university technology5. Another report published by the 
Science and Technology Committee that compiled written evidence and responded to the 
Bridging the Valley of Death6, recognises business models as important drivers of successful 
university technology commercialisation, particularly between the ideation and prototyping 
stage7. Poorly developed early-stage business models are the main cause of  USO failure 
despite market opportunities, novel business ideas, adequate resources and talented 
entrepreneurs (Morris et al. 2005). Thus, better means of developing the early-stage business 
model are warranted. 
 
From the practitioners’ perspective, this pressing issue is highly acknowledged but only 
partially understood. Similarly, business model development for the commercialisation of 
university technology in general is emphasised in entrepreneurial practice, but tends to receive 
limited attention from academic researchers (Morris et al. 2005; Lubik & Garnsey 2016). 
Success in identifying the challenges facing USO commercialisation have yet to be matched 
by progress in tackling it. The proper recipe for an early-stage business model that causes USOs 
to succeed or fail remains an enigma. It is also still unclear how much of the early-stage 
business model development process can be—and should be—influenced or managed by the 
USO. Given this, the need to understand the mechanism behind the early-stage business model 
development for new technology commercialisation has come to the fore.  
 
In general, USOs recognise the importance of a business model for commercialising new 
technology. However, the modus operandi behind viable business models at the early-stage of 
                                                
5	HEFCE, 2015. Report on survey: Higher Education Business and Community Interaction Survey 2013/14, Available at: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/HEFCE,2014/Content/Pubs/2015/201513/2015-13.pdf 
6 The Valley of Death is a metaphor used to describe the difficulty of covering the negative cash flow in the early stages of 
commercialisation before new product is monetised (Osawa & Miyazaki 2006). 
7 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Eight Report of Sessions 2012-13: Bridging the Valley of Death: 
improving the commercialisation of research. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmsctech/348/348.pdf 
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commercialisation is often exclusive to an individual USO. Hence, they are rarely shared 
beyond the confines of the organisation. Due to this, general lessons cannot be drawn from 
successful and failed attempts at commercialisation. Since university technology 
commercialisation does not lend itself to generalisation and openness, USOs are precluded 
from learning the best practices. As a result, it is difficult to realise the commercial value of 
university technology.  
 
The state of affairs gives rise to a crucial question: how can a USO develop the early-stage 
business models to bring university technology into commercial reality. Since practitioners 
generally keep the inner workings of the early-stage business models tacit, deeper academic 
investigation is warranted. Unless USOs are armed with a viable business model, most will 
continue to fail. If this issue is not expounded, realisation of greater value from R&D 
investments will remain difficult.  
 
1.2  Research Gap and Research Question 
The main research gap addressed in this thesis is the lack of a clear understanding of how USOs 
develop initial business models that are viable enough to position their products in the 
marketplace. Therefore, the research question asked in this thesis is as follows: 
 
 How does a USO develop its early-stage business models to commercialise new technology? 
 
This question, although important, appears to be poorly explored and underrepresented in the 
academic sphere. There are several reasons for this research gap. First, the dominant scholarly 
work studies the change and innovation in business models over time rather than how they 
initially emerged at the early-stage of the commercialisation pipeline. Previous research relies 
heavily on empirical data, which is mostly derived from successful technology 
commercialisation cases that survived the initial phases of business model development 
(Rasmussen et al. 2006). The empirical setting is usually pre-painted by the view that firms 
have their business models up and running. As a result, scholarly work to understand how the 
early-stage business models are developed remains scarce. Throughout this thesis, explicit 
focus is given on the development of the early-stage business model (henceforth referred to as 
‘business model’) rather than the later-stage business model i.e. after the USO launches their 
product or service in a defined market. 
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Second, the subject of business model development for university technology 
commercialisation stems from two traditional streams of literature: university technology 
commercialisation literature and business model literature. The former emerged in the late 
1980s from the academic entrepreneurship field (Shane 2004), and the latter emanated in the 
1990s from the strategic management field (Zott et al. 2011). Both streams advanced 
significantly in silos, and reconciliation between them is relatively recent (e.g. Lubik & 
Garnsey 2016; Bigdeli et al. 2016). Much has been discussed about USOs in the academic 
entrepreneurship literature, but not their relation to the concept of the business model. As a 
stream of knowledge, the academic entrepreneurship field is considered patchy at best (Siegel 
& Wright 2015). In the strategic management literature, the state-of-the-art has contributed 
significantly to advancing our understanding of how a business model influences new 
technology commercialisation (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; Andries & Debackere 
2007). However, previous studies have not fully sought to understand the process behind the 
emergence of business models in the university context.  
 
Third, academic work on new technology commercialisation often neglects or generalises the 
challenges faced by entrepreneurial firms like USOs with corporate firms or incumbents. Due 
to this, the unique challenges faced by a USO in commercialising new technology seem to be 
overlooked. There is a limited distinction being made between different challenges faced by 
USOs during commercialisation. For example, an extensive scholarly work has contributed to 
the understanding business model development for a start-up firm (e.g. Velu 2017) and an 
established firm (e.g. Demil & Lecoq 2010). Unfortunately, recommendations made in such 
empirical settings are not directly translated into practice for USO practitioners (Lubik & 
Garnsey 2016). Siegel at al. (2003)  and Fini et al. (2017) claim that the unique challenges 
faced by USOs are the result of convergence between science and business, which may not 
necessarily be encountered by other types of firms and thus require different comprehension. 
 
In summary, although there are significant bodies of academic work regarding business model 
development and university technology commercialisation, the two have not yet been 
integrated through a formal and in-depth empirical investigation. Knowledge relating to 
business models and commercialisation of new technology is still fragmentary in the academic 
entrepreneurship and strategy literature. This issue underscores an important literature gap that 
must be addressed urgently. 
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1.3  Research Overview  
Responding to the gap in the literature, this research is conducted with an overarching aim to 
advance our understanding of how USO develop business models to commercialise new 
technology. Despite the exigency of researching this topic, previous literature on strategic 
management and academic entrepreneurship have not fully come to grips with this issue 
empirically and theoretically.  
 
Given this, extant literature on business models and university technology commercialisation 
is critically analysed to recapitulate the state-of-the-art and validate gap in the literature. 
Relevant premises related to effectuation logic and the concept of opportunity creation are 
adopted as the underpinning theoretical lenses to guide the research.  Cursory information is 
also collected through an explanatory, theory-building, in-depth case study. A qualitative case 
study of four cleantech USOs based at the University of Cambridge, UK, are performed. All 
cases are systematically and purposely selected to understand how the firms under study 
develop their business models to commercialise new technology in response to the market 
challenges and needs. 60 interviews with multiple stakeholders are conducted and a substantial 
amount of archival data are gathered to inform the investigation. 
 
Based on the empirical evidence, the findings, presented in a conceptual framework suggests 
that a USO develop its business model through three interlocking, iterative and mutually 
reinforcing mechanisms namely by 1) creating value through flow-field control; 2) capturing 
value through pragmatic kinesis; and 3) managing value network through deliberate 
temperament. Flow-field control is an approach that aims to craft a proposition and create 
valuable offering while overcoming the market resistance, by taking active control over a 
firm’s resources and capabilities.  Pragmatic kinesis on the other hand, is a measure taken by a 
USO to capture value and respond to the financial pressure, by being flexible and sensible to 
move towards where the profit lies. Lastly, deliberate temperament constitutes a measure that 
aims to manage conflicting value network, by aligning stakeholders’ expectations which results 
in a mutually beneficial outcome. The thesis also proposes COPE principle as the foundation 
for the business model development process. COPE principle resembles a set of parameters a 
USO needs to consider when developing its business model, (i.e. take control, create 
opportunities, forge partnerships and embrace contingencies). 
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This research contributes mainly to the business model literature and to some extend also 
providing useful insights to the academic entrepreneurship literature as well as to the ongoing 
debate of effectuation logic. To this end, the findings forges a closer link between 
multidisciplinary theories which previously existed in isolation despite their important 
potential connection. Additionally, this thesis also offers a critical logical shift to a more 
systematic understanding about the commercialisation of technology in a new empirical setting 
where understanding is partial and highly needed. The empirical evidence, new set of 
metaphors and principles embedded in the conceptual framework respond to the scholarly 
inquiry into improving business model theoretical grounding, construct clarity, contingencies, 
and outcomes. 
 
From a broader perspective, the findings of this thesis reveal a subtle yet critical reflection 
about the inner workings of the initial business model emergence rather than how it evolves, 
changes or gets innovated. To achieve this, the thesis introduces new approaches for business 
model development which could support previously held conjectures about business model 
evolution and business model innovation. From the practitioner viewpoints, the finding informs 
policymakers about the pitfalls and opportunities associated with new technology 
commercialisation in cleantech industry where uncertainties are ubiquitous. 
 
Throughout the thesis, some terminologies are repetitively used across all chapters. To enhance 
interpretational consistency and avoid semantic misunderstanding, the terminologies are 
defined in Table 1-1. 
 
Terminology Definition 
Business model 
The architecture of interdependent components of value proposition, value creation 
and value capture that are dynamically configured by a networked stakeholder. 
 
Commercialisation 
A process of bringing new technology into the market to be exploited in return for 
business profits.  
 
Cleantech firms 
Firms that seek to increase performance, productivity and efficiency by minimising 
negative impact to the environment. 
 
Effectuation Decision-making mechanism for entrepreneurial pursuance that takes a given set of means and focuses on selecting the effects that can be created with that set of means. 
Intellectual Property 
(IP) 
Creations of the mind, such as inventions, literary and artistic works, designs and 
symbols, names and images used in commerce. 
 
Opportunity creation  
A notion that recognises that opportunities are not always objective phenomena 
created by change in a market but may be proactively created by the actions of an 
entrepreneur. 
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Technology transfer The translation of university research into commercial success.  
Technology transfer 
office (TTO) 
A company often established by the university dedicated to identifying commercially 
viable research results and formulating strategies to exploit them. 
 
University spin-off 
(USO) 
A new firm created to exploit commercially the knowledge, technology or research 
results developed within a university. 
 
Table 1-1: Terminologies used in this thesis 
 
 
1.4  Structure of the Thesis  
The remainder of this thesis is structured into three main components (Figure 1-1). Component 
1 (Chapters 2 and 3) reviews the literature upon which this research is founded and the 
methodological approach. Component 2 (Chapters 4 and 5) presents the research case studies 
and findings of the research. Component 3 (Chapters 6 and 7) is dedicated to the discussion of 
the results and the conclusion.  
 
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) reviews relevant literature to elucidate the state-of-the-art and 
validate the gap in the literature. It also presents the theoretical lenses and premises used in the 
current investigation.  
 
Chapter 3 (Methodological Approach) describes the research philosophy to justify the chosen 
methodological approach, scope and procedures for selecting cases and collecting and 
analysing data. Research quality issues and ethical considerations are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 (Case Studies) reports the individual case studies that serve as primary sources of 
evidence to answer the research question. Each case is reported in a descriptive way, based on 
the USOs’ technology commercialisation journey and its resulting business models. 
 
Chapter 5 (Findings) performs a cross-case comparative analysis of the findings. It also 
synthesises the data and presents the overall findings in an integrative conceptual framework. 
 
Chapter 6 (Discussion) discusses and interprets the findings in more depth in light of what was 
already known in the existing literature. It also presents new insights about the problem under 
investigation. 
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Chapter 7 (Conclusion) concludes the thesis by summarising key findings, implications of the 
thesis to theory and practice, limitations of the study, and finally suggestions for future 
research.  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Thesis layout (dotted lines indicate the links between chapters) 
 
 
1.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the background of this research. It has also clarified the motivation 
for this research, the research question to be answered and a brief overview about the research 
approach, findings and contributions. The following chapter will critically evaluate prior 
academic work on the problem under investigation. It will also discuss the theoretical lenses 
through which this thesis assesses the problem. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Chapter Introduction 
This chapter assesses previous scholarly work concerning business models and university 
technology commercialisation as these areas of study are deemed to be relevant to the research 
question of this thesis. The former generally stems from strategic management literature, while 
the latter emerges from academic entrepreneurship literature. The fragmented nature of both 
streams means that they must be separately assessed. Thus, this chapter is split into five main 
sections.  
 
Section 2.2 presents an overview of the business model literature, covering the origin and 
definitions of a business model. It then presents current knowledge obtained from academic 
work concerning business models and highlights the utility of business models for 
commercialising new technology. It also discusses the limited research being done in relation 
to business models for technology commercialisation in the USO context. Section 2.3 explores 
the state-of-the-art academic studies concerning business models for commercialising 
university technology in USO settings in an in-depth manner. It strives to narrow the scope of 
this thesis by looking at the unique challenges encountered by most USOs related to business 
model development. Section 2.4 further articulates the challenges associated with different 
value components of business model development. Following that, section 2.5 describes the 
effectuation logic and concept of opportunity creation as well as their merit as potential lenses 
with which to answer the research questions. It also presents the central premises borrowed 
from both domains, which help to identify suitable operationalisation measures to answer the 
research question. Finally, section 2.6 concludes the literature review chapter. 
 
2.2  Overview of Business Models  
The concept of the business model has been widely used by practitioners in multiple discourses 
for a long time, predominantly to conceptualise the core element of a business (Teece 2010a). 
The concept has grown in significance, achieving global impact (Wirtz et al. 2016), and it has 
been widely applied in research and corporate practice alike. The next section provides a 
comprehensive overview of the business model literature and its origin, definitions, current 
knowledge and role in technology commercialisation.   
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 Origin and Definitions of the Business Model 
The formal use of the term ‘business model’ in academia can be traced back to the late 1950s. 
Ostewalder and Pigneur (2005) argue that the term first appeared in an academic article in 
19578 and in the title and abstract of a paper published in 19609. Today, the business model has 
become prevalent in academic literature. A search of the term ‘business model’ in the titles of 
academic articles published between 1957 and 2018 returned more than 14,000 results. Of 
these, only 32 were published before the year 1990. This analysis suggests that the popularity 
of the business model is recent but increased dramatically in the late 1990s. The business model 
literature has expanded four times faster than the dynamic capability literature, which emerged 
about the same time (Foss & Saebi 2017).  
 
Despite its rapid proliferation, the business model still lacks a definitional consistency (Zott et 
al. 2011; Wirtz et al. 2016). Although the business model is highly regarded as a useful 
managerial tool, attempts to achieve definitional uniformity have been criticised:  
 
“The definition of a business model is murky at best. Most often, it seems to refer to a 
loose conception of how a company does business and generates revenue. Yet, simply 
having a business model is an exceedingly low bar set for building a company.” (Porter 
2001, p.73) 
 
Similarly, Hedman and Kalling (2003) claim that the business model is defined according to 
its intended use, which causes excessive polarisation and insufficient grounding in theory.  
However, despite the lack of consensus regarding the definition of the business model, most 
literature is building congruence towards a comprehensive understanding of business models 
based on the notion that a business model summarises the architecture and logic of a business 
(Baden-Fuller & Morgan 2010) and defines the organisation’s value proposition and approach 
to value creation and value capture (Teece 2010a).  
 
 In general, scholars attempt to define the business model implicitly and explicitly at two levels 
of abstraction: 1) a depiction concept using terms like ‘design’, ‘tool’, ‘structure’, ‘architecture’ 
                                                
8	Bellman, R., Clark, C.E., Malcolm, D.G., Craft, C.J. & Ricciardi, F.M., 1957. On the construction of a multi-stage, multi-
person business game. Operations Research, 5(4), pp.469-503. 
9	Jones, G.M., 1960. Educators, electrons, and business models: A problem in synthesis. The Accounting Review, 35(4), p.619. 
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or ‘configuration’ and 2) a structural concept detailing the core components of a business model 
(Osterwalder & Pigneur 2005). Table 2-1 presents several commonly cited business model 
definitions and their components.  
 
Author(s) Definition Components 
 
Amit and Zott (2001) 
A business model depicts the content, 
structure and governance of 
transactions designed to create value 
through the exploitation of business 
opportunities. 
 
Transaction content, transaction 
structure, transaction governance. 
Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom (2002) 
A business model is the heuristic logic 
that connects technical potential with 
the realisation of economic value. 
Value proposition, market segment, 
revenue generation mechanisms, value 
chain, complementary assets, cost 
structure and profit potential of the 
offering, position of the firm within the 
value network of suppliers and 
customers, competitive strategy. 
 
Magretta (2002) 
Business models are stories that 
explain how enterprises work. A good 
business model answers Peter 
Drucker’s age-old questions: Who is 
the customer? What does the 
customer value? It also answers the 
fundamental questions every manager 
must ask: How do we make money in 
this business? What is the underlying 
economic logic that explains how we 
can deliver value to customers at an 
appropriate cost? 
 
Customer, customer value proposition, 
value delivery method, economic logic 
that supports delivery of value to the 
customer at an appropriate cost. 
Morris et al. (2005) 
A business model is a concise 
representation of how an interrelated 
set of decision variables concerning 
venture strategy, architecture and 
economics are addressed to create a 
sustainable competitive advantage in 
defined markets. 
 
Value proposition, customer, internal 
processes/competencies, external 
positioning, economic model, 
personal/investor factors.  
Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010) 
A business model describes the 
rationale of how an organisation 
creates, delivers and captures value. 
Customer segment, value propositions, 
channels of distribution, customer 
relationships, revenue streams, key 
resources, key activities, key network 
partnerships, cost structure. 
 
  
Teece (2010a)  
A business model articulates the logic, 
data and other evidence that support a 
value proposition for the customer and 
a viable structure of revenues and 
costs for the enterprise delivering that 
value. 
 
 
Market segment, value proposition, 
mechanism to capture value, isolating 
mechanism. 
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Zott et al. (2011)   
The business model is a system of 
interdependent activities that 
transcend the focal firm and span its 
boundaries. 
 
Transaction content, transaction 
structure, transaction governance. 
Baden-Fuller and 
Haefliger (2013) 
 
A business model is a system that 
solves the problem of identifying the 
customer(s), engaging their needs, 
delivering satisfaction and monetising 
value. 
 
Customers, customer engagement, 
value delivery and linkage, 
monetisation.  
 
Wirtz et al. (2016)  
 
A business model refers to the ability 
and extent to which the firm is able to 
create and capture value. 
Value proposition (product offering, 
service offering, pricing model), value 
creation (core competences, key 
resources, governance, complementary 
assets, value networks), value delivery 
(distribution channels, target market 
segments), value capture (revenue 
model, cost structure, profit allocation), 
and value communication 
(communication channels, ethos and 
story).  
 
Table 2-1: Commonly cited definitions of the business model 
 
 
The context for definitions of the business model may be either static or dynamic. Existing 
literature has mostly adopted a static perspective on business models. However, a more 
pragmatic approach to understanding business model development involves engagement with 
the dynamic perspective (Casadesus-Masanell et al. 2010; Cavalcante et al. 2011) because 
different components of business models dynamically interrelate (Johnson et al. 2008) and 
should allow changes whenever entrepreneurs improve their knowledge of available 
opportunities and resources (Druilhe & Garnsey 2004; Demil & Lecocq 2010). 
 
Moving away from Porter’s (2001) and Hedman and Kalling’s (2003) critics about business 
model definition being murky and inconsistent, the current thesis employs the dynamic view 
and strengthens the definitional context for the business model by reconciling relevant 
definitions and offering a comprehensive definition: a business model is an architecture of 
interdependent components of value proposition, value creation and value capture that 
dynamically exist within a networked stakeholder. 
 
This definition is deemed appropriate given the dynamism of business models, which requires 
value to be co-created for a wide range of networked stakeholders (e.g. Zott & Amit 2010). In 
this definition, business model’s depiction and components are combined. Following 
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Chesborough (2003), Richardson (2008) and Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), the key 
components of the business model includes value proposition, value creation, value capture 
and value network (see Table 2-2).  
 
Component Explanation 
Value proposition 
The technology encapsulated in a product or service that creates value for a specific 
customer. 
 
Value creation The value created for users by the product or service containing the new technology.  
Value capture 
The revenue-generating mechanisms for the USO, including the cost structure and profit 
margins of producing the product or service. 
 
Value network The network of internal and external stakeholders that makes a business model work.  
Table 2-2: Key components of business models 
 
 
The definition of business models employed in this thesis claims that both value creation and 
value capture occur in a value network. Unlike most definitions, the definition used in this 
thesis explicitly mentions the value network as it is an outward-looking conjecture that 
complements internal values. The value network includes suppliers, partners, distribution 
channels, competitors, customers and coalitions that extend the company’s resources (Hamel 
2000). By elucidating this network, the current thesis fills the gap in prior literature on business 
models, which adopted a view of value creation that separates firms as producers (e.g. 
innovators) and customers as consumers (e.g. adopters) of market offerings (Vargo & Lusch 
2011).  
 
Now that the origin and definitional context of the business model have been discussed, the 
next section will dissect current wisdom, presenting a comprehensive view of state-of-the-art 
research and highlighting the gaps in business model literature that are worth addressing.  
 
 Current Wisdom of Business Model Literature 
Discussions of the business model in the 1990s mainly occurred in the field of information 
systems and coincided with the advent of the Internet. The Internet was—and remains—one of 
the principal drivers of scholarly interest in business models (Magretta 2002; Osterwalder & 
Pigneur 2005). Beyond information systems, the concept of the business model gradually 
dispersed to strategy and management literature. The year 2000 saw a sharp increase in 
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publications on business models in the fields of information systems, strategy and management 
(Hedman & Kalling 2003; Osterwalder & Pigneur 2005). However, at that stage, the concept 
of the business model was still nascent and, as a research area, poorly understood.  
 
Ten years later, in early 2010, the three areas of interest remained relatively similar but tended 
to explicate each domain more deeply. In information systems literature, effort was made to 
understand e-business; in strategy literature, focus was placed on competitive advantage, firm 
performance and value creation; and in management literature, researchers focused on 
technology management and innovation (Zott et al. 2011). During that time, the cumulative 
development of business model literature was hampered because the concept of the business 
model was discussed in silos, resulting in heterogeneous comprehension. Scholars’ work did 
not build upon each other. 
 
Although the concept of the business model is used to address an important phenomenon, it 
lacks theoretical grounding because the concept is mostly discussed independently from 
established theories (Teece 2010a; Sosna et al. 2010). Despite being discussed in the literature 
for over 50 years, it can be argued that the business model is still undergoing consolidation 
(Foss & Saebi 2017). Scholarly work related to business model appeared to be rapidly adopted 
by strategy scholars, whose interest is partly driven by business model’s expediency for 
extending the traditional wisdom in the strategy literature. 
 
In conventional strategy literature, focus is placed on competition, value capture and 
competitive advantage. The business model extends this, involving co-operation, partnership 
and joint value creation (Magretta 2002; Mäkinen & Seppänen 2007). As a result, current 
research on business models revolves mainly around three aspects, namely, 1) the networked 
nature of value creation; 2) the relationship between business models and firm performance; 
and 3) the distinction between the business model and other strategy concepts. Since strategy 
scholars are generally interested in a firm’s activities, most business model conceptualisations 
are centred on the notion of the activity system. Zott and Amit (2010) suggest a set of 
parameters that activity system designers need to consider when developing a business model: 
its content, structure and governance.  
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Additionally, the concept of the business model involves value proposition and a generalised 
emphasis on the role of the customer, which appears to be less pronounced elsewhere in the 
strategy literature. There is a strong consensus that the business model revolves around 
customer-focused value creation (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; Mansfield & Fourie 
2004). Viewed from this perspective, the business model encompasses the firm’s pattern of 
economic exchanges with external parties (Zott & Amit 2008), and it outlines the essential 
details of a firm’s value proposition for its various stakeholders and the activity system the firm 
uses to create and deliver value to its customers (Zott & Amit 2010). 
 
As an immature but growing field of literature, the business model has been developed from 
multiple angles. Wirtz et al. (2016) argue that the phenomenon is growing in four new domains: 
innovation, change and evolution, performance and control and design. Despite failure to come 
to a consensus regarding the definition of the business model and the lack of construct clarity, 
the literature has moved towards the innovation sub-stream. Scholars like Foss and Saebi 
(2017) perform scholarly work on business model innovation and claim that business model 
innovation is gaining increasing attention among academics and practitioners. However, based 
on 150 papers published between 2000 and 2015, Foss and Saebi (2017) argue that business 
model innovation literature faces problems with respect to construct clarity and has gaps 
regarding the identification of antecedent conditions, contingencies and outcomes. These 
findings are unsurprising since the fundamental issues associated with the business model have 
not been fully resolved.  
 
The rapid growth of business model innovation literature has left the foundation of the business 
model weak; scholars hastily pursued the new sub-stream without fully answering fundamental 
questions like ‘what is a business model’, ‘how is it developed’ and ‘what roles does it play’. 
Therefore, instead of furthering the discussion of business model innovation, the current 
research seeks to strengthen the elementary comprehension of business model literature by 
investigating aspects of business model development and the role it plays in commercialising 
new technology.  
 
The previous section discussed the lack of a unified definition of the business model as a critical 
gap in the literature. Other areas of study that seem to be underexplored are the way in which 
a business model emerges and the role that it plays (Palo & Tähtinen 2013). Despite the 
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growing importance of developing a novel business model, the scarcity of empirical studies on 
business model development has hindered practical use of the concept of the business model 
(Im & Cho 2013). The limited research on business model development has a narrow focus on 
the relationships between elements of value conceptualisation and organisations in which 
business models undergo a linear development process (i.e. they are first designed and then 
implemented). There is a need to improve our understanding of the connective mechanisms 
and dynamics involved in business model development through study of networked business 
model development (Palo & Tähtinen 2013; Dmitriev et al. 2014). 
 
A search of academic papers on business model development and configuration between 1990 
and 2018 yielded only 60 papers. After a careful review, only 34 studies appeared to deal with 
business model development in a non-marginal way (i.e. they used business model 
development as the unit of analysis and explored how a business model is developed). These 
papers can be categorised as those discussing ways in which a business model is developed 
(e.g. Andries et al. 2013; Palo & Tähtinen 2013; Im & Cho 2013; Dmitriev et al. 2014; Reymen 
et al. 2017), antecedents to successful business model development (e.g. Storbacka et al. 2013) 
and framework development based on empirical results (e.g. Schillebeeckx et al. 2012; Ebel et 
al. 2016). Of these papers, only 12 explicitly deal with business model development. Spieth et 
al. (2014) note a lack of research exploring the processes involved in the design and 
implementation of business models. Thus, there is a need for extensive work to understand the 
logic behind business model development. 
 
Due to its heterogeneous development, the business model plays multifaceted roles. Based on 
the elements of a business model and how they interact as a dynamic process, Zott et al. (2011) 
posit that a business model represents a holistic approach to explaining how firms do business 
at the systemic level. Some scholars refer to a business model as a conceptual tool or model 
(Osterwalder & Pigneur 2005; George & Bock 2011), a structural template (Amit & Zott 2001) 
or a framework (Morris et al. 2005). In light of this, Chesbrough (2003) suggests that there are 
at least five roles a business model should play: 1) articulation of the value proposition; 2) 
identification of the market segment; 3) definition of the value chain; 4) specification of the 
revenue-generating mechanisms of the organisation; and 5) formulation or specification of a 
competitive strategy that will enable the organisation to gain and maintain an advantage over 
rivals that offer competing technologies.  
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Given the many roles of a business model, scholars claim that a business model is essential for 
every organisation. In particular, an organisation can benefit from a business model due to its 
ability to capture the value of new technology (Baden-Fuller & Haefliger 2013). However, 
despite its importance, this area of study has not been fully explored (Gambardella & McGahan 
2010). The next section will discuss the academic work investigating the role of the business 
model in the commercialisation of new technology. 
 
 Business Model and Technology Commercialisation 
Generally, technology commercialisation refers to the launch of a product in a defined market 
(Jolly 1997). The role of a business model in the commercialisation of technology is part of a 
broader discussion of innovation and technology management (see Zott et al. 2011). Since the 
proliferation of business model literature, much has been discussed about the role of the 
business model in unlocking the value of latent technology (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 
2002; Chesbrough 2003; Johnson et al. 2008; Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009; Baden-
Fuller & Haefliger 2013; Gaus & Raith 2016). 
 
Pioneering studies argue that bringing technology to the market for commercialisation requires 
more than scientific knowledge; rather, the process needs to be sustained by a viable business 
model that evolves in response to challenges and market needs (Chesbrough 2007). This echoes 
Schumpeter’s (1983) claim that technology push10 and market pull11 are equally pertinent entry 
points for business model development into value proposition creation (Lubik et al. 2012; 
Dmitriev et al. 2014). Business models also matter for half-polished applications sold at 
intermediate stages of development, which upstream firms license to downstream firms rather 
than developing the final product themselves (Gambardella & McGahan 2010).  
 
Scholars agree that the business model is an innovative tool that complements the traditional 
subjects of process, product and organisational innovation and involves new forms of co-
operation and collaboration. In addition to embedding technology in attractive products and 
services, a firm needs to design a unique business model to fully realise its commercial 
potential (Teece 2010b). Technological innovation alone might not be sufficient to guarantee 
                                                
10	Technology push is when research and development in new technology, drives the development of new products.   
11	Market pull is when the need/requirement for a new product or a solution to a problem comes from the market place. 
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a firm’s success (e.g. Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009) because technology per se has no 
inherent value (Chesbrough 2007). 
 
For example, based on evidence from Xerox Corporation’s technology spin-offs, Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom (2002) demonstrate that technologies might not be profitable using a 
traditional business model but may be highly rewarding when commercialised with the right 
model. According to the authors, discovery-oriented research often creates spill-over 
technologies that lack a straightforward path to the market and the business model construct 
plays a critical role in extracting value from those technologies. Chesbrough (2007, p.12) 
stresses that “[a] better business model often will beat a better idea or technology.” Further, 
Chesbrough (2010, p.354) argues that “[a] mediocre technology pursued within a great 
business model may be more valuable than a great technology exploited via a mediocre 
business model.” 
 
While the technological development associated with breakthrough innovations is truly 
challenging, creating markets to stimulate use of such innovations may be an even more 
daunting barrier to successful commercialisation (O’Connor & Rice 2013). As a result, firms 
constantly review and reiterate their business models to reach the market (Johnson et al. 2008). 
A business model is mainly seen as a mechanism that connects a firm’s innovative technology 
to customers’ needs and the firm’s resources. It is conceptually placed between a firm’s input 
resources and market outcomes, and it embodies the organisational and financial architecture 
of the business (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; Teece 2010a; Dmitriev et al. 2014).  
 
Different organisations construct different types of business models to commercialise 
technology in response to competitive landscapes. Despite the emphasis placed on the utility 
of business model for capturing value in latent technology, studies of knowledge-intensive 
organisations such as universities appear to be severely underrepresented in the literature 
(Bigdeli et al. 2016; Lubik & Garnsey 2016). Scholars mainly employ corporate and 
established firms as empirical settings, although universities are breeding grounds for new 
technology with commercial potential; Gaus and Raith (2016) and Fini et al. (2018) argue that 
most commercially viable technology originates from the university rather than corporate 
firms. In addition, Ndonzuau et al. (2002) claim that a significant proportion of the products 
and processes that are sold and used could not have been developed without academic research. 
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The scarcity of academic work on university technology commercialisation indicates the need 
for further research. Thus, the current thesis delves deeper and narrows its focus to business 
models for commercialising new technology developed in universities. Prior to examining 
previous work on business models and commercialisation of university technology, the next 
section will build a fundamental understanding of the USO phenomenon as a common way to 
commercialise university technology.  
 
2.3  Overview of University Spin-off (USO) 
USO is a vehicle for the commercialisation of the results of research performed in university 
laboratories, which contributes to economic growth (Lockett & Wright 2005; Fini et al. 2017). 
It is one of the most effective mechanisms for transferring technology between universities and 
industries (Ndonzuau et al. 2002; Markman et al. 2008). The following section provides an 
overview of the USO phenomenon and research on the use of business models for 
commercialising university technology through the creation of a USO.  
 
 USO and University Technology Commercialisation 
Research concerning USO that focuses on new technology-based firms is gaining interest 
among scholars and has been part of the academic landscape for decades12. Such research has 
led to many attempts to define a USO, hindering clarity concerning the topic. To enhance 
understanding of USOs, Table 2-3 presents commonly cited definitions. For consistency, 
current thesis adopts the definition offered by Pirnay et al. (2003), which is derived from 
extensive examination of USO typologies. 
 
Authors Definition 
Smilor et al. (1990, p.63) 
A company that is founded; 1) by a faculty member, staff member or student 
who left the university to start a company or who started the company while 
still affiliated with the university and/or 2) around a technology or 
technology-based idea developed within the university.  
Klofsten and Jones-Evans 
(2000, p.300) 
A new firm or organisation to exploit the results of the university research.  
Pirnay et al. (2003, p.356) 
A new firm created to exploit commercially some knowledge, technology or 
research results developed within a university. 
Table 2-3: Commonly cited USO definitions 
                                                
12	Cooper, A., 1971. Entrepreneurial environment. Industrial Research 1971; 74–76. 
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As a new venture, a USO is endowed with a distinct legal status as neither an extension nor a 
controlled subsidiary of the university as the parent organisation, but an autonomous structure 
pursuing profit-making activities (Pattnaik & Pandey 2014). To exploit knowledge produced 
by academic activities, a USO includes not only technological innovations or patents (Smilor 
et al. 1990) but also scientific and technical know-how accumulated by an individual during 
academic activities. 
 
From an operational point of view, a USO is established primarily to transfer (Cohen & 
Philipsen 2010) and commercialise university technology (Pattnaik & Pandey 2014). At least 
two common ways in which a USO commercialises technology are provision of an official 
platform for firms to further develop and commercialise early-stage inventions with high 
uncertainty (Etzkowitz 2003) and a mechanism to ensure the inventor’s involvement in the 
development of university technologies (Di Gregorio & Shane 2003).  
 
Scholars argue that a USO plays a crucial role in maximising the returns of IP (Lockett & 
Wright 2005) and, subsequently, contributing to regional economies (Fini et al. 2017). Through 
the formation of a USO, the commercial benefit of research is extended beyond the narrow 
confines of the academic community. In addition, a USO provides inventors with equity 
holdings more easily than established firms because the distribution of equity when a firm is 
founded does not involve transfer of equity from one individual to another, as is the case when 
equity is distributed after firm foundation.  
 
The creation of a USO is usually explained within the technology transfer discourse. Scholars 
decipher the mechanism underlying USO creation through multiple stages and lenses (see 
Ndonzuau et al. 2002; Siegel et al. 2003; Di Gregorio & Shane 2003; Vohora et al. 2004; 
Lockett & Wright 2005; Pattnaik & Pandey 2014). Building upon Siegel et al.’s (2004) work, 
the current thesis extends the technology transfer process beyond USO creation to the market 
entry stage. This is done to unify the definition of technology commercialisation to a defined 
market. Figure 2-1 illustrates the most common process of university technology 
commercialisation and the key stakeholders involved in each stage. 
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Figure 2-1: University technology commercialisation process and the key stakeholders 
involved (not necessarily in this order; see Siegel et al. 2003; Locket et al. 2005) 
 
 
The commercialisation of university technology usually commences when an academic 
inventor of a new technology discloses the invention to a TTO, which then seeks IP protection. 
Based on the limited monopoly provided by a patent, the TTO can either sell the IP, license the 
IP to established firms or create a USO to which the IP is licensed. Practically, a USO emerges 
after separation from the university, which contributes to its financial, human and intellectual 
capital. Together with other relevant intangible assets, the university also transfers to the new 
legal entity the obligations and risks associated with commercialisation of the technology 
(Pattnaik & Pandey 2014).  
Licensing the IP to established firms is the most common route for university technology 
commercialisation. In this process, an IP right holder gives another entity the authority to 
exploit the IP and, in return, the licensee pays royalties to the IP right holder (Siegel et al. 
2003). Technology licensing gives the inventor the opportunity to be less involved in 
commercial matters (Minshall et al. 2007). However, not all technology can be easily 
transacted via a licensing agreement. Furthermore, the university may not be able to capture 
the full value of technology through a licensing arrangement and therefore may seek more 
direct involvement through a USO (Franklin et al. 2001). In line with this, Ndonzuau et al. 
(2002) contend, one of the most effective ways to transfer research results to the marketplace 
is through establishment of a USO. 
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Figure 2-1 illustrates that the types of key stakeholders involved in the university technology 
commercialisation process evolve over time. As the firm transitions from the academic network 
to the commercial network, more stakeholders with different roles, motivations and cultures 
become involved (Siegel et al. 2004). Table 2-4 presents the key stakeholders involved in 
university technology commercialisation and their motives and cultures. This is by no means 
an exhaustive list of stakeholders; for example, the federal government, which funds these 
research projects, can also be viewed as a stakeholder. 
 
Stakeholder Action Primary motive Secondary motive Culture 
Academic inventor 
Discovers new 
technology  
 
Recognition within 
the scientific 
community - 
publications, grants  
Financial gain  Scientific 
TTO Structures deal 
Protection and 
marketing of the 
technology 
Facilitation of 
technological 
diffusion  
Bureaucratic 
USO entrepreneur 
Commercialises 
new technology  
 
Financial gain 
Maintenance of 
control over 
proprietary 
technologies 
Entrepreneurial 
Investor, venture 
capitalist (VC) 
Allocates capital to 
the USO Financial gain 
Provision of short-
term financial 
support to the USO 
Business 
Supplier, partner, 
customer, 
competitor  
Adds, delivers, 
receives, reduces 
value 
 
Financial gain Engagement in the value chain Business 
Table 2-4: Key stakeholders involved in university technology commercialisation (See 
Siegel 2004) 
 
 
 Business Model and University Technology Commercialisation 
As previously discussed, research on business models and commercialisation of technology is 
gaining attention in mainstream literature, but it has been mostly investigated in corporate 
settings. Scholars like Dagonova and Eyquem-Renult (2009), Lehoux et al. (2014), Dmitriev 
et al. (2014), Bohnsack et al. (2014) and Reymen et al. (2017) seek to investigate the evolution 
of the business model in the new corporate venture setting. In addition, Demil and Lecoq (2010) 
and Sitoh et al. (2014) advance the understanding of how a business model plays a role in 
technology commercialisation in the context of an established firm. However, similar research 
conducted at the university setting is scarce.  
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A systematic literature review between 1990 until 2018 returned only eight papers discussing 
business models and technology commercialisation in the university context (Table 2-5). These 
papers can be divided into studies focusing on business models’ evolution (e.g. Druilhe & 
Garnsey 2004; Lubik & Garnsey 2016; Bigdeli et al. 2016), role (e.g. Gaus & Raith 2016), 
antecedents (e.g. McAdam et al. 2017) and those that merely employ the business model as a 
lens with which to conceptually understand related issues (e.g. Mustar et al. 2006; Patton 2014; 
Still 2017). Still, very few studies explicitly investigate the efficacy of business models for 
commercialising university technology in the USO setting (e.g. Druilhe & Garnsey 2004; 
Mustar et al. 2006; Lubik & Garnsey 2016; Bigdeli et al. 2016).  
 
Author(s) Research objective Unit of analysis 
Unit of 
observation  
Lubik and Garnsey 
(2016) 
 
To investigate how USOs’ business models 
often develop by trial-and-error in response 
to their unique challenges. 
 
USO Business model evolution 
Bigdeli et al. (2016) 
To examine the evolution of USOs’ 
business models throughout different 
development phases. 
 
USO 
Business model 
evolution 
 
Druilhe and Garnsey 
(2004) 
To explore the typologies of companies that 
originate in universities. USO 
Business model 
evolution  
Mustar et al. (2006) To develop a taxonomy of USOs.  USO 
Business model 
antecedents 
 
Gaus and Raith (2016) 
To analyse how an entrepreneurial 
university creates, delivers and captures 
value by characterising its business model. 
 
University Business model role 
Still (2017) 
To explore how the lean start-up paradigm, 
which validates the market for a product 
with a business model, can sustain 
subsequent scaling. 
 
University Business model antecedents 
McAdam et al. (2017) 
To explore how greater engagement with 
industry and end users has influenced 
the TTO business model. 
 
TTO 
Business model 
antecedents 
 
Patton et al. (2014) 
To analyse and evaluate the potential of 
incubation for strengthening the business 
model of new technology firms. 
 
University 
incubators 
Business model 
antecedents 
 
Table 2-5: Academic papers discussing business models and university technology 
commercialisation 
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The literature examining business models in relation to university technology 
commercialisation is sparse for several reasons. First, investigations of business models within 
the domain of strategic entrepreneurship represent a new stream of research (Demil et al. 2015). 
In addition, study of business models in relation to the commercialisation of university 
technology has recently emerged as a hybrid between two established streams of literature: 
business model literature and university technology commercialisation literature. Hence, 
research on business models in relation to university technology commercialisation became 
more visible in the mainstream literature only recently (e.g. Lubik & Garnsey 2016; Bigdeli et 
al. 2016).  
 
Second, scholars often fail to separate USO from corporate and established firms and hence 
assume that USO faces challenges similar to those of corporate and established firms (Druilhe 
& Garnsey 2004). Yet, universities are distinct in that they initially operate in a non-
commercial context (Rasmussen et al. 2011). As a result, recommendations made regarding 
business models’ use for technology commercialisation in other settings are not directly 
applicable to the USO context (Lubik & Garnsey 2016). In the same spirit, Still (2017), Nelson 
(2014) and Garud et al. (2014) argue that the organisational context shapes decisions to engage 
in entrepreneurship and approaches to commercialisation. Third, USOs face multifaceted 
challenges and are prone to failure. As a result, empirical data with which to study business 
model development are limited and difficult to obtain. Therefore, only a relatively small 
number of studies aim to understand the development of a business model for university 
technology commercialisation in response to the unique challenges (Mustar et al. 2008). 
 
The few studies focusing on the development of business models for technology 
commercialisation agree that business models are key to unlocking the value of immature 
university technology (e.g. Gaus & Raith 2016). Additionally, they argue that business models 
are developed through a dynamic (e.g. Dmitriev et al. 2014) and iterative or trial-and-error 
process (e.g. Demil & Lecocq 2010; Sosna et al. 2010).  
 
Dmitriev et al. (2014) investigate the connective mechanisms and dynamics involved in the 
development of business models for commercialising innovations. They contend that specific 
elements of business model development that involve the conceptualisation of value and 
organisation for value creation are integrated in the dynamic and cyclical process of 
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commercialisation of technological innovations. More recent work by Lubik and Garnsey 
(2016) aims to identify the appropriate business models for USOs attempting to commercialise 
generic technologies. They argue that business models are often developed by trial-and-error 
in response to unique challenges. Lubik and Garnsey’s (2016) findings echo those of Sosna et 
al. (2010) and Cavalcante et al. (2011), who argue that a firm’s business model should fulfil 
two interlinked purposes: to provide stability for development of a firm’s activities and to be 
flexible enough to allow for change.  
 
Inspired by Penrosian’s resource-based view13 and Vohora et al.’s USO development phases14, 
Demil and Lecoq (2010) and Bigdeli et al. (2016) argue that business model development 
evolves as a process of fine-tuning process of permanently linked core components. They find 
that firm sustainability depends on anticipation of and reaction to sequences of voluntary and 
emerging change. In parallel with this, Chesbrough (2010, p.356) suggests that business model 
development “. . . is not a matter of superior foresight ex ante – rather, it requires significant 
trial-and-error, and quite a bit of adaptation ex post.” 
 
Scholarly efforts to promote a more iterative method of technology commercialisation have 
pragmatically moved away from the conventional commercialisation process, which promotes 
a linear go/no-go process (e.g. Hindle & Yencken 2004). Modern literature mostly adopts the 
perspective of dynamic business model development. Markman et al. (2008) claim that private 
universities are championing technology commercialisation because of its agility at the 
commercialisation stage. This notion suggests that a flexible business model allows firms to 
test an assumption, rapidly adapt to the business model and create a foundation for 
commercialisation. Likewise, Chesbrough (2003) and Clarysse et al. (2011)  posit that, to 
identify the value of new technology, effective USO governance should promote 
experimentation and adaptation in response to highly uncertain environments.  
 
While most studies agree that a USO business model is developed through an iterative process, 
very few scholars explicitly examine how the iterative process unfolds (Andries et al. 2013; 
Sitoh et al. 2014), and the extent to which a USO can influence the process is still debated. 
                                                
13	Penrose, E., 1959. The theory of the growth of the firm. New York, JohnWiley & Sons. 
14	Vohora, A., Wright, M. and Lockett, A., 2004. Critical junctures in the development of university high-tech spinout 
companies. Research policy, 33(1), pp.147-175. 
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Although Andries et al. (2013) and Sitoh et al. (2014) do not use USOs as empirical settings, 
their findings shed light on current research. Both adopt Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation and 
causation theory as a theoretical lens. Their findings navigate current research, adopting 
appropriate established theory to understand the iterative process. Consideration of how 
business models are iteratively developed for commercialisation also raises questions regarding 
how new technologies will meet the market’s needs. 
 
With regards to the discussion about the commercialisation of new technology that satisfy 
market needs, Lehoux et al. (2014) analyse how USO respond to the market needs. They sought 
to address the value expectations of users and capital investors and how business models and 
technology designs influence each other. At the early-stage of USO development, business 
models are reframed and refined for various reasons. First, this occurs as a reactive or proactive 
response to changing market needs. Second, the business model is seen as a market device that 
allows entrepreneurs to explore a market and plays a performative role by contributing to the 
construction of the techno-economic network of an innovation. In this sense, business models 
are developed in response to market needs (Still 2017).  
 
Bohnsack et al. (2014) discuss how business models transform the specific characteristics of 
sustainable technologies to create economic value and overcome the barriers to market 
penetration and how incumbent and entrepreneurial firms’ path dependencies have affected the 
evolution of business models for electric vehicles. Still (2017) uses a lean start-up paradigm 
that validates the market for a product with a business model that can sustain subsequent 
scaling, which has led to use of a new process model to accelerate innovation. It is known that 
a USO should proactively interact with the market while developing a business model. 
However, the way in which market needs are validated is less adequately addressed. Still 
(2017) argues that the phase of value proposition discovery is less understood and that the 
phase of growth discovery, which emphasises building of a scalable, sustainable business, is 
not addressed by innovation approaches from the research context.  
 
Although the myriad of study concerning business model and technology commercialisation 
has been instrumental in informing current thesis investigation, they are not sufficient to 
respond to the peculiar challenges faced by USOs in commercialising university technology. 
As compared to other types of firms, a USO faces all the challenges encountered by other firms 
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with added obstacles stemming from the low technology readiness level (TRL), conflicts 
among academic and commercial stakeholders, the urgent need to monetise the licensed IP 
within a designated period and strict licensing agreement. Table 2-6 depicts a comparison of 
commercialisation challenges faced by an established firm, a generic start-up, a technology 
start-up and a USO.
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Firm
s / typical com
m
ercialisation 
challenges 
M
arket 
uncertainty 
Liability of 
new
ness 
Product 
validation 
Technological 
uncertainty 
Low
 
technology 
readiness 
level (TR
L) 
A
cadem
ic 
/com
m
ercial 
stakeholders 
conflict 
M
onetisation 
of IP 
IP licensing 
agreem
ent 
Established firm
s 
(an established firm
 that has 
positioned itself in a defined 
m
arket) 
Ö 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
G
eneric start-up  
(a new
 firm
 created to address a 
m
arket need through a 
com
m
ercially viable 
product/service) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Technology start-up 
(a new
 firm
 created to address a 
m
arket need through a 
com
m
ercially viable technological 
solution) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
- 
- 
- 
- 
U
SO
 
(a new
 firm
 created to exploit 
com
m
ercially som
e know
ledge, 
technology or research results 
developed w
ithin a university) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Table 2-6: Comparison of commercialisation challenges faced by an established firm, a generic start-up, a technology start-up and USO.
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Since a USO is a unique type of firm (Druilhe & Garnsey 2004) that faces specific obstacles 
to commercialisation (Bigdeli et al. 2016), business models must be understood in a different 
way (Lubik & Garnsey 2016). In this thesis, to understand the strategy underpinning 
development of a viable business model to commercialise university technology, the challenges 
faced by a USO across business model components are explored. Following that, current 
wisdom regarding the measures used to disentangle the identified problems is reviewed.  
 
2.4 Unique Challenges Concerning Business Model Development 
Early in its formative years, a USO must develop its technology while finding the appropriate 
market to plot its course. At this stage, a new firm needs to cope with the various challenges 
stemming from its nascent status (Aldrich & Fiol 1994) and overcome difficulties that are 
unique to USOs, such as technological immaturity (Lehoux et al. 2014), market uncertainty 
(Etzkowitz et al. 2000), conflicts between stakeholders with different motives (Siegel et al. 
2003) and long time to market (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009).  
 
In the USO context, technology is usually limited to low technology readiness levels (TRLs; 
TRL1 to TRL2) when it is first discovered and may not be validated beyond the laboratory 
environment (TRL4) (Minshall et al. 2007). As depicted in Figure 2-2, a USO usually has a 
long way to go before it can create value and place value in products or services for potential 
customers (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009). This is evident at all stages of the 
development of new laboratory discoveries into commercial reality (i.e. ideation, prototyping 
and commercialisation) and produces barriers that affect technology development and, 
eventually, commercialisation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Technology readiness level (See Mankins 1995) 
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In response to these challenges, a viable business model is warranted. However, for a USO, 
developing a business model is a strenuous pursuit in itself and is partly exacerbated by the 
lack of a reference business model for a similar technology (Pries & Guild 2011; Lehoux et al. 
2014) and a lack of industrial perspective (McAdam et al. 2017). Therefore, it is crucial to 
carefully identify the difficulties faced by USOs that directly affect the business model 
development process. To this end, business model value components are grouped into three 
main blocks based on the main challenges facing each segment: value proposition and value 
creation, value capture as well as value network. The following section explores the distinct 
challenges facing USOs that directly affect business model development across these three 
blocks. 
 
 Challenges Concerning Value Proposition and Value Creation 
At its commercial infancy, a USO is at a disadvantage for creating value and embedding it in 
a proposition due to the liability of newness (Karlsson & Wigren 2012) and premature offerings 
(Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009). Hence, technology needs to achieve a high TRL before 
the value is apparent (Minshall et al. 2007). As a USO slowly begins to gather resources, create 
value and move to higher TRLs, it faces resistance to adoption of new technology. As 
previously noted by scholars, creating value from technology is not simply a matter of 
managing resource constraints and technical uncertainty; one must also consider the inherent 
uncertainty within the economic domain due to market ambiguity (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 
2002).  
 
As a result, creating value and embedding it in a proposition for a difficult market resemble a 
bigger set of challenges that a USO must overcome. The persistent gap between value creation 
and adoption complicates the encapsulation of value in a proposition. This is jointly caused by 
legitimate resistance to change, sceptical customers and high market inertia, which can be 
termed ‘market resistance’ (Bond & Houston 2003). Indeed, market resistance to a new idea 
has a long academic history. Schumpeter (1934, p.87) describes the phenomenon as “... social 
ostracism and finally to physical prevention or to direct attack.” 
 
Many potential customers shy away from new technology because it tends to interrupt existing 
routines. In fact, the nature of any market is to prefer equilibrium and resist new ideas. To a 
great extent, the networked players within an equilibrium market usually erect formidable 
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barriers to the adoption of new technology (Chakravorti 2004). Given this, firms like USOs are 
known to provide insufficient incentive for customers to adopt or switch to new technologies. 
Additionally, new products usually rest outside customers’ routines and, hence, have increased 
apparent risk. Radical innovations are even riskier; they are outside a customer’s cognitive 
space and their attributes are difficult to understand, let alone value (Aldrich & Fiol 1994; 
Anderson & Gatignon 2008). 
 
As commonly acknowledged in the literature, value creation for any firm involves finding 
novel ways to create value and satisfy market needs (Zott et al. 2011; Velu 2017). Schumpeter 
(1983) argues that the entry point to value proposition and value creation is either technology 
or market needs. However, in the USO context, technology is usually discovered prior to 
analysing the market needs (if there are any), and therefore, they tend to be more strongly 
oriented towards technology (Markman et al. 2008; Lubik et al. 2012). In most cases, the 
market is ambiguous and beset with resistance.  
 
Since successful value creation can only be embedded in a viable proposition adopted by 
customers, a deeper understanding of how a USO can creatively create value and become an 
advocate for change is needed. Despite this, there seems to be inadequate understanding of how 
the process takes place. Furthermore, new ventures generally have limited foresight about the 
future, preventing them from making predictions (Kim & Mauborgne 1999). The underlying 
questions of how a USO moves to a higher TRL and how the market can generate need for a 
new technology warrant exploration. In summary, a way to significantly improve value 
creation and promote rapid adoption in the face of market resistance needs to be developed. 
 
 Challenges Concerning Value Capture  
In the business model development process, value creation and value capture are highly 
interlinked. However, when value is created, a reward does not necessarily follow, which 
means that value creation and value capture are mutually exclusive (Amit & Zott 2001). 
Likewise, technology does not create wealth on its own (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002). 
Rather, the products generated by application of technological inventions through 
commercialisation create wealth (Vohora et al. 2004). In a similar vein, scholars argue that 
university technology, although perceived to be theoretically ground-breaking, is still far from 
the end customer (Lubik & Garnsey 2016).  
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The value capture of a new technology is directly related to the ability of the USO to match the 
new technological solution to the market need. As Bower and Christensen (1996) argue, as 
long as there remains incompatibility between the offering and market needs, technologically 
interesting propositions can only excite the market and never generate profits. However, in the 
USO context, the value capture strategy is not immediately obvious at the USO’s commercial 
infancy due to the incompatibility between the unclear offering and the ambiguous market. 
Unlike other types of companies that carry on traditions, the way a USO should capture value 
is distinct. As a new entrant to the market, a USO usually needs to carve out a new space in the 
market, raise capital from sceptical sources, recruit untrained employees and devise a new way 
to generate income (Aldrich & Fiol 1994).  
 
For a USO, operations and potential entries to value capture are usually tightly linked to 
monetisation of the firm’s core IP. The latent value of the IP licensed to a USO need to be 
realised immediately. The longer a firm takes to market the IP, the more likely that the firm 
will not be able to maximise profits, which exposes the USO to more risk prior to 
commercialisation (Vohora et al. 2004; Gaus & Raith 2016). Stakeholders’ expectation that a 
technological solution will be rapidly converted into a commercially viable product gives the 
USO less flexibility to explore potential revenue models beyond immediate application of the 
technology (Rasmussen et al. 2011). 
 
Apart from the aforementioned challenges, a USO is also expected to generate quick, 
alternative and sufficient income to fund pre-commercialisation operations (Vohora et al. 
2004). Even when the technology is ready for the market, a USO must find a way to capture 
enough value to cover the high cost of R&D despite having little control over the market price 
of the technology (Jensen & Thursby 2001). When getting a product into customers’ hands, a 
USO must often reconcile uncertainty regarding profit and risk regarding loss; setting the price 
too high would not attract customers and setting the price too low would impede growth. The 
trade off between price and perceived value requires further investigation.  
 
While disentangling this issue from value capture, the literature suggests that incremental 
technology commercialisation should aim to penetrate an existing market (Pattnaik & Pandey 
2014), while radical technology commercialisation should aim to create a new market (King & 
Tucci 2002). How
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most firms treat it as an afterthought to value creation (McGrath 2010). However, this should 
not necessarily be the case because delayed decision making could lengthen the amount of time 
to market, lose revenue and lead to a lack of VC investment (Vohora et al. 2004).  
 
This resulted in another vexing issue: understanding how a USO captures value when the firm 
faces difficulties related to the pressure of rapid technological monetisation, the urgent need to 
realise the value of the core IP, financial pressure to fund immature operations, limited control 
over the market price and a weak charging strategy. The myriad challenges related to financial 
pressure offer few opportunities for a USO to capture value. Since the wealth of research could 
not clarify this issue, a pragmatic approach for a USO to capture value despite financial 
pressure is needed. 
 
 Challenges Concerning Value Network 
When establishing a value network to commercialise a new technology, a USO needs to 
transition from the academic network to the commercial network. In doing so, the firm 
encounters weak support mechanisms beset with conflicts of interest, value, culture and motive 
among key stakeholders at the individual and organisational levels at both the front and back 
ends of the commercialisation phase (Siegel et al. 2003; Clarysse & Moray 2004; Miller et al. 
2014).  
 
There are many asymmetric motives and cultures related to technology commercialisation. For 
example, academic inventors are concerned about gaining scientific recognition and less 
interested in commercialisation (Lam 2010), TTOs safeguard universities’ IP through 
bureaucratic policies (Siegel et al. 2003), investors only participate at late stages of 
commercialisation (Clarysse & Moray 2004) and entrepreneurs pursue monetisation of 
technologies purely for financial gain (Siegel et al. 2004). Negativity, including mistrust and 
scepticism among stakeholders, further polarises motives for commercialisation (Gümüsay & 
Bohné 2018). Indeed, a USO is characterised by dynamic interactions between complex 
stakeholders (Clarysse & Moray 2004) trying to exert disparate influences on the 
commercialisation process (Vohora et al. 2004). The rigid dichotomy related to engagement in 
commercialisation of a technology raises tension and translates into blockages to technology 
commercialisation (O’Shea et al. 2005).  
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Despite conflicting motives, a USO still needs to rapidly strengthen its internal value network 
and establish trustworthy relationships with external stakeholders (Siegel et al. 2003; Lehoux 
et al. 2014). Miller et al (2014) contend that a business model is developed as a result of 
multiple stakeholders’ influences. In addition, external pressure is regarded as a main driver of 
business model development  (Chesbrough 2007; Zott & Amit 2010). Further, a USO is 
dependent on the support of venture capitalists, who tend to foster short-term financial growth 
(Ackerly et al. 2008), and as a new firm, a USO cannot easily avoid conflicts because they 
mostly occur with long-standing stakeholders that have strategic importance to USO 
commercialisation. 
 
Few studies have explicitly focused on USOs’ ability to manage business networks with 
conflicting values. Although the literature has identified the key role of USO stakeholders in 
the development of business models (Vohora et al. 2004; Miller et al. 2014) and how tensions 
are detrimental to the commercialisation progress (O’Shea et al. 2005), limited research has 
investigated the alignment of significant commitments from stakeholders with conflicting 
interests. Thus, it is necessary to determine how a USO manages stakeholders with conflicting 
values. In light of this, deeper examination of how a USO could minimise divergent interests 
and values among stakeholders is warranted.  
 
The following section will discuss previous work that responded to the aforementioned 
challenges and highlight the remaining gap related to the development of a business model for 
commercialising new university technology.  
 
2.5 The Remaining Gap  
Although multiple theoretical and conceptual lenses have been proposed to understand the 
development of a business model for commercialising new technology, including Vohora’s 
USO creation process perspective15 (Clarysse et al. 2011), Penrosian’s resource-based view16 
(Demil & Lecocq 2010), the dynamic perspective17 (Dmitriev et al. 2014), path dependence18 
(Bohnsack et al. 2014) and the lean start-up19 (Still 2017), there is still an obvious gap 
                                                
15	A process to create a USO by overcoming several critical junctures. 
16 A managerial framework used to determine the strategic resources with the potential to deliver comparative advantage. 
17	A connective mechanism and dynamic involved in business model development.  
18 A tendency to become committed to develop in certain ways due to structural properties, beliefs and/or values. 
19 An approach to creating and managing start-ups and get a desired product to customers' hands faster. 
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concerning how a USO develops its business model in response to the unique challenges it 
faces. Scholars agree that the business model itself is an interlocking system of values with 
reinforcing effect  that arises in a value network (Hamel 2000). Therefore, the difficulties faced 
by a USO in establishing value would affect other value components (Lockett & Wright 2005). 
 
Past work recognised the unique challenges associated with USO technology 
commercialisation. In response to challenges at the macro level (within the marketplace) and 
micro level (within the firm), the process of developing a business model for commercialisation 
of new technology is said to take shape iteratively through trial-and-error process (e.g. 
Chesbrough 2010; Holloway & Sebastio 2010; Sosna et al. 2010; Trimi & Berbegal-Mirabent 
2012). McGrath (2010) claims that high market uncertainty requires an exploratory and 
experimental approach because most decisions related to commercialisation are made on the 
fly.   
 
While these findings have been useful for advancing our understanding of the iterative nature 
of business model development, a more important question that remains to be answered is how 
the iterative process unfolds in response to market resistance, financial pressure and conflicting 
stakeholders. Furthermore, although research implies that a USO’s reaction to exogenous 
pressures shapes how a business model is developed, there seem to be few investigations of 
how value is created, captured and, eventually, embedded in a proposition when the technology 
is nascent, the market is ambiguous and resistance to new technology is high.  
 
Lubik and Garnsey (2016) claim that USOs require different approaches to development of 
business models in response to the unique challenges they face. However, scholars are 
precluded from formulating well-grounded explanations of business models for 
commercialising university technology due to the insufficiency of empirical investigations 
(Schneider & Spieth 2013). Moreover, the majority of academic literature discusses iterative 
development of business models to commercialise new technology in the backdrop of validated 
technology or a ready market (e.g. Chesbrough 2010; Demil & Lecocq 2010; Bohnsack et al. 
2014).  
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Thus, there is a clear need to clarify business model development within the transitional phases 
of USO development, particularly the commercialisation stage, and better understand how a 
USO develops its business model in response to specific challenges. Although the antecedents 
to development of a viable business model are known, how the process unfolds in the face of 
high market resistance, financial pressure and conflicting stakeholders is black-boxed. 
 
As thoroughly discussed, what is known about the USO business model development process 
is that 1) a business model is key for bringing new technology from the laboratory to the 
market; 2) business model components resemble an interlocking system in which a change in 
one component affects another; 3) the main components of business models are configured 
iteratively and 4) to develop a viable business model, a USO needs to specifically address 
challenges to value proposition, value creation, value capture and value network. All these 
notions are graphically illustrated in Figure 2-3 and will be used to guide data collection and 
operationalisation of the research.  
 
 
Figure 2-3: Knowledge about business model development for commercialisation of new 
university technology 
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Since previous studies could only provide fragmentary explanations to the phenomenon under 
investigation, this thesis seeks a plausible theoretical explanation of the issue. Six established 
and relevant theories that could supplement the partial knowledge about business model 
development for the commercialisation of new university technology (Figure 2-3) were 
examined based on their utility in addressing issues such as resource management, competitive 
advantage, changing environment, early-stage iterative process, technological uncertainty, 
market uncertainty, market creation through commercialisation and firm’s flexibility towards 
goals. The theories and conceptual lens explored were Penrosian’s resource-based view, 
Teece’s dynamic capability, Pierson’s path dependence, Vargo and Lush’s service-dominant 
logic, Still’s lean start-up and Sarasvathy’s effectuation. A closer examination (Table 2-7) 
revealed that Sarasvathy’s effectuation logic deemed to be the most promising theory to be 
employed in addressing the question of ‘How does a USO develop its early-stage business 
models to commercialise new technology?’ The following sections will explain -in greater 
depth- the practical relevance of effectuation logic for determining how a USO develops a 
business model for technology commercialisation. 
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Theory and  
conceptual lens/  
issue addressed 
R
esource 
m
anagem
ent 
 
C
om
petitive 
advantage 
C
hanging 
environm
ent 
Early-stage 
iterative 
process 
Technological 
uncertainty 
M
arket 
uncertainty 
M
arket 
creation  
Flexibility 
tow
ards goal 
Penrosian’s resource-
based view
 
(a m
anagerial fram
ew
ork 
to determ
ine the resources 
for com
petitive advantage) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Teece’s dynam
ic capability  
(a theory of com
petitive 
advantage in rapidly 
changing environm
ents) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Pierson’s path dependence 
(a decision-m
aking logic 
based on past know
ledge 
trajectory) 
 
- 
- 
Ö 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Vargo and Lush’s service 
dom
inant logic  
(a fram
ew
ork to explain 
value creation, through 
exchange, am
ong 
configurations of actors) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Still’s lean start-up  
(a scientific approach to 
get a desired product to 
custom
ers' hands faster) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
- 
- 
Sarasvathy’s effectuation  
(a decision-m
aking logic 
based on the utilisation of 
a given set of m
eans to 
achieve flexible goals) 
 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Ö 
Table 2-7: Potential theories and conceptual lens to supplement current understanding about business model development for the 
commercialisation of new university technology
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2.6  Theoretical Lens 
This section begins by describing the origin of effectuation theory, what it entails, state-of-the-
art for effectual business model development and its merits as well as limitations as the 
theoretical lens of the current research. It then discusses how the concept of opportunity 
creation supplements effectual logic’s limitations regarding advancement of the understanding 
of the decision-making process for commercialising new technology. The section concludes 
by presenting premises related to effectual logic and the concept of opportunity creation to 
guide the investigation in this research.  
 
 Effectual Logic 
Effectual logic is part of the new wave of strategic entrepreneurship discourse concerning how 
entrepreneurial opportunities are pursued. Historically, the traditional entrepreneurial decision-
making process was strictly described as a goal-driven entrepreneurial pursuit, and 
opportunities were pursued objectively with a well-defined goal (e.g. Chandler & Jansen 1992). 
This method of goal-driven entrepreneurial pursuit is also referred to as causation logic by 
Sarasvathy (2001), the discovery approach by Alvarez and Barney (2007) and the classic 
approach by Shah and Tripsas (2007). 
 
In the last decade, many scholars have begun to realise that a linear approach encapsulates only 
a fraction of the strategic entrepreneurship discourse. Scholars argue that entrepreneurs do not 
necessarily use the goal-driven approach to gain a competitive advantage. Rather, they perform 
a means-driven process and become more pragmatic when looking for opportunities to employ 
their actual and limited resources in creative ways, involve different stakeholders along the 
way and ultimately develop a new product or service that creates value for their customers 
(Sarasvathy 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew 2005). This process is often analogised to building rather 
than discovering a mountain. 
 
Following this literature, a paradigmatic shift in the theoretical perspective occurred and 
scholars began to contrast their own traditional ideologies with alternative ways in which 
opportunity creation could be understood. For example, Sarasvathy (2001) cognitively 
contrasts causal logic and its antipodal, termed ‘effectuation theory’ or ‘effectual logic’. 
Alvarez and Barney (2007) contrast the discover approach with the creation approach, and 
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Shah and Tripsas (2007) contrast the classic approach with user entrepreneurship. Unlike these 
scholars, who juxtapose their own ideas, Baker and Nelson (2005) employ anthropology 
literature20 to discuss the same phenomenon, which they term ‘entrepreneurial bricolage’ to 
describe the means-driven process as creation from a diverse range of available elements. 
Among these theoretical perspectives, Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation and Baker and 
Nelson’s (2005) entrepreneurial bricolage are most widely cited. Although both viewpoints 
complement each other, effectual logic offers a robust explanation of the creation of new 
ventures under uncertainty and, hence, offers stronger theoretical grounding for modern 
literature. Since it was proposed, Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation has gained scholarly interest.  
 
Sarasvathy (2001) claims that, unlike causal logic, which takes a given effect and selects 
between means to create that effect, effectuation processes take a given set of means and select 
between possible effects that can be created with that set of means. Causation invokes search 
and select tactics, and causal thinkers believe, “[i]f I can predict the future, I can control it” 
(Sarasvathy 2001, p.18). Contradictorily, effectuation employs creative and transformative 
tactics through a heuristics approach (Sarasvathy & Dew 2005), and effectual thinkers believe, 
“[i]f I can control the future, I do not need to predict it” (Sarasvathy 2001, p.18). 
 
Based on Sarasvathy’s (2001) study, Sarasvathy and Dew (2005) outline five principles 
underlying effectual logic. First, it begins with given means and goals. Second, it focuses on 
affordable loss rather than expected returns. Third, it emphasises competitive analysis or 
strategic alliances and pre-commitments. Fourth, it explores pre-existing knowledge or 
leverages environmental contingencies. Fifth, it seeks to influence the future rather than 
predicting it. The process of effectual logic is depicted in Figure 2-4 below. 
 
                                                
20 Lévi-Strauss, C., 1966. Anthropology: Its achievements and future. Current Anthropology, 7(2), pp.124-127. 
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Figure 2-4: A dynamic model of effectual logic (Sarasvathy & Dew 2005) 
 
 
Although it is a young phenomenon, effectual logic has been extended beyond its conventional 
context (Perry et al. 2012). While rooted in the entrepreneurship domain, it may also be 
possible and useful to see how it works in other domains, such as strategy (Wiltbank et al. 
2006), marketing (Read et al. 2009) and R&D management (Brettel et al. 2012).  
 
A systematic literature review of effectual business model development for the period between 
1990 until 2018 using five databases returned only 28 results. All the retrieved academic papers 
were critically reviewed, and only 14 papers were identified to employ effectuation as a 
theoretical backbone to explicitly and implicitly advance the understanding of business model 
development and innovation (e.g. Chesbrough 2010; Andries et al. 2013; Sitoh et al. 2014; 
Velu & Jacob 2016; Reymen et al. 2017; Futterer et al. 2018). Some scholars strive to 
investigate effectual business model development as a secondary pursuit, while their primary 
pursuit is to use effectuation to understand new venture creation (Becker et al. 2015), 
uncertainty delimitation (Grichnik et al. 2016) and market creation (Holloway & Sebastio 
2010).  
 
As expected, none of the literature examines effectual business model development in the USO 
context. Although the scholarly discourse has suggested that effectuation is instrumental to 
business model development and innovation, specific knowledge about effectual business 
model development in relation to university technology commercialisation is lacking, and the 
limited knowledge that does exist is scattered among different literature streams. Of the 14 
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academic papers reviewed, very few scholars attempt to reconcile business model development 
and effectuation constructs into technology commercialisation discourse.  
 
Chesbrough (2010) is among the pioneers proposing effectuation theory as a promising 
perspective with which to understand business model innovation. He argues that, to 
commercialise new technologies, conflicts with existing assets and business models need to be 
minimised and the understanding of barriers to business model innovation needs to be 
maximised. In support of his view, Reymen et al. (2017) argue that, to avoid the high costs 
associated with business model re-configuration, technological and market uncertainty need to 
be reduced in an effectual manner. Futterer et al. (2018) describe the effectiveness of 
effectuation at different levels of industry growth. In addition, Teece (2010a) argues that the 
firm is the central actor in effectuation of innovation and technological change.  
 
Andries et al. (2013) on the other hand, claim that a business model is developed using two 
approaches: causally, through focused commitment, and effectually, through simultaneous 
experimentation. Both are worthwhile pursuits, but they are mutually exclusive and often 
associated with adverse risk to a firm’s growth and survival. Striking a balance between the 
effectuation and causation logics, Becker et al. (2015) propose an integrative view of dynamic 
multi-stage new venture emergence to show how these approaches can be matched with the 
life cycle stage of an emerging venture. This finding aligns with earlier work by Sitoh et al. 
(2014) arguing that effectuation and causation can co-exist and are configured in specific ways 
during different phases of new product creation.  
 
As previously mentioned, effectuation theory is structured according to five principles, which 
most literature ardently adopt (e.g. Qureshi et al. 2016). However, there seems to be less work 
that explicates or extends the principles based on empirical findings. Deeper empirical 
examination of each principle is also scarce but warranted.  
 
Generally, the literature discusses causal and effectual logics concurrently during empirical 
discourse (e.g. Andries et al 2013; Sitoh et al. 2014; Becker 2015). Current theory endorses 
effectual logic as an explanation for a firm’s starting point. When the firm gets closer to its 
goal and acquires sufficient resources, it gradually switches from effectual logic to causal logic 
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(Chesbrough 2010; Reymen et al. 2017; Futterer et al. 2018). The transition from effectual to 
causal logic is the heart of Sarasvathy’s (2001) earlier work.  
This intuitive finding, although novel, seems to have gained universal acceptance and saturated 
research. Rather than contributing imperceptibly to the conventional theoretical debate, the 
current thesis seeks to examine the issue by drilling deeper into the effectual logic. Likewise, 
effectuation opens windows to more interesting exploration because it does not merely validate 
the universal applicability of the causation and effectuation based models of entrepreneurship 
but it also enhances the pragmatism of a theory. Additionally, the effectiveness of effectuation 
when resources are not just constrained, but almost completely lacking, such as in a USO 
setting, has not been well explored. 
 
 The Merit of Effectual Logic as a Theoretical Lens 
Effectuation has attained widespread attention as a logic with which to understand the 
mechanism of artefact creation. Scholars use the term ‘artefact’ to refer to a new venture 
(Harms & Schiele 2012), new market (O’Connor & Rice 2013) or new business model 
(Reymen et al. 2017). Since effectuation is a promising approach to ‘demystify entrepreneurial 
decision making by describing how strategies emerge through the use of specific cognitive 
approaches’ (Dew et al. 2008, p.320), the current thesis uses effectual logic as a basis for 
uncovering how business models are developed for commercialising university technology. 
Effectuation logic is useful as a theoretical lens for three reasons. 
 
First, effectuation logic corresponds to the gap highlighted in the business model literature 
concerning weak theoretical grounding (Porter 2001; Hedman & Kalling 2003; Teece 2010a). 
Gaining clarity for business model development is an age-old problem, but there is still limited 
research being done to theoretically understand how a USO develops a business model in 
response to the unique challenges it faces. In an attempt to start a new venture and, potentially, 
create a new market, a USO could follow the well-established process of effectual logic. 
Moreover, effectuation has been proven to be useful to both novices and expert entrepreneurs 
in highly unpredictable early-stage ventures.  
 
Second, effectuation principles relate to the phenomenon under investigation in the current 
thesis. Effectuation could explain how a USO creates a business model and market space 
through an iterative process because it considers the future to be fundamentally unpredictable 
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but could be influenced through human action, the environment to be constructible through 
choices and goals to be negotiated residuals of stakeholder commitments rather than pre-
existing organisation of preferences. In addition, scholars argue that the development of 
business models for commercialising new technology requires significant experimentation 
(McGrath 2010), is highly ambiguous (Bigdeli et al. 2016) and demands commitment from 
various stakeholders (Siegel et al. 2003; Siegel & Wright 2015). 
 
Third, employing effectual logic to understand business model development enables original 
contributions to the literature. This stream of knowledge is underexplored as both effectuation 
and business models are rooted in disparate streams of literature  (Trimi & Berbegal-Mirabent 
2012; Perry et al. 2012). The current thesis aims to re-contextualise the understanding of the 
business model using effectuation logic. Effectuation does not merely explain how 
entrepreneurial opportunities are pursued but also enables the risk of failure to be decreased. 
Thus, the current thesis may be useful for practitioners and guide the way to fruitful market 
opportunities. 
 
Based on these reasons, effectuation is deemed to be the most appropriate way to explore the 
phenomenon of interest. Further, this thesis aims to not only apply effectual logic for 
comprehension of business model development but also explore the possibility of extending 
the understanding of the specific challenges faced by USOs when developing a viable business 
model. This is achieved by determining how a USO develops a business model in the face of 
unique challenges.  
 
While effectuation theory is practically relevant to the topic under investigation, the logic 
appeared to have insufficient grounding about how a market creation can be proactively 
managed in order to commercialise new technology This issue deserves robust deliberation 
considering the market uncertainty facing university technology commercialisation (i.e. the 
market is either unclear or non-existent) (Andries & Debackere 2007). Scholars argue that, in 
commercialising a university technology, the much complex issue lies within the way forward 
for converting a scientific discovery into marketable product that fits a designated market (Still 
2017).  
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Additionally, the commercialisation of new technology essentially involves the creation of a 
new business, including new markets, new revenue models and new partners, which requires 
changes in routines and behaviour (O’Connor & Rice 2013). Despite this, firms developing 
breakthrough technology often pay less attention to the later phases of the innovation process, 
which are successful market entry and creation. In the business model literature, the market is 
often assumed to be pre-existing, thus hampering discussion of how USO entrepreneurs could 
proactively co-create markets with stakeholders.  
 
Zahra et al. (2014) argue that human agency is the backbone of entrepreneurial endeavour. 
However, in Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation, new markets emerge as an outcome of the 
interaction between networked actors through an adaptive process within a changing 
competitive landscape. Hence, the emergence of new market appeared to be merely a residual 
of the effectuation process without fully grasping with the issue as to how entrepreneurs could 
proactively improve market creation for technology commercialisation (O’Connor & Rice 
2013). Although effectuation offers a description of what happens in normal human 
interactions, as an actor-centric process, it could have been more proactive in creating its own 
opportunity to realise a new market. Here, a supplementary theoretical lens that could respond 
to the opportunity creation agency is needed.  
 
After all, effectuation is not an independent doctrine; it builds on and integrates the work of 
several well-received economics and management theories (Dew & Sarasvathy 2002). The 
limitation of effectuation regarding proactivity in market creation calls for renewed emphasis 
on the conversion of university technology into marketable products by employing relevant 
theories that strengthen effectuation’s view on new market creation. Careful review of the 
literature reveals that the opportunity creation theory proposed by Alvarez and Barney (2007) 
is a potential lens that can supplement effectual logic. 
 
 Concept of Opportunity Creation 
The concept of opportunity creation is derived from creation theory, which is a popular logical 
theoretical alternative to discovery theory. Creation theory has risen in prominence among 
entrepreneurship theorists as it rationalises the actions that entrepreneurs take to form and 
exploit opportunities (Aldrich & Ruef 2006). Eminent scholars like Schumpeter (1983), 
Sarasvathy (2001), Alvarez and Barney (2005) and Baker and Nelson (2005) ground their work 
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using creation theory. They use the theory to explain entrepreneurial phenomena such as 
entrepreneurial decision making, the business planning process and the decision to finance an 
entrepreneurial venture. 
 
In their seminal work, Alvarez and Barney (2007) apply granularity to creation theory and 
develop the notion of opportunity creation, which recognises that opportunities are not always 
objective phenomena created by change in a market. Rather, an opportunity may be proactively 
and endogenously created by the actions of an entrepreneur seeking ways to develop new 
offerings. The scholars further argue that “[r]ather than searching for a clear opportunity to 
be exploited, entrepreneurs creating opportunity might engage in iterative learning process 
that ultimately could lead to the formation of opportunities” (Alvarez & Barney 2007, pp.11–
12).  
 
Opportunity creation also assumes that opportunities do not necessarily exist independently of 
the actions taken by entrepreneurs to create them (Baker & Nelson 2005). Linking this to the 
market creation perspective, objectively pursuing opportunities in a ready and available market 
appeared to be less valuable because, unlike entrepreneurs with a proactive market orientation 
(Jaworski et al. 2000), opportunity-creating entrepreneurs do not only aim to satisfy existing 
market needs because, in some cases, they have to create a new market. 
 
Bringing the phenomenon closer to the USO context, latent technology does not come with 
clear foresight of a market’s needs (Teece 2010b); the market may exist but still unclear, and 
in some cases, the market may need to be created. Therefore, rather than aiming to enter an 
available market and/or waiting for the market to ready itself, entrepreneurs could proactively 
and endogenously take actions to influence the creation of new market. In this way, 
entrepreneurs do not necessarily have to wait for opportunities to unfold prior to responding 
because decisions are made using logical incrementalism based on beliefs and available 
information. When doing so, entrepreneurs should rely not only on technology and networks 
but also on their own actions to commercialise new technology by creating the market. 
 
Kim and Maubourgne (1999) argue that firms may create new markets and re-create existing 
ones without any foresight of the future. Instead of looking within the accepted boundaries that 
define how firms compete, entrepreneurs could systematically gather information across them. 
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By doing so, entrepreneurs may find unoccupied territory that leads to breakthroughs in value. 
This can be achieved by looking across substitute markets, strategic groups within industries, 
chains of buyers, complementary offerings, functional or emotional appeal and/or time. Kim 
and Mouborgne’s (1999) findings align with those of Druehl and Schmidt (2008) concerning 
the strategy of opening a new market by satisfying a detached market21.  
 
Alvarez and Barney’s (2007) concept of opportunity creation and Sarasvathy’s (2001) 
effectuation logic are not entirely different. Both seek to explain actions that entrepreneurs take 
to form and exploit opportunities. Most importantly, both agree that opportunities are created 
rather than discovered. Thus, they build upon each other in a coherent manner. However, they 
differ in terms of the magnitude of human agency in market creation; the concept of opportunity 
creation believes that actors have more agency in new market creation compared to effectual 
logic (O’Connor & Rice 2013).   
 
Supplementing Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation with Alvarez and Barney’s (2007) 
opportunity creation has important implications for the current thesis’s theoretical grounding 
as it provides information about how USO entrepreneurs’ beliefs and actions (not predictions) 
are valuable sources of viable business models for commercialising new technology.  
 
 Borrowed Premises 
The current thesis borrows relevant principles from effectuation logic and opportunity creation 
to guide its investigation. It follows the theoretical viewpoint that effectuation reduces 
uncertainty by emphasising control over prediction. The four premises borrowed from 
effectuation logic and opportunity creation are as follows: 1) operations are based on taking 
control; 2) there is exigency for market creation by creating opportunities; 3) interest in pre-
commitment is created by forging partnerships; and 4) firms react to unexpected events by 
embracing contingencies. 
 
Take control –  This premise concerns the basis for taking action to commercialise new 
technology by focusing on only what the USO has power over instead of what is out of the 
firm’s control. The firm predicts less and takes an available set of individual means as a starting 
point for decision making. It then focuses on working toward a possible outcome that can be 
                                                
21	Preference in the new market that is divergent (detached) from the current market (Schmidt & Druehl 2008). 
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achieved with these means. By taking control over its own resources and capabilities, a USO 
could become more pragmatic when influencing outcomes and creating opportunities using 
their limited means in creative ways. This approach also avoids expending effort on things that 
cannot be controlled. 
 
Create opportunities – This premise depends on the exigency of creating opportunities through 
the actions of the entrepreneur. It also assumes that opportunities do not necessarily exist 
independently of the actions taken by entrepreneurs to create them. Rather than pursuing 
opportunities objectively in an available market, entrepreneurs strive to proactively and 
endogenously create the opportunities needed to commercialise new technology. 
 
Forge partnerships –  This premise concerns interest in obtaining pre-commitments from the 
external stakeholders involved in the commercialisation process. A firm tends to build 
partnerships with self-selecting stakeholders to reduce uncertainty and jointly co-create the 
new market with interested participants. Also, entrepreneurs interact with and involve other 
people and organisations in the venture creation process. Venture creation processes are open 
to, and indeed contingent upon, the involvement of other people and organisations as 
committed stakeholders. External stakeholders provide access to resources, reduce uncertainty 
and shape the goals and direction of the firm.  
 
Embrace contingencies –  This premise concerns a firm’s reaction to unexpected events 
throughout the technology commercialisation discourse by tolerating contingencies. Since 
mistakes are inevitable, a USO embraces contingencies that arise from uncertain situations by 
remaining flexible and not tethered to existing goals. Through an adaptive process, the 
entrepreneur keeps decision making sufficiently open to leverage unexpected events for the 
benefit of the firm. Instead of making what-if scenarios to deal with worst-case scenarios, 
entrepreneurs interpret contingencies as potential clues to create a market. 
 
2.7  Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed extant strategic management literature concerning business models 
and academic entrepreneurship research involving USO technology commercialisation. It has 
also more deeply and narrowly investigated the challenges facing USOs during business model 
development and linked the research question to the value components of business models. 
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After clarifying the research gap, this section identified the most appropriate theoretical lens to 
answer the posed research questions. The next section will describe the data needed to address 
the research question, how to obtain such data and how the data was analysed. The rationale of 
specific procedures concerning the methodological approach are also discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodological approach underpinning the research. Section 3.2 
justifies how the research design is determined in accordance with philosophical assumptions. 
Section 3.3 presents the context of the research and method of case selection. Next, section 3.4 
and section 3.5 specify which data are required and how to obtain, manage and analyse them. 
Section 3.6 discusses the steps taken to ensure research quality, rigour and ethical 
considerations. Finally, section 3.6 summarises the key points of this chapter. 
 
3.2 Research Philosophy and Research Design 
A philosophical standpoint is crucial for determining the research design (Saunders et al. 2000). 
It informs how a research question is understood, what data are significant and how data should 
be collected (Easterby-Smith et al. 2015). Withal, Holden and Lynch (2004) argue that research 
should not be methodologically led; rather, a methodology should be chosen based on the 
researchers’ philosophical stance. It is vital to apply a methodological approach that can be 
philosophically justified to avoid generation of spurious results (Easterby-Smith et al. 2015). 
To determine the most suitable research design, the philosophical positions associated with the 
phenomenon under investigation were examined. 
 
Ontology and Epistemology (Constructivism and Subjectivism) 
Ideally, a research philosophy is understood based on its ontological and epistemological 
standpoints (Johnson & Duberley 2000). The current research aims to understand how a USO 
develops its business models for commercialising university technology. Given this, the 
ontology of the research fell on the constructivism spectrum (i.e. there is no single reality, and 
reality is constructed within social phenomena). Given this, the epistemological orientation of 
the research fell on the subjectivism spectrum (i.e. understanding the process through which 
human beings give meaning to the world is important) (Guba & Lincoln 1994).  
 
Philosophical Stance (Interpretivism) 
Based on the ontological and epistemological orientations of this research, the interpretivist 
perspective stood out as the most compatible paradigm because the findings of this research 
were predominantly shaped by information provided by key stakeholders of USOs. The 
 52 
interpretivist approach emphasised the meaningful nature of people’s participation in social 
and cultural life and determine the subsequent methodological choice  (Holden & Lynch 2004). 
 
Methodological Choice (Inductive) 
In parallel with interpretivism philosophy, this research sought to gain rich insight into 
subjective meanings rather than providing law-like generalisations (Yin 2014). It also aimed 
to make a broad generalisation based on specific observation by obtaining an in-depth 
understanding of how the business model development process unfolds. Given this, inductive 
and interpretive reasoning were deemed to be the most suitable methodological choices to 
satisfy the research question (i.e. the investigation began with the research question and 
proceeded to observation, analysis and, finally, theory) (Saunders et al. 2000). 
 
This also meant that the research took a grounded approach to theory building and allowed the 
theory to emerge without relying solely on any longstanding assumptions (Suddaby 2006; 
Gioia et al. 2013; Charmaz 2014). Despite this, the initial arguments were still loosely based 
on the preliminary theories affiliated with the focal phenomenon (i.e. development of business 
models for commercialising new technology). A grounded approach does not imply that the 
researcher should enter a field without prior knowledge of the existing research. Rather, it 
should ‘aim to achieve practical middle ground between theory laden view of the world and 
unfettered empiricism’ (Suddaby 2006, p.635). 
 
Data Inquiry (Qualitative) 
Inductive reasoning relies heavily on naturalistic methods such as interviewing, observation 
and analysis of existing texts (Bryman 2001). These methods ensure adequate dialogue 
between the researchers and informants in an attempt to collaboratively construct a meaningful 
reality (Yin 2014). As a result, a qualitative approach appeared to be the most appropriate mode 
of data inquiry. Data were obtained from in-depth investigations with focus samples to 
understand how business models emerge for the commercialisation of university technology. 
Qualitative data inquiry also allowed for a rich understanding of the context and, thus, an 
answer to the ‘how’ question (Langley 1999). Likewise, this research aims to address the 
question of ‘How does a USO develop its early-stage business models to commercialise new 
technology?’ 
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Strategy (Multiple-Case Study) 
Since this research involved qualitative and detailed examination of a USO and its related 
contextual conditions, it integrated research strategies that could satisfy the empirical inquiry 
and examine a phenomenon in its real-life setting. In this case, the boundaries between the 
phenomenon (subject) and the context (external) were not clear, and the researcher had no 
control over these events. As a result, the case study approach was the most suitable research 
strategy (Yin 2014). According to Van Maanen (1979), the case study approach is an array of 
interpretive techniques that seeks to describe, decode, translate and come to terms with the 
meaning of data.  
 
Again, since this research dealt with a ‘how’ question, it had to be executed in an explanatory 
manner, which further reinforced that the case study as the best strategy (Langley 1999). This 
research employed four cases. Multiple case studies allowed the establishment of replication 
logic and yielded more robust, generalisable theory (Saunders et al. 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner 2007; Yin 2014). A comparative case study was also appropriate to gain reflective 
insight into the dynamic organisational phenomenon prior to drawing the generalisation 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Flynn 1990). 
 
Data Collection (Interview and Archival Data) 
The unique strength of case studies is their ability to gather evidence beyond what is available 
in the conventional historical study (Eisenhardt 1989; Flynn 1990). This research was 
operationalised through interaction with USO stakeholders who represented small samples that 
were investigated in depth and over time. Interpretivist philosophy assumes that access to 
reality is achieved through social constructions, such as language, consciousness, shared 
meanings and instruments (Lindgren & Packendorff 2009). Given this, data collection occurred 
primarily through interviews and secondarily through archives.  
 
Time Horizon (Cross-Sectional Analysis) 
The time horizon of any research is independent of the research strategy (Saunders et al. 2000). 
Given the limitations of research duration and resources, a cross-sectional approach was 
deemed to be the most appropriate as it enabled the researcher to simultaneously capture 
findings from four different USOs in a snapshot manner. This technique also allowed for 
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comparison of many different variables without manipulating the study environment (Yin 
2014).  
 
Considering the above justifications, the research was pursued using an inductive, cross-
sectional, multiple-case study design. The chosen design enabled systematic organisation of 
research activities so that the empirical data could be connected with the research question in 
a logical sequence (Yin 2014; Easterby-Smith et al. 2015). Following Saunders et al. (2000), 
the way in which the research design is determined is illustrated as a ‘research onion’ in Figure 
3-1.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Research design illustrated as a research onion (See Saunders et al. 2000) 
 
 
3.3 Research Context and Case Selection 
The research context for a case study is highly linked to the unit of analysis, unit of observation 
and empirical setting (Yin 2014). The unit of analysis refers to the main entity under analysis 
in research, and the unit of observation represents the specific data to be observed within 
theunit of analysis. Defining the unit of analysis is key for determining what data will be 
collected. Since this research aimed to determine how a USO develops business models for 
commercialising university technology, the USO was set as the organisational unit of analysis. 
The approach adopted by the USO to develop its business model was set as the unit of 
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observation. Throughout this study, the unit of analysis was revisited twice due to new 
discoveries during data collection.  
The empirical setting chosen for this research was USOs originating from academic research 
conducted at a single university, the University of Cambridge, UK. USOs at the University of 
Cambridge offered a promising setting in which to address the research question in a way that 
would enhance generalisability in two ways. First, the University of Cambridge has a strong 
technology transfer profile supported by its TTO, the Cambridge Enterprise. As a result, it is 
hailed as the technology transfer benchmark for other universities in the UK and therefore is 
an exemplary case for identifying best practices (Kirk & Cotton 2012). Second, USOs at the 
University of Cambridge are governed by the same policies and practices concerning university 
technology commercialisation employed by many other universities. Most public research 
universities in the UK and across the globe are governed by similar legislation dealing with the 
IP arising from government-funded research: universities can claim the IP rights of 
technologies developed in their laboratories and the government can directly create 
mechanisms to transfer and commercialise the knowledge produced in universities (Goldfarb 
& Henrekson 2003; Hewitt-Dundas 2015). This was instrumental for controlling the empirical 
setting and thus increasing the likelihood that findings will be transferred and generalised into 
broader domains (Guba & Lincoln 1994). 
 
To distinguish the phenomenon (subject) from the context (external) (Yin 2014), the scope of 
empirical enquiry was determined based on spatial and temporal boundaries. The spatial 
boundary was set to include only USOs originating from research conducted at the University 
of Cambridge and commercialised in the cleantech industry. The temporal boundary was set to 
include business model development until 01 January 2017. Defining these limitations was 
useful for establishing the scope of data to be included and fit the time and resource limitations 
of this research.  
 
Due to the large number of potentially eligible cases, a two-staged, purposive and homogenous 
case screening technique was employed to systematically select cases for this research 
(Saunders et al. 2000; Yin 2014). Purposive sampling allowed for pragmatic judgment of case 
selection and resulted in cases that were particularly informative regarding the research 
question. Homogenous sampling was performed to select one USO subgroup with similar 
attributes (Saunders et al. 2000). Both techniques aimed to maximise the comparable 
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environmental contexts, reduce rival explanations of other causal relationships and enable 
cases to be studied in great depth (Saunders et al. 2000; Yin 2014).  
 
To minimise sampling bias and prejudice, the entire pool of 64 USOs at the University of 
Cambridge identified from the Cambridge Enterprise portfolio database were examined as 
potentially eligible candidates. During the first screening stage, two operational inclusion 
criteria were employed to align the cases with the research question and reduce the number of 
candidates to a manageable number (i.e. 12 or fewer) (Yin 2014). The criteria were as follows: 
1) the USO must originate from research at the University of Cambridge and 2) the USO must 
be active at the point of data collection. The first screening procedure, however, failed to reduce 
the number of eligible cases (i.e. 47) to fewer than 12. Following Lubik and Garnsey’s (2016) 
recommendation and to retain homogeneity of the cases, another inclusion criterion was 
adopted: only USOs performing commercialisation in the cleantech industry were included. 
Further justification for this industry selection is explained in section 4.3. The second screening 
stage resumed after the number of eligible cases was reduced from 47 to eight. Generic 
information about and access to all the eight USOs were obtained from two technology transfer 
officers employed at Cambridge Enterprise.  
 
After examining all eight eligible cases, two more qualifying criteria were set for practical 
reasons: 1) USOs must be willing to participate in the research; and 2) USOs must be able to 
provide rich and meaningful data. In the end, four USOs originating from research at the 
University of Cambridge and performing commercialisation in the cleantech industry were 
deemed to be qualified to serve as the cases for this research. Figure 3-2 depicts the two-staged, 
purposive and homogenous case screening procedure. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Two-staged, purposive and homogenous case screening procedure 
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According to Eisenhardt (1989), depending on the likelihood that an emergent theory will be 
developed, a total of four to ten cases is considered sufficient to satisfy a case study inquiry, 
enhance research validity and facilitate replication logic. Despite this, the perceived 
assumption was further verified by mapping the selected cases across a two-dimensional matrix 
known to provide contrasting patterns in the collected data, which included 1) USOs’ age; and 
2) USOs’ commercialisation performance. These dimensions were chosen because they were 
independent of one another (i.e. there is no strict relationship between sales growth and/or loss 
with the age of the USO) (Shane 2004; Hewitt-Dundas 2015). 
 
USO age was chosen as the proxy of the firm’s maturity. USOs in operation for 10 years or 
less were considered immature, whereas USOs in operation for more than 10 years were 
considered mature. Most technology transfer scholars agree that pharmaceutical USOs usually 
take more than 10 years to commercialise technology (Swamidass & Vulasa 2009), while 
USOs in other industries usually take 10 years or less (Markman et al. 2005; Han 2017). A 
USO’s ability to introduce a new product or production method into commerce was chosen as 
the proxy of commercialisation performance. High means that the USO’s product is available 
on the market, and low indicates that it is not. This aligned with Jolly’s (1997),  Lehoux et al.’s 
(2014) and Hewitt-Dundas (2015) work on new technology commercialisation.  
 
To observe diverse data, case positioning was performed to map one case in each cell of the 
matrix and represent individual illustrative USO profiles. As a result, richer findings at polar 
extremes were identified, and each case was treated as an experiment to confirm or refute the 
generalisable aspects of observations from other cases (Flynn 1990). The ability to include 
cases with low commercialisation performance represented another potential contribution to 
the knowledge because most research on academic entrepreneurship relies heavily on data 
derived from successful commercialisation and neglects data from less successful attempts at 
commercialisation (Druilhe & Garnsey 2001; Lubik & Garnsey 2016). The four polar cases are 
presented as a 2 x 2 matrix in Figure 3-3, and the case firms are described in Table 3-1. 
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Figure 3-3: Case positioning matrix (Refer to Table 3-1) 
 
 
USO / Detail University laboratory 
Founding 
team Technology 
Incorporation, 
age on 
01 Jan 2017 
Stage, 
commercialisation 
status 
Case profile 
AlphaVent 
(AV) 
Department of 
Engineering 
A senior 
lecturer and 
a professor 
Novel 
natural 
ventilation 
system for 
buildings 
 
16 Jan 2006, 
10 years,  
11 months 
(Immature) 
 
Acquired 
(Product has been 
commercialised) 
Immature USO 
with 
commercialised 
product 
BetaRecycle 
(BR) 
Department of 
Chemical 
Engineering 
and 
Biotechnology 
 
A 
postdoctoral 
student and 
a professor 
Novel waste 
packaging 
material 
recovery 
23 Feb 2005, 
11 years,  
10 months 
(Mature) 
Commercial 
availability 
(Product has been 
commercialised) 
Mature USO 
with 
commercialised 
product 
GammaSolar 
(GS) 
Department of 
Physics 
Three 
professors 
Novel 
printed 
plastic solar 
module 
22 Jul 2010, 
6 years,  
6 months 
(Immature) 
 
Sample distribution 
(Product has not 
been 
commercialised) 
 
Immature USO 
without 
commercialised 
product 
DeltaCool 
(DC) 
Department of 
Material 
Science and 
Metallurgy 
A professor, 
a 
postdoctoral 
student and 
a physicist 
Novel low-
carbon, gas-
free 
magnetic 
cooling 
design 
 
1 May 2003, 
13 years, 
 8 months 
(Mature) 
Prototyping 
(Product has not 
been 
commercialised) 
Mature USO 
without 
commercialised 
product 
Table 3-1: Case profiles 
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3.4 Data Collection  
With reference to the research questions, data was collected to satisfy three main inquiries: 1) 
how does a USO create value and embed it in a proposition in the face of market resistance; 2) 
how does a USO capture value in the face of financial pressure; and 3) how does a USO manage 
stakeholders with conflicting values? The two types of data collected in this research were 
interview data and archival data.  Data were obtained from multiple sources and at various 
levels to enable triangulation (Miles et al. 2014; Yin 2014).  
 
In preparation for the interviews with the USOs, efforts were made to understand the USOs’ 
backgrounds and develop interview protocols to be tested in a pilot study. To build sufficient 
understanding for each case, extensive secondary archival data were gathered from multiple 
secondary sources. The data were then used to develop a comprehensive chronological timeline 
of each USO with three transitional stage (i.e. ideation, prototyping and commercialisation) 
(Vohora et al. 2004; Lehoux et al. 2014) based on TRL. The information provided significant 
insight into how the USOs developed business models in response to the challenges they faced. 
An example of a USO chronologic timeline is presented in Appendix A.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it was expected that interviewees’ perspectives and 
cultures would be complex (Siegel et al. 2003). In response to this, two different interview 
protocols with slightly different lines of questioning were prepared. The first protocol was used 
in interviews with internal stakeholders (e.g. USO founders and CEO), and the second protocol 
was used in interviews with external stakeholders (e.g. TTOs, investors, partners and 
competitors). Examples of the interview protocols are available in Appendix B. 
 
To refine the interview protocols, trial interviews were conducted with three interviewees: a 
CEO of an automotive USO based in Oxford, a USO investor based in Cambridge and a CEO 
of a medtech USO based in London. The interviews took place at Cambridge Science Park, 
Cambridge, in April 2016; St. John Innovation Centre, Cambridge, in April 2016 and UK IP 
Office, London, while attending an IP master class in May 2016, respectively. The cases were 
selected based on their convenience, accessibility and geographic proximity (Yin 2014). Each 
interview was guided by the protocol and lasted for 60 to 90 minutes. 
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The line of questioning in each round of the trial interviews allowed for progressive 
optimisation and minimisation of bias (Yin 2014). The scope of the pilot case inquiry was 
broadest in the beginning and narrowed as the protocol was optimised. As a novice interviewer, 
the pilot study exercise was effective for building confidence in the researcher’s ability to 
conduct qualitative interviews and becoming familiar with probing follow-up questions based 
on interviewees’ responses. In addition, scholars have argued that piloting provides the 
qualitative researcher with a clear definition of the focus of the study and its logistics, which 
in turn helps the researcher to concentrate data collection on a narrow spectrum of projected 
analytical topics (Easterby-Smith et al. 2015).  
 
Upon gaining confidence and access to the cases, four sets of three-way Confidential 
Disclosure Agreement (CDA) were prepared. Prior to data collection, the agreements were 
signed by the chancellor, masters and scholars of the University of Cambridge, the researcher and 
the CEO (or equivalent) of the USO. An example of the agreement is presented in Appendix C. 
Then, stakeholders of each USO were interviewed one-on-one using the semi-structured 
interview technique guided by the refined protocols. Interviews were intended to gain insight 
into how business models were developed and why decisions were made. 
 
Using a narrative approach (Rubin & Rubin 2011), each interviewee was first asked to describe 
his or her involvement in and knowledge of the USO from its inception to the present, with 
minimum interruption by the interviewer. Then, semi-structured interview questions were 
posed. The use of narrative interviewing minimised the influence of personal views and 
theoretical perspectives on data collection (Yin 2014). Contrary evidence was tolerated as 
diligently as possible. The interviews resembled guided conversations rather than structured 
questions, and the line of inquiry and stream of questions was fluid (Rubin & Rubin 2011). 
Each interview lasted for 60 to 90 minutes. 
 
When performing data inquiry, caution was taken to avoid over-reliance on the input of key 
information, which may be biased due to reflexive influence (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). 
To factor in the bigger context of phenomenon under study, interviewees included participants 
who were external to the USO but had contributed considerably to the overall technology 
commercialisation process (e.g. TTOs, investors, partners, competitors, customers). Also, 12 
additional interviews were conducted with technology commercialisation experts from around 
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Cambridge who were not directly related to the USOs. Interviewees were chosen based on their 
contribution to the evolving theory and experience. Decisions regarding whom to interview in 
each round were informed by ongoing analysis using a snowballing technique22 (Saunders et 
al. 2000; Rasmussen et al. 2011). Interviewees with multiple positions in the USO were 
interviewed based on their different functional and hierarchal roles (e.g. academic inventor, 
CEO and investor).  
 
Interview sessions were arranged and conducted at regular intervals throughout a 35-weeks 
period (May 2016 until January 2017). By the end of the data collection period, 48 interviews 
were conducted with key stakeholders directly related to the USO and 12 interviews were 
conducted with technology commercialisation experts. Although ten interviews were intended 
for each case, only eight interviews could be conducted with informants from AlphaVent. This 
was partly attributed to scheduling conflicts and unavailability of the key informant during the 
data collection period. In addition, the data collection process was interrupted by the USO’s 
internal issues when AlphaVent was in the process of being incorporated by a larger company. 
This shortcoming was counterbalanced with external interviews and archival data collected 
from secondary sources. To enhance reliability, all 60 interview sessions were audiotaped with 
prior consent. The list of interviewees is presented in Table 3-2, and a detailed list of 
interviewees is available in Appendix D.  
 
Informant / USO AlphaVent BetaRecycle GammaSolar DeltaCool 
Academic founder  1 2 2 2 
Board of director 1 3 3 3 
TTO 3 4 3 3 
Investor/partner 3 7 4 2 
Competitor/other 0 1 1 0 
Total interviews 8 17 13 10 
Total verbatim transcription (pages) 65 142 96 81 
Table 3-2: List of interviews 
 
To avoid overabundance of data, all material was triaged and indexed based on its apparent 
relevance to the research inquiry. A list of the data collected from the interviews and the 
archives is presented in Table 3-3 and the overall steps of data collection is presented in Figure 
3-4. 
                                                
22 Nonprobability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. 
 
 62 
Data Source Data collected 
Primary Interviews 
§ Audio interviews conducted by the researcher with 8 informants from 
AlphaVent, 17 from BetaRecycle, 13 from GammaSolar, 10 from DeltaCool 
and 12 technology commercialisation experts from around Cambridge 
between May 2016 and Jan 2017 
 
§ 65 pages of verbatim interview transcription for AlphaVent 
§ 142 pages of verbatim interview transcription for BetaRecycle 
§ 96 pages of verbatim interview transcription for GammaSolar 
§ 81 pages of verbatim interview transcription for DeltaCool 
§ 24 pages of interview notes extracted for commercialisation experts 
Secondary 
Interviews 
§ Audio/video of interviews with USOs conducted by other journalists on 
television/radio programmes (e.g. Naked Science, BBC) 
 
Archival 
data 
§ Information about USOs retrieved from their websites 
 
§ Information about USOs retrieved from the House of Companies UK 
website 
 
§ Published articles about USOs from the Cambridge Enterprise website and 
SpinoutsUK database 
 
§ Published articles, news, news releases, reports and 
comments/commentaries about USOs retrieved from Factiva and 
Bloomberg 
 
§ Full credit report of USOs downloaded from the Jordans Group Limited 
website 
 
§ U.S. patents awarded to USOs retrieved from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademarks Office database and Espacenet database 
 
Table 3-3: List of data collected 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Steps for data collection 
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3.5 Data Analysis 
Prior to data analysis, all 48 key interviews were transcribed verbatim using ExpressScribe, a 
professional audio player software designed to help transcribe audio recordings. Transcription 
allowed familiarity to be developed with the collected data (Charmaz 1996). The procedure 
was then followed by a careful vetting process to correct inaccuracies that occurred in the 
generated transcripts. 12 non-key interviews conducted with technology commercialisation 
experts were not transcribed verbatim; instead, the audio data were replayed and key points 
from the interviews were extracted and typed. The transcription and extraction of key points 
for all 60 recorded interviews took 17 weeks (February until June 2017) to complete and 
resulted in 384 pages of transcriptions and 24 pages of notes (Times New Roman, 11 point, 
single spacing). 
 
The transcriptions and notes were then reduced to eliminate redundancy, filler, 
mispronunciations and incomplete and repeated sentences. At this stage, caution was taken to 
not eliminate information based on assumptions of what counts as significant data. This 
exercise resulted in cleaner data for analysis (Miles & Huberman 1994; Easterby-Smith et al. 
2015). To enable triangulation, the reduced data was cross-mapped against the USO’s 
chronologic timeline, which was developed using archival data. The chronological sequence 
of key events and key data from informants were validated, and inconsistencies were 
investigated. The data were then ready for analysis.  
 
To build a theory from a case study, the current thesis employed a grounded approach to 
analyse the data (Glasser & Strauss 1967; Corley & Gioia 2004). Scholars argue that a 
grounded approach is suitable for discovering and defining complex process (Corbin & Strauss 
1990; Charmaz 1996; Gioia et al. 2013). During the late stage of the analysis, the template 
analysis approach (King & Brooks 2012) was also used to link the emergent findings with the 
four premises borrowed from effectuation theory and the concept of opportunity creation. Data 
analysis performed using the grounded approach allowed a theory to emerge from the data. 
Template analysis, which is an extension of a grounded approach, identifies systematic 
interference from qualitative data that has been structured by a set of concepts (Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2015).  
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Reconciliation of both self-reinforcing techniques represented a means of triangulation and 
was useful to avoid forgoing empirical knowledge that leads to the production of an 
unstructured manuscript that would only contribute to the literature marginally (Suddaby 
2006). In addition, the most prevalent abuse of the grounded approach as a means of analysing 
data occurs when researchers have insufficient prior knowledge of the extant literature 
(Suddaby 2006). Easterby-Smith (2015) states that template analysis is located at the interface 
between content analysis (in which codes are strictly predetermined) and grounded theory (in 
which codes emerge during analysis) and hence is an appropriate method of triangulation.  
 
The overall coding process was segmented into four rounds, each of which involved constant 
comparison to assure the emergence of substantive theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Gibbert 
and Ruigrok 2010). The first round of intra-case, line-by-line, open coding23 was conducted 
manually using a pen and paper. This was done to independently identify the key events 
involved in the commercialisation of university technology in each USO. Throughout the 
coding process, key depictions of ways in which USOs developed business models in response 
to multifaceted challenges were identified. Since the concepts have yet to be proven to be 
theoretically meaningful, data were analysed without imputing any motives (Charmaz 1996). 
Results of the first round of intra-case open coding is presented as descriptive case studies in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Once all the individual cases were manually framed and data familiarisation was obtained, the 
second-round coding was conducted. This round involved electronic inter-case, open coding 
using QSR NVivo 11 software, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) 
programme (Rubin & Rubin 2011). This time, open coding was conducted to identify the 
measures adopted by USOs across four cases to develop business models. At this stage, 
tentative labels were assigned to the data based on their respective meanings. Following 
Sudabby (2006), the four borrowed premises from the effectuation logic and concept of 
opportunity creation (i.e. take control, create opportunities, forge partnerships and embrace 
contingencies) were loosely employed to guide the coding process. Through a creative leap 
(Langley 1999), insights that emerged across cases were cross-compared to identify similarities 
and differences (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). The similarities and differences were registered 
                                                
23 Open coding is the processes of analysing textual content which involves tentative labelling of concepts. Basically, a 
researcher reads through data and create tentative labels for chunks of data observed. 
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in the form of comments, annotations and memos. To enhance the visibility of data, tables with 
three main queries based on the research questions were built and filled (Miles & Huberman 
1994).  
 
The third round of inter-case coding was performed to structure and synthetise the data across 
the four cases. This time, the codes were aggregated at a higher level of abstraction (Miles & 
Huberman 1994). All categories were grouped into higher-level themes through axial coding24 
and aggregate dimensions through selective coding25. Axial coding consists of identification of 
relationships among open codes, and selective coding was used to identify the core variable 
that includes all of the data (Charmaz 1996). 
 
Finally, selective coding using template analysis approach was performed to formally track the 
connection between the codes and the four borrowed premises and to explain business model 
development. The premises were employed as placeholders for predefined themes (Gibbs 
2002). The multiple rounds of coding was laborious and required repetitious visitation of data 
until category saturation was achieved (Corbin & Strauss 1990). The process was highly 
iterative, taking about 21 weeks (July until December 2017) to complete. It also required a 
second and third round of interviews with several key informants. Throughout this process, 
this thesis acknowledged the dynamic process of field research, as new patterns emerged during 
data analysis (Edmondson & Mcmanus 2007). 
 
Since the process of data analysis relied heavily on the researcher’s interpretation, which might 
be biased due to subjectivity, inter-coder assessment was undertaken (Corley 2002) to enhance 
the robustness of the data and demonstrate the plausibility of the emergent findings (Lavrakas 
2008). Four assessors not involved in the research—three postdoctoral researchers and one 
doctoral student at the Institute for Manufacturing, University of Cambridge, UK—were 
enlisted to assist the exercise. Using a Q-sort technique26, the assessors were asked to replicate 
                                                
24 Axial coding is the processes of breaking down of core themes via a combination of inductive and deductive thinking. 
Basically, a researcher identifies the connections among the open codes. 
25 Selective coding is the process of choosing one category to be the core category, and relating all other categories to that 
category. Basically, a researcher selectively codes any data that relates to the core variable identified. 
26 Systematic study of participant viewpoints used to examine complex subjective structures like opinions, attitudes and 
values. In Q-sort technique, participants are asked to sort a set of statements representing a broad diversity of opinions and 
perspectives on the phenomenon being investigated (Kitzinger 1987). 
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the coding process by matching 21 randomly selected interview quotes with 21 categories, 21 
categories with six themes and six themes with three aggregate dimensions. 
 
The inter-coder reliability coefficients ranged from 0 (complete disagreement) to 1 (complete 
agreement). In most studies, coefficients of 0.90 or greater are considered highly reliable, while 
coefficients of 0.80 or greater are considered reliable (Corley 2002; Lavrakas 2008). The level 
of agreement achieved between the researcher’s coding efforts and those of four independent 
assessors is presented in in Table 3-4 below. 
 
Assessor Codes – categories match 
Categories –  
themes match 
Themes – 
dimensions match 
Average 
agreement 
Assessor # 1 1.00 0.83 0.67 0.83 
Assessor # 2 0.83 0.75 1.00 0.86 
Assessor # 3 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.94 
Assessor # 4 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.92 
Average agreement 0.96 0.79 0.92 0.89 
Table 3-4: Inter-coder assessment results 
 
 
Although the inter-coder agreement was well within the range of reliability, the disagreements 
between the researcher and assessors were discussed at the end of the assessment. The 
discussion revealed that none of the disagreement was rooted in poor operational definitions 
and hence did not result any alternative perspectives. Rather, it was mostly caused by overlap 
of themes due to the interrelatedness of business model components (e.g. measures taken to 
create value may also be applicable to measures taken to capture value). Following Van 
Maanen (1979) and Gioia et al. (2013), once data were synthesised and finalised, they were 
tabulated as a data structure consisting of the first-order category, second-order themes and 
aggregate dimension structure (Figure 3-5). 
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Figure 3-5: Template for data structure (See Van Maanen 1979; Gioia et al. 2013) 
 
 
Synthetised data were further analysed based on the extant literature and integrated in a 
conceptual framework in Chapter 5, which illustrates the key findings of the research. Each 
case was thoroughly analysed to identify the relationships between constructs, and cases were 
compared with each other to progressively develop a richer theoretical framework. Throughout 
this process, the literature was frequently re-examined to relate the findings with extant theories 
(Miles & Huberman 1994). A summary of the overall steps taken to analyse the collected data 
is illustrated in Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6: Data analysis steps 
 
 
3.6 Research Quality, Rigour and Ethics 
The research design described in the previous sections represents a logical set of statements 
that can be judged through several tests commonly used to validate the quality and rigour of 
empirical social research (Yin 2014; Easterby-Smith et al. 2015). In this study, four tests were 
conducted to substantiate the construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability of the research in an effort to enhance its quality and rigour.  
 
First, to improve the quality of this study based on construct validity, multiple sources of 
evidence were used to build a chain of evidence. Key informants were also included to review 
the draft of the case study report. Second, to enhance internal validity, pattern matching was 
conducted to assure that the sequence was checked for the presence of constituents and 
potential rival explanations were systematically addressed. In addition, inter-coder assessment 
was conducted to enhance the plausibility of findings. Third, to enhance the generalisability of 
the findings, the comparability of the environmental contexts of the USOs in this study and the 
USOs in other universities was maximised (Yin 2014). Finally, to ensure reliability, every 
procedure involved in the protocol and database was documented and systematically stored 
(Miles & Huberman 1994; Saunders et al. 2000; Yin 2014). All tactics used to ensure the 
quality and rigor of research are summarised in Table 3-5. 
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Test Aim Tactics used by this research Phase 
Construct 
validity 
To identify the correct 
operational measures for the 
concepts being used 
§ Used multiple source of evidence 
§ Established chain of evidence 
§ Had key informants review a draft 
of the case study report 
 
§ Data 
collection, 
data analysis  
Internal validity 
To establish a causal 
relationship whereby certain 
conditions are believed to 
lead to other conditions 
 
§ Conducted pattern matching 
§ Addressed rival explanations 
§ Conducted inter-coder assessment 
 
§ Data analysis 
External validity 
To define the domain in 
which findings can be 
generalised 
 
§ Used replication logic in multiple-
case studies 
§ Retained a homogenous case 
setting 
 
§ Research 
design 
Reliability  
To demonstrate that the 
operations of a study can be 
repeated with the same 
results 
§ Systematically documented 
procedure 
§ Used case study protocol 
§ Used multiple cases 
 
§ Data 
collection 
Table 3-5: Tactics to ensure the quality and rigour of the research 
 
 
Research ethics are defined as the appropriateness of a researcher’s behaviours in relation to 
the rights of those who become the subject of work or are affected by it (Saunders et al. 2000). 
This research aspired to the highest possible ethical standards and maintained strong 
professionalism and competence by, for example, keeping up with related research, ensuring 
accuracy, striving for credibility and divulging methodological qualifiers and limitations (Yin 
2014). Three measures were adopted to ensure that the ethical considerations of the research 
were adhered to. The measures were manifested during the research design, data collection, 
data analysis and reporting stages. 
 
First, during the research design stage, cases were equitably selected using a two-staged, 
purposive and homogeneous sampling procedure to ensure that no group was excluded or 
included unnecessarily. A case study is not a way to substantiate a preconceived position (Yin 
2014). Second, during data collection, informants’ confidentiality was protected to ensure that 
they were not unwittingly put in an undesirable position. The signed CDA required the 
researcher to ensure that the outcomes of the inquiry did not interfere with the business of the 
companies and people that contributed information. Thus, all communications with informants 
were treated with strict confidentiality. In addition, any data that could reveal the identity of 
participants were intentionally omitted from this manuscript. After scrutiny of the nature of the 
case study and formally soliciting volunteers, each interviewee also provided informed consent 
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to participate in this research. Lastly, during the data analysis and reporting stages, the collected 
data were interpreted justly and reported correctly. This study tolerated contrary findings. The 
confidentiality and anonymity of the cases and informants were continuously maintained 
throughout the reporting stage. The overall research design and process are presented in Figure 
3-7. 
 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to describe and justify the methodological approach adopted in 
this study, in particular, the plan of enquiry to answer the question posed earlier. Based on its 
philosophical stance, this research was conducted using an inductive, cross-sectional, multiple-
case study design. Four cleantech USOs were purposely selected. Data from 60 interviews and 
a substantial amount of archival data were collected using multiple triangulation techniques. 
The collected data were analysed using the grounded approach and template analysis approach. 
The next chapter will individually describe each case. A detailed examination is performed for 
each case’s journey to commercialisation of new university technology and the resultant 
business models. 
 
71 
  
Figure 3-7: Research design and linkages between chapters
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4 CASE STUDIES 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter details the four case studies used as primary sources of evidence to satisfy the 
research question earlier posed. Section 4.2 provides a general background of the cleantech 
industry and justifies the selection of cleantech as the industry of choice. Following that, 
sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 present the case studies for AlphaVent, BetaRecycle, 
GammaSolar and DeltaCool, respectively. Each case is reported in a descriptive way, following 
the history of technology commercialisation throughout the ideation and incorporation, 
prototyping and commercialisation stages. The resulting business models are also discussed. 
Finally, section 4.7 summarises this chapter. 
 
4.2 Industry Background 
Also referred to as clean technology, ‘cleantech’ is an industry term and investment theme used 
in multiple settings but lacking a standard definition. Some practitioners argue that cleantech 
is not an industrial sector in itself, and its definition involves the congruence of technologies 
focusing on sustainability, mitigation and adaptation to climate change or reduction of natural 
resources (Caprotti 2012). Similarly, Kachan and Fugere (2013) define cleantech as new 
technology and/or related business models intended to provide a diverse range of products, 
services and processes using renewable materials and energy sources while reducing the use of 
natural resources and cutting or eliminating emission and waste. It also aims to provide superior 
performance at low costs. Cleantech is often used interchangeably with the term ‘greentech’, 
which is an umbrella term encompassing investment assets, technology and business sectors 
that include clean energy, environmental and sustainable or ‘green’ products and services27. 
 
Cleantech is a relatively new technology sector which rose in prominence starting 2002 
(Kachan & Fugere 2013). The primary interest of cleantech industry lies in the decline of the 
relative cost of clean technology and increased understanding of the link between industrial 
design in the 19th century and in the early 20th century (Cohen & Philipsen 2010). Going forward, 
the driving forces of cleantech are intensified partly because of resource scarcity, resource 
independence, climate change, changing policy and regulatory requirements (Kachan & Fugere 
                                                
27 What is Cleantech? (Dikeman, N., 2015). Available at: http://www.cleantech.org/what-is-cleantech/  
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2013). Historically, the general perception of cleantech was limited to clean energy. However, 
growing investments in clean infrastructure, technology and services are being made across all 
sectors of the economy, including storage, efficiency, water, clean industry and transportation. 
As depicted in Figure 4-1, the categorisation of cleantech is complex and spans diverse 
industrial sectors, with wind and solar (part of the clean energy sector) constituting the biggest 
subsector. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Major groupings of cleantech sectors (Source: Kachan & Fugere 2013) 
 
 
Presently, cleantech is becoming more ubiquitous and is poised for even more rapid expansion. 
In addition, it is recognised as a tool to achieve sustainable industrialisation. A new analysis 
by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) (Figure 4-2) showed that, in 2017, global 
spending on clean energy (the biggest cleantech subsector) projects reached USD 333.5 billion. 
This represented an increase in 3% from the previous year and was only 7% short of the record 
USD 360 billion spent in 2015. In addition, cumulative spending on clean energy has reached 
USD 2.5 trillion since the start of the decade. 
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Figure 4-2: New global investment in the clean energy sector (in billion USD)                
(Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)) 
 
 
With the steady investments in cleantech, more cutting-edge technologies are able to respond 
to the global energy and climate challenge issues. Cleantech firms are now at the forefront of 
technological advancement and the transition to a sustainable industry (Del Río 2005). Mrkajic 
et al. (2017) argue that most of these breakthrough technologies originate in entrepreneurial 
ventures like USOs rather than incumbent corporations. However, few cleantech USOs manage 
to transform their technology into big commercial successes (Migendt et al. 2017). Moreover, 
the establishment of a cleantech USO is not as common as other technology USOs, like those 
focusing on software, biotech and medtech (Lubik & Garnsey 2016). Unlike incumbent 
corporations, cleantech USOs seem to encounter all the challenges faced by USOs in other 
industries with added uncertainty associated with existing in a high-inertia and commodity-
driven industry.  
 
First, cleantech USOs are least preferred by inventors and VCs because they are uncompetitive 
in commodity markets, and hence, investors struggle to find attractive risk-reward premiums 
for their investments (Knight 2012). The conflicting motivations of cleantech entrepreneurs 
and investors usually only result in short-term financial gain (Migendt et al. 2017). 
Unfavourable cleantech investments are prevalent at the early-stage and further exacerbated by 
the financial crisis in 2008 (McCrone et al. 2012). Second, the length of cleantech 
commercialisation cycles is generally greater than in other fields, such as biotech, software and 
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medtech because scaling up is difficult. Due to its nascent stage, a cleantech USO always 
requires complementary innovations because it is still remote from the end customer (Lubik & 
Garnsey 2016). Finally, cleantech USOs demand stronger market pressure from the critical 
mass of the private sector, government and academic actors that support widespread adoption 
(Giudici et al. 2017).  
 
Bocken (2015) and Migendt et al. (2017) argue that the factors affecting cleantech USOs’ 
success are the novelty of the business model and collaboration with different firms. Despite 
this, limited work has focused on business models suited to the commercialisation of scientific 
research on celantech, and there seems to be relatively little information available on the 
ecosystem of young cleantech enterprises (Gaddy et al. 2017) A thorough investigation to 
understand the underlying strategy for a viable business model underscores an upmost 
importance in the transition to sustainable economies. 
 
4.3 Case 1: AlphaVent  
AlphaVent is a company developed within the Department of Engineering in 2006 following 
the discovery of a propriety e-stack mixing ventilation system. The realised business model 
involves manufacture, customisation and sale of cheaper, more efficient and greener natural 
ventilation systems to building owners. AlphaVent was incorporated about six years after the 
idea was fleshed out. After two years of successful prototyping, the USO launched its product 
into the market and managed to hit the first sales milestone within the same year. In 2016, 
AlphaVent was acquired by a bigger firm. In 2017, AlphaVent was 10 years old and had 
already launched its product into the market. Hence, it was a case of an immature USO with 
commercialised products. The firm’s commercialisation journey across TRLs and 
commercialisation stages is presented in Figure 4-3. 
 
Ideation and Incorporation (2000–2006)  
AlphaVent technology was developed based on research conducted by a senior lecturer from 
the Department of Engineering and an eminent professor from the X Institute focusing on low-
energy natural ventilation. The lecturer previously worked as a strategy consultant at a financial 
firm, and the professor was the head of the X Institute in Cambridge. The research was funded 
by an international oil and gas firm as part of the Cambridge–MIT Institute (CMI) Partnership 
Programme, which aimed to exploit research findings for the benefit of society and the 
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economy of the UK. In line with the aspiration of the CMI Partnership Programme, the lecturer 
aligned his research with feedback from the architects to devise a novel solution for ventilating 
buildings with fresh air in the winter months without freezing the occupants.  
 
In 2003, the inventors discovered a new way to provide natural ventilation to buildings by 
adopting a propriety e-stack mixing ventilation system, which was claimed to have the potential 
to reduce heating bills by as much as 50%. The new technology exploited the heat produced 
by people, lights and sunlight and avoided wasteful use of radiators. Provision of energy to 
buildings accounts for around 40% of the energy consumption in the developed world28. In 
2004, the inventors applied for a patent on their passive ventilation stack invention. While 
waiting for the patent to be filed, the inventors talked with other people from the industry to 
refine the technology and develop it into products with the maximum impact on the 
marketplace. The patent was then filed in May 2005. According to the inventor, 
 
“When we filed the Cambridge University patent, we knew we were onto something 
big. No one had previously understood the energy saving achieved by mixing in a 
natural ventilation scheme. All the natural ventilation system on the market simply 
dumped cold air in winter, or used energy-hungry radiators to try and overcome cold 
draughts.” 
 
In January 2006, AlphaVent was founded, with the lecturer assuming the role of CEO and the 
professor assuming the role of technical director. In January 2010, four years after its 
incorporation, AlphaVent changed its name to one that is more relatable to its technology. 
Having successfully established a company, the funder, TTO and the founders acknowledged 
the commercial terms that allowed the funder and the TTO to hold shares in the USO through 
an equity-only agreement, and AlphaVent was given royalty-free, exclusive commercial rights 
to the university-owned technology. 
 
 
 
                                                
28Source: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency/buildings  
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Prototyping (2006–2008) 
With ongoing funding from the international oil and gas firm for the development of its 
prototypes, AlphaVent spent the first two years concentrating their efforts on the proof of 
concept and validation of the technology in a real environment. Since the technology was not 
fully developed, it was agreed up front that once the product is market-ready, either AlphaVent 
or the funder will be the commercial entity associated with the new technology; if the funder 
commercialised the technology, then they would pay AlphaVent an ongoing royalty, or vice 
versa. 
 
In 2006, AlphaVent piloted the first version of its eco-ventilation system in schools across the 
UK. The gathered data were used to determine the appropriate control algorithm for multiple 
e-stack systems in the winter prior to proposing practical applications to contractors and 
architects who declared interest in the technology. While actively advocating its technology, 
AlphaVent also invested in market research and constantly reviewed current and upcoming 
regulations that would support their offerings. 
 
By 2008, the firm managed to optimise its ventilation system with energy savings of 10 to 50 
megawatt (MW) per hour of pre-heat, equivalent to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions of two to 
10 tonnes per year. Compared with a mechanically air-conditioned system, savings of 40MW 
per hour per year, equivalent to eight tonnes of CO2 emissions, were achieved. The firm began 
to enjoy greater traction among investors and customers. AlphaVent also established a positive 
market presence because its technology was novel and it had received many awards, including 
the Project of the Year at the 2008 RICS Pro Yorkshire Awards. 
 
Commercialisation (2008–2017) 
AlphaVent started to commercially introduce the e-stack system into the market in 2008 and 
began to sell its ventilation systems and commercial projects within the same year. However, 
the sales made during that time were only sufficient for its survival as a start-up. Given what 
AlphaVent achieved as a young firm, consensus was achieved between the funder and 
AlphaVent that AlphaVent would continue to be the commercial entity. However, rather than 
receiving ongoing royalties from AlphaVent, the funder decided to sign an equity-only 
agreement partly because the USO’s core business did not align with the funder’s commercial 
business concerning oil, gas and related technologies.  
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Around 2008, the industry was hit by the recession and, as a result, AlphaVent decided to 
compete based on price. The CEO described the competition as harsh in his interview: 
 
“The competition was really harsh. You’re competing on price for an equal or 
approved product. If it’s a better product, then we learned that you can’t charge much 
of a premium for it. It’s not, given the structure market, if anything at all, but if you’re 
offering a better product, then people are very interested in talking to you.” 
 
In the following years, AlphaVent tried twice, unsuccessfully, to outsource its sales function, 
missed its sales forecast and almost lost its momentum. Despite this, a deal with a VC was 
signed in 2009, allowing the USO to invest in product development while extending its sales 
team. In 2014, AlphaVent’s patent was infringed upon, causing a loss of five projects worth 
approximately GBP 300,000 of potential income.   
 
Over the years, the firm continued to create value for building owners, with operations 
revolving around quicker and higher returns on investment. The benefits of mixing ventilation 
became clearer when written into regulations, such as the BB101 Guidelines on Ventilation, 
Thermal Comfort and Indoor Air Quality in Schools. Since then, AlphaVent’s technology has 
been implemented in more than 300 buildings in the UK. In the 2015/16 financial year, the 
firm exceeded its revenue forecast of more than 30% growth with average three-year sales 
growth of 52.25% and recorded sales of GBP 7.8 million. In December 2016, after 10 years of 
establishment, AlphaVent’s entire share was bought by an international supplier of ventilation 
products to the residential and commercial construction markets. 
 
4.4 Case 2: BetaRecycle  
BetaRecycle was incorporated in 2005 following the discovery of a novel technology to 
recover useful materials from plastic aluminium laminate (PAL), which is widely used in 
packaging but is not fully recyclable. The research was conducted at the Department of 
Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology as a PhD research in 1997 and advanced as a 
postdoctoral research in 2002. After spending about two years prototyping, BetaRecycle 
assembled a bench scale demonstration unit and launched its proven technology in 2008. The 
business model involved customisation and sale of greener PAL recovery plants for waste 
handlers. However, the USO has not made any sales yet. In 2017, BetaRecycle was 11 years 
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old and represented a case of a mature USO with products and service that were already 
launched in the market. The firm’s commercialisation journey across TRLs and 
commercialisation stages is presented in Figure 4-4. 
 
Ideation and Incorporation (1997–2005) 
The ideation of BetaRecycle can be traced back to a PhD research that investigated the 
environmental applications of microwave heating of carbon, specifically, microwave-induced 
pyrolysis for plastics. It was steered by a young researcher and supervised by a well-known 
professor, who was the former head of the Department of Biochemical and Environmental 
Engineering. Using the pyrolysis process, both scientists discovered a novel technology that 
could recover oil and aluminium from PAL. The findings translated into a new approach to the 
recycling of PAL, which is widely used in product packaging and was not previously fully 
recyclable. It is estimated that roughly 160,000 tonnes of PAL rubbish is disposed of in UK 
landfills each year29. BetaRecycle’s technology offers a solution to eliminate the need to send 
PAL waste to landfills or incinerators and prevents valuable resources from going to waste. 
 
In 2002, while pursuing his postdoctoral research, the researcher approached the technology 
transfer unit to discuss the future of the newly discovered technology. During that time, the 
university TTO had not yet been established and the IP policy for revenue distribution was not 
fully articulated. It was agreed that the university would bear the cost of patenting the new 
technology and would co-own the patent, the researcher would get two-thirds of the royalties 
of the patent and the university would get one-third. A patent for the microwave-induced 
pyrolysis reactor and method was applied for in 2002 and filed in December 2003. According 
to the CEO, he initially did not anticipate founding a company after his research discovery: 
 
“I went to the research service division when I was halfway through postdoc work, I 
said, ‘We have this idea we think is commercial, what do we do?’ I knew nothing, 
absolutely nothing, about how to commercialise this, I didn’t even know where to start. 
To be quite honest, I did not foresee founding a company, I just knew that there was a 
potential commercial opportunity and I wanted someone to do something with it.” 
                                                
29Source: https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/features/where-theres-muck-theres-aluminium-if-not-brass  
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Through one of the initiatives in the technology transfer unit, called the Challenge Fund, the 
researcher was put in contact with entrepreneurial mentors. The mentors convinced the 
researcher to establish a company so that there would be an official platform to develop and 
validate the technology. This suggestion led to the incorporation of BetaRecycle as a private 
limited company in February 2005, with the researcher assuming the role of CEO and the 
professor acting as chairman of the board.  
 
Prototyping (2005–2007) 
In May 2005, with the help of the mentors in the Challenge Fund, the USO developed a 
business plan and entered two university entrepreneurial competitions, the 50k Business 
Creation Competition and the People, Planet, Productivity Cambridge University 
Entrepreneurs Business Plan Competition. Although no prototype was established, 
BetaRecycle won both competitions and secured a seed investment of GBP 200,000. However, 
the investors agreed to release the investment fund only if BetaRecycle managed to produce a 
small-scale prototype. The Challenge Fund agreed to invest in a small-scale prototype with a 
convertible loan. The prototype was then developed over several months. 
 
The seed investment allowed BetaRecycle to build its execution team and kick-start the work 
for its first demonstration unit prototype over the nine months. From 2006 onwards, the firm 
was focused on validating the technology in a relevant environment. One of the angel investors 
requested to join the board, after which he became heavily involved in BetaRecycle. After 
about a year of sitting on the board, he took over BetaRecycle’s chairmanship in September 
2006. The professor, who was the former chairman, still sits on the board as a non-executive 
member. As a novice entrepreneur, the CEO received coaching advice mostly from the new 
chairman, who was a serial entrepreneur. 
 
While BetaRecycle was working on the demonstration unit prototype, several fast-moving 
consumer goods (FMCG) firms and government agencies, expressed their interest and wished 
to support the development of the technology to gain early access to its industrial applications. 
However, the prototyping stage was challenging and, as a result, BetaRecycle took longer than 
expected to build the demonstration unit. They only moved from the proof of concept stage to 
the prototyping stage in 2007, when the firm finally managed to get the prototype unit working. 
During that time, BetaRecycle was still the first firm in the world to use microwave-induced 
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pyrolysis technology to recycle PAL, with a break-even point of 3.5 years. The previous 
chairman described the long time required to take the product to market as follows: 
 
“…it has taken us much longer time to iron out the problems of operating this 
technology at scale, I’d say nobody had ever done it before, so we had to solve 
unforeseen issues as we went and I think it’s fair to say that it has taken us longer than 
we had ever hoped.” 
 
Commercialisation (2007–2017)  
Upon completion of its demonstration unit, BetaRecycle actively promoted its proven 
technology and tried to gain stronger traction among potential customers involved in the PAL 
value chain. It aimed to customise and build recycling plants for FMCG companies, local 
authorities and waste handlers. Unfortunately, the 2008 financial crisis caused a significant 
collapse in demand for industrial commodities. As a result, potential customers were no longer 
interested in buying the plant. According to the CEO, 
 
“Whoever a few years ago had said, ‘Oh yeah, we’ll buy a plant for sure, whenever 
you’re ready, here’s the cheque,’ kind of thing, now are saying, ‘Well, with the price of 
commodities and how they are, I’m not interested now.’ You can shout at them as much 
as you want, show them any number of studies showing that the price of oil and the 
price of commodities will not stay at the levels that they are at now, they just don’t 
care.” 
 
BetaRecycle faced a challenging commercialisation stage when none of the targeted customers 
seemed to perceive the value as how the USO had wished to advocate it. Further, there was 
still no segregation platform that would separate PAL from other general waste, and therefore 
adoption of the technology meant that waste handlers needed to have capital not only to buy 
the plant but also to invest in waste segregation. Moreover, when it comes to recycling, 
stakeholders still had the option to bypass the recycling process because the conventional 
method of dumping waste at the landfill or incinerating it was still legal. Scaling up was also 
difficult partly due to the lack of regulation or policies to drive the technology forward. 
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In 2011, BetaRecycle entered a partnership with the Waste and Resource Action Programme 
(WRAP) to fund a trial which successfully proved that BetaRecycle’s process was 
technologically and environmentally sound. In the same year, the USO received the Best New 
Technology award at the National Recycling Awards. In 2012, the USO decided to build its 
first commercial-scale plant to allow the technology to be fully commissioned and demonstrate 
the capabilities and economics of the process to investors and waste handlers. In 2013, three 
FMCG giants agreed to co-finance the establishment of the plant and, in return, were given the 
right to use BetaRecycle ecolabels on their food packaging. In 2016, when the plant was fully 
operational, BR entered negotiations with a serious buyer who wanted to buy a plant. BR was 
also in an arrangement with a PAL manufacturer to recycle its industrial scrap for less than 
what they would have spent sending it to landfill.  
 
4.5 Case 3: GammaSolar  
GammaSolar is a firm developed within the Department of Physics in 2012 that aimed to 
produce lower-cost solar energy using organic photovoltaics (OPV). The intended business 
model involved manufacture, customisation and sale of higher-performance OPV modules for 
off-grid users. The prototyping stage started at the end of 2010 and is still ongoing. 
GammaSolar was about six years old in 2017 and had not officially launched its product in the 
market. Therefore, the USO represents a case of an immature USO without commercialised 
products. The firm’s commercialisation journey across TRLs and commercialisation stages is 
presented in Figure 4-5. 
 
Ideation and Incorporation (2007–2010) 
GammaSolar was founded after three professors at University of Cambridge’s Department of 
Physics won a Carbon Trust-funded project aimed to unlock the potential of OPV to deliver 
lower-cost solar energy in October 2007. Prior to winning the competition, the research group 
had already carried out fundamental studies on different aspects of organic semiconductor 
materials, including OPV. The group was led by a professor who is a world-renowned expert 
pioneering the study of plastic electronic properties. An initial GBP five million investment 
was used to fund the first three years of a long development process. Recalling the founding of 
the USO, the founder acknowledged the support received from Company Y, a British based 
technology commercialisation company: 
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“GammaSolar was a company that started in a rather peculiar way. There was a 
competition launched by the Carbon Trust for what they called PV Accelerators. We 
made a pitch. It seemed that it was a good idea at the time. The pitch was to make use 
of a lot of know-how in the research labs here as to how to make printed solar cells 
based on organic semiconductors. We won the competition, we had quite a lot of 
support from Company Y for their bid. Once we won, we then had a lot of work involved 
in deciding what to do.” 
In an effort to improve the efficiency of OPV, the research group discovered a breakthrough 
technology that could provide solar power at a lower price than that of earlier solar generations 
by manufacturing high-performance OPV cells for markets with high growth of volume using 
roll to roll30  (R2R) technology. The discovery was aligned with Carbon Trust’s desire to deploy 
more than one gigawatt (GW) of OPV by 2017, which could deliver CO2 savings of more than 
1 million tonnes per year. The market for OPV has the potential to reach USD two billion by 
2020 and could save up to 900 million tonnes of CO2 by 205031. 
GammaSolar was incorporated in July 2010, with the professors acting as the director of the 
board. Few months after incorporation, GammaSolar employed a serial entrepreneur as the 
USO’s CEO. Within the same year, an international specialty chemicals firm co-invested in 
GammaSolar. A patent was filed in June 2012 and licensed back to GammaSolar to be 
exploited. 
 
Prototyping (2011–2017) 
The subsequent commercial phase aimed to develop prototypes backed by ongoing funding 
from Carbon Trust and an international specialty chemicals firm. Due to the complexity of the 
technology, prototype development was lagged. While advocating the technology, the CEO 
saw an untapped market opportunity for solar energy in the African market, which did not 
require the GammaSolar prototype to be fully established. In July 2012, GammaSolar 
developed GammaSolar2 to commercialise pay-as-you-go solar boxes using older-generation 
silicon panels. The intention was to substitute the silicon panel with OPV once the prototype 
was ready. Both GammaSolar and GammaSolar2 became independent, and GammaSolar 
shareholders held shares of GammaSolar2. In 2013, a new CEO of GammaSolar was 
                                                
30 The process of creating electronic devices on a roll of flexible plastic or metal foil.  
31Source: https://www.oecd.org/env/cc/49082173.pdf  
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appointed. One of the major revamps led by the new CEO was to change GammaSolar strategy 
from being technology pushed to be market pulled. As the new CEO said in the interview, 
 
“When I came, we didn’t have any customers. The company was emotionally focused 
on engineering development of technology and you know that’s fatal. It’s okay for a 
while because you have some point but it is never too soon to get customers involved 
and the company needed challenging. Right, we are going to change this, we are going 
to shift the emphasis around, board meeting and management meeting around. It get to 
the point where I can make some samples, now I need customers telling me what 
samples to make.” 
 
In 2014, the solar industry became even more challenging after gas became very cheap and 
there was a collapse in desire for renewable energy. Many solar companies faced bankruptcy. 
Despite this, in November 2014, GammaSolar secured additional funding of GBP one million 
to further develop its proprietary production processes to prepare for high-volume 
manufacturing and to expand its commercial activities. The new equity financing was led a 
British-based IP firm, with support from existing investors.  
 
In 2016, GammaSolar optimised its R2R coating plant to produce up to 200,000 meter squared 
(m2) OPV per year. Although the final product was not ready yet, GammaSolar actively 
distributed solar module samples and discussed price points with potential customers. It aimed 
to commercialise OPV in two other niche markets: 1) the wireless and Internet of things market, 
which enabled micro-generation for a world of connected smart devices and the building of 
automation and security, monitoring and tracking and consumer electronics; and 2) the retail 
market, which enabled determination of point-of-sale advertising, pricing, signage and the 
logistics of transitioning from the shelf to warehouses through engagement with on-shelf 
displays and store stock tracking.  
 
4.6  Case 4: DeltaCool 
DeltaCool was incorporated in 2003 as part of postdoctoral research at the Department of 
Material Science conducted in 2002 following the discovery of magnetocaloric refrigerant. The 
intended business model involved manufacture, customisation and sale of more efficient and 
environmentally friendly cooling devices for domestic fridge manufacturers. In 2017, 
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DeltaCool was still dealing with the technical aspects of its prototype and was not able to 
launch a finished product in the market. The firm has existed for 13 years but has not officially 
launched its product in the market. Thus, this case represents a mature firm without a 
commercialised product. The firm’s commercialisation journey across TRLs and 
commercialisation stages is presented in Figure 4-6. 
 
Ideation and Incorporation (2002–2004) 
The incorporation of DeltaCool preceded a research on magnetic refrigeration by a postdoctoral 
researcher, who was supervised by an eminent professor at the Material Science laboratory, 
conducted in May 2002. The professor was the head of the Department of Materials Science 
and Metallurgy. The researcher investigated the potential of a gadolinium-containing alloy to 
be to be used in lower-cost magnetic refrigeration by extracting rare-earth elements from the 
material. Within three years of Enginnering and Physical Science Resaecrh Council (EPSRC) 
funding, a year was spent unsuccessfully investigating the gadolinium-containing alloy. In 
2003, DeltaCool turned to an alternative material, cobalt manganese silica. The USO was 
founded in May 2003, with the professor sitting at the board, the scientist assuming the role of 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO). A physicist joined the USOs and then was appointed as the 
CEO. Within the same year, a patent was applied for and filed in September 2005. According 
to the founder of the USO, the decision to start a company was partly motivated by the 
commercialisation potential of the material he was investigating: 
 
“So, those materials themselves have not achieved commercialisation but we said, 
‘Okay, let’s think about commercialising them.’ Because at that time we didn’t know 
their limits. We didn’t know could they work, could we optimise, could we make them 
as good as possible? And so, we said, ‘Okay, let’s start a company that would maybe 
take those materials, well it would design and build kind of magnetic cooling engines.’” 
 
The first year and a half after incorporation was spent raising funds in preparation for the 
prototyping stage. In 2006, DeltaCool conducted market research and discovered a weak 
market signal for the technology among fridge and air conditioning manufacturers because they 
were comfortable with conventional gas compressor technology. Despite this, the European 
refrigeration industry was interested in alternative technologies, and legislative incentives 
created a climate for higher-efficiency devices. To illustrate, the magnetic refrigeration market 
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is expected to reach USD 315.7 million by 2022, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 
of 98.7% between 2017 and 202232. Given this, the founders were convinced that among 
methods of solid-state cooling, magnetic cooling was the most disruptive technology.  
 
Prototyping 1 (2004–2008) 
DeltaCool’s prototyping stage started around 2004 but was not successful because the material 
optimisation process was more complex than anticipated. Additionally, the market space was 
quickly saturated by multiple companies optimising different materials. After approximately 
four years of unsuccessful attempts to optimise cobalt manganese silica, in 2008, DeltaCool 
brought its material prototyping to a halt and switched to a different niche within the magnetic 
cooling industry. 
 
Ideation 2 (2008) 
Instead of focusing on material optimisation, DeltaCool shifted its aim to design a magnetic 
cooling device that could be embedded in domestic refrigerators for a more efficient, less noisy 
and environmental-friendly cooling system. A new patent on the design and fabrication of 
multi-material blades used as active regenerative regenerators in active regenerative 
magnetocaloric or electrocaloric engines was applied for in 2009 and filed in June 2012. The 
CEO described the USO’s shift of focus as follows: 
 
“So, it is not anymore about taking this particular material and making it useful, it’s 
been about designing a low cost, small, compact, refrigeration system, that could use 
any material, ideally. In the future, just pick the best one [material] available. There 
are two families of materials that have come through the literature and into semi-
commercial production by chemical companies.” 
 
In order to achieve higher-efficiency cooling using conventional technology, refrigerator’s  
wall needs to be wide and thick or use expensive insulation material. With the new patent, 
DeltaCool’s technology could overcome this problem by reducing costs and cutting energy 
usage by 40%. With its new technology, DeltaCool gained a healthy reputation within the 
                                                
32 Source: http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/magnetic-refrigeration-market-243034247.html  
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refrigeration industry. The firm survived the subsequent R&D stage mainly due to grants from, 
for example, the Carbon Trust and the EU. It also collaborated with researchers from other 
universities. In 2008, the USO appointed a business developer. 
 
Prototyping 2 (2008–2017) 
Although in principle the firm’s concept was successful, getting the technology to work 
unattended for a long time was still a challenge. As the USO continued to accelerate the 
development of its technology, fridge manufacturing still moved very slowly; it has not 
changed for the past 50 years. The magnetic refrigeration industry saw a relatively weak drive 
to develop cooling device, and hence the network chain was insufficient for bringing 
DeltaCool’s technology into commercial reality. There were very few companies similar to 
DeltaCool who served as competitors, but due to years of experience in magnetic refrigeration, 
DeltaCool managed to retain a competitive advantage by having less expensive designs than 
its competitors. 
  
In 2017, DeltaCool was still optimising its technology and operated like a virtual company. 
However, backed by an unshakeable belief that the novel technology would be welcomed by 
the industry, the firm continued to bring value to its potential customers. By 2018, DeltaCool 
planned to evaluate the fridge it assembled for fridge manufacturers. Next, it planned to focus 
on finalising the device and design based on a new patent. The firm aimed to license its 
technology to the fridge manufacturer once the technology was ready. 
 
4.7  Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the general background of the cleantech industry and justified it as 
the industry of choice for operationalisation of this research. It also presented the four case 
studies and their business models in great depth. The next chapter will examine the themes, 
similarities and differences across the four cases to collectively mobilise the findings that are 
useful for answering the research question of this thesis.  
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Figure 4-3: AlphaVent’s technology, commercialisation journey and realised business model 
 
Figure 4-4: BetaRecycle’s technology, commercialisation journey and realised business model 
 
Figure 4-5: GammaSolar’s technology, commercialisation journey and intended business model 
 
Figure 4-6: DeltaCool’s technology, commercialisation journey and intended business model 
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5 FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
In the previous chapter, each case was described individually based on the technology 
commercialisation journey and its resulting business model. This chapter collectively 
substantiates the findings across cases to identify common patterns and, therefore, answer the 
research question: how does a USO develop its early-stage business models to commercialise 
new technology? Chapter 5 is split into six main sections. Section 5.2 presents the cross-case, 
open coding, axial coding and selective coding findings which depict the three mechanisms for 
business model development. Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 further elaborates the findings and 
provide evidence that enables understanding of how a USO 1) creates value through flow-field 
control; 2) captures value through pragmatic kinesis; and 3) manages value network through 
deliberate temperament. Next, section 5.6 presents the underlying principles used to guide the 
findings in the template analysis. The conceptual framework summarising the key findings is 
graphically presented in Section 5.7. Finally, section 5.8 summarises this chapter. 
 
5.2 Three Mechanisms for Business Models Development 
The second-round open coding and third-round axial as well as selective coding analysis 
resulted in key depictions that illuminated the approaches taken by USOs to develop business 
models while responding to external challenges. To reiterate the overarching purpose of the 
analysis, the findings that arose from the analysis, which resembled the emerging categories, 
were viewed in parallel with the unique challenges faced by the USOs across the business 
model components. A summary of the results of inter-case coding analysis are presented in 
Table 5-1. 
 
The categories that emerged from the analysis were further synthesised through constant 
reviewing until theoretical saturation was achieved33. The categories were then structured to 
aggregate the categories into higher levels of abstraction. The resulting data structure, which 
                                                
33 The phase of qualitative data analysis in which the researcher has continued sampling and analysing data until no new data 
appear and all concepts of the theory are well- developed (Morse 2004). 
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provides a graphical context in which to understand the derivation of the second-order themes 
and the aggregate dimensions, is outlined in Figure 5-1. 
 
Value components Unique challenges Emerging categories 
Value proposition and 
value creation 
Crafting value proposition and creating 
value in the face of market resistance  
§ Create transcending solution 
§ Create sintering solution 
§ Propose new regulation 
§ Ride the wave of regulatory reform 
Value capture 
Creating value in the face of financial 
pressure 
 
§ Explore auxiliary revenue stream 
§ Enter substitute market 
§ Employ customisation strategy 
§ Employ cost efficiency strategy 
 
Value network 
Managing stakeholders with conflicting 
values 
 
§ Forge co-operation 
§ Forge co-opetition  
§ Trade-off incompatible values 
§ Tolerate divergent values 
Table 5-1: Results of cross-case, open-coding analysis 
 
 
Linking the analysis results back to the research question, the empirical findings suggest that a 
USO develops its business models through three interlocking, iterative and interdependent 
mechanisms namely: 1) value creation through flow-field control; 2) value capture through 
pragmatic kinesis; and 3) value network management through deliberate temperament. The 
findings cast new light into the partial explanation of business model development that usually 
depicts a business model as a block, hence, suggests a vague description of business model 
development approach whereby the intricateness of a business model that constitute several 
sub-components has been widely disregarded. 
 
Based on the data structure, the following sections provide in-depth descriptions of each 
mechanism at three levels of abstractions (i.e. aggregate dimensions, second-order themes and 
first-order categories). Exemplary quotes from the interviews and archival data are also 
presented within the sub-sections to more explicitly portray how a USO creates value and 
embeds it into a proposition, captures value and manages its value network. 
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Figure 5-1: Data structure 
 
 
5.3 Value Proposition and Value Creation through Flow-Field Control 
When resistance to new technology was high, USOs across cases created and incorporated 
value in their propositions by devising flow-field control34. Flow-field control is a mechanism 
                                                
34 Flow-field control is performed by a fish to control the water flow while swimming. It is intended to enhance propulsion, 
reduce drag, and coordinate feeding and locomotion. As the water friction slows down the fish’s movement, the fish propels 
through water by pushing back and forcing their way through the incompressible medium. Flow-field control is an analogy 
used to describe how USOs take active control over their resources and capabilities to proactively craft propositions, create 
value and overcome market resistance. 
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orchestrated by USOs that proactively exerts endogenous force within the firms’ control and 
influences exogenous forces (from its partners) to create value.  
 
Across cases, USOs were disadvantaged by weak signal and pushback from the market, which 
were exacerbated by the infancy of the technology and ambiguity of the market. As 
DeltaCool’s director of business development said, “[t]here was a weak signal from the 
market. You have to be able to intercept before you know.” Similarly, DeltaCool’s inventor 
highlighted that “[t]he fridge manufacturing industry over the past 50 years, they haven’t 
changed.” In addition, BetaRecycle’s CEO remarked, “[w]e are changing the business model 
to be able to accelerate that [the technology] because the waste management sector is so risk 
and technology-averse, they haven’t changed for so many years.” 
 
Two ways of creating value through flow-field control observed in this study were 1) 
enrichment of technological benefits; and 2) regulatory manoeuvring. The data structure for 
the aggregate dimension, termed flow-field control, is presented in Table 5-2. For data 
reporting, key quotes are depicted within the sub-sections and additional quotes that mapped 
to the first-order category are provided in Table 5-3. 
 
First-order category Second-order theme Aggregate dimension 
Create transcending solution   
Enrichment of technological 
benefits  
 
 
Flow-field control 
 
(an approach taken by a USO to 
craft propositions, create valuable 
offerings and overcome market 
resistance by taking active control 
over its resources and capabilities) 
 
Create sintering solution 
Propose new regulation 
Regulatory manoeuvring   
Ride the wave of regulatory reform 
Table 5-2: Data structure for the aggregate dimension of flow-field control 
 
 
 Enrichment of Technological Benefits 
The analysis indicated that a USO crafted a viable proposition and created value by enriching 
the properties of the technological solution beyond what the targeted customer expected. In 
this sense, the USO challenged incumbent corporations by solving a problem for customers 
before they explicitly asked for a solution or even before the problem arose. By doing so, the 
USO created unique value, shifted customers’ perception of what was valuable, avoided being 
average and raised the bar for competition. In other words, USOs did not just reactively respond 
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to changing market dynamics; rather, they proactively solved customers’ problems to gain a 
competitive advantage. 
 
Two major approaches to value creation that aim to enrich the technological benefits observed 
in the case studies were a) creation of a transcending solution; and b) creation of a sintering 
solution. The former is concerned with providing a better solution than the targeted customer 
envisioned, and the latter is concerned with combining different solutions into one proposition 
that was previously unavailable.  
 
a)    Create a transcending solution 
A transcending solution solves problems for customers and goes beyond the customers’ 
expectations. USOs across cases created value by responding to different types of problems 
faced by customers, including those that were only partly addressed by incumbent corporations, 
problems that were perceived as unsolvable, problems that were perceived as insignificant or 
problems that customers did not realise they had. In most cases, customers were generally 
satisfied with the status quo and hence did not actively seek a new solution and tended to resist 
new solutions. Given this situation, the USOs were forced to be proactive in creating 
indispensable propositions that would encourage adoption of their technology.  
 
For example, AlphaVent created value by providing a better solution to an old problem. The 
USO observed the market conditions and took advantage of the inefficiency of the current 
solution provided by incumbent corporations. Rather than responding reactively to customers’ 
apparent need, which was being served by the incumbents, the USO investigated hidden market 
gaps and filled them with the new technology. 
 
Through interactions and partnerships with the architects, AlphaVent identified an accepted 
paradox in the conventional method of ventilating buildings. The firm then utilised its patented 
technology to improve the method of ventilating buildings, proposed a new solution and, 
eventually, took sales away from the existing natural ventilation market. As stated in an article 
published on 18th July 2016 in the Cambridge Enterprise35, AlphaVent technology was 
described as ‘a completely new way of ventilating buildings’ that revolutionised the classic 
                                                
35	Source: https://www.enterprise.cam.ac.uk/case-studies/breathing-buildings-develops-natural-building-ventilation-
technology/ 
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British open-windows-plus-radiators approach to ventilating buildings. The article reported 
that “[i]nstead of the classic British open-windows-plus-radiators approach, AlphaVent’s 
technology consists of an exterior opening, a mixing chamber and two low-energy fans.” 
 
Similarly, DeltaCool partnered with cooling appliance manufacturers to identify problems with 
the current method of cooling a refrigerator using a gas compressor. Although the 
manufacturers were not actively looking for a better solution, the USO persistently promoted 
their technological solution and proposition. According to the inventor, 
 
“The actual method that we used for cooling is much more efficient than the present 
method… using the existing technology, they either have to make the walls of the fridge 
very much wider, thicker, which means there’s less room for your cabbage, or they 
have to use very expensive insulation materials. Our technology should overcome that 
because it actually reduces the cost of the cooling.” 
 
In a report dated 9th February 201636, BetaRecycle was reported to offer ‘one solution to 
tomorrow’s plastic problem’ as a novel way to recycle PAL while saving energy as part of the 
journey to a circular economy. In the report, the inventor also stated that, “[w]e just hope that 
in the future, it’s [the technology] remembered as a turning point for how modern society deals 
with the enormous amount of plastic products we all use and consume.” The statement implied 
that BetaRecycle created value by responding to the future consequence of waste handling. 
 
Across cases, USOs were seen to create value by attending to unmet needs that might exist but 
were hidden or did not exist at all. They mostly attacked incumbent corporations at their weak 
points to gain a competitive advantage. The evidence also implied that the creation of value 
involved the escalation of customers’ expectations for improved products. Focusing narrowly 
on filling an apparent market gap might cause the USO to converge with competitors who 
aimed to address the same problem. Due to this, crafting a transcending solution enabled USOs 
to create value more pragmatically.  
 
 
 
                                                
36Source: http://www.enval.com/enval-offering-one-solution-tomorrows-plastic-problem-ellen-macarthur-report/  
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b)    Create a sintering solution 
Creation of a sintering37 solution is a process that creatively combines multiple solutions and 
embeds them in a proposition without losing the core value of the new technology. A solution 
to customers’ problem with a sintering approach was created at the intersection between 
distinctive priorities. In the case studies, USOs created a new product with multiple elements 
that were either currently unavailable or being served by different providers. This avoided the 
complication of seeking complementary value from multiple providers, eventually resulting in 
a competitive advantage. Apart from solving multiple problems, this approach may also solve 
problems the customers will face as the market evolves.  
 
Having successfully commercialised its technological solution, AlphaVent represented the 
epitome of a USO that successfully created value through the sintering approach. From a 
functional perspective, the firm provided a novel proposition that combined solutions for 
ventilation problems during winter and summer. As the inventor said, “[y]ou worry about the 
summer, but everyone forgets about the winter, whereas we spend most of our time in the UK 
under winter conditions, we have solutions for both.” 
 
Upon realising the need to merge natural and powered ventilation syetem, AlphaVent forged a 
strategic partnership with Company N to offer their customers a full range of ventilation 
systems. This was reported in an article published by Cambridge Enterprise on 10th February 
201138: 
 
“AlphaVent is collaborating with a leading UK ventilation company in the first real 
partnership between the natural and mechanical ventilation industries. Company N, 
the UK market leader in the design, manufacture and distribution of powered 
ventilation and air movement solutions, has teamed up with natural ventilation expert, 
AlphaVent to offer customers a full range of both powered and natural ventilation 
systems, thereby lowering energy bills and consumption.” 
 
                                                
37	Sintering is a borrowed scientific term that refers to the process of compacting and forming a solid mass of material with 
heat without melting it. 
38	Source: https://www.enterprise.cam.ac.uk/news/breathing-buildings-announces-major-collaboration-project/ 
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From the customer’s perspective, AlphaVent’s technology was beneficial because it reduced 
costs, reduced energy consumption and increased ventilation efficiency. Another example of 
value creation achieved through the sintering approach can be observed in AlphaVent’s 
founding, which preceded the need to provide solutions for building design and building 
equipment. AlphaVent took the problem as a clue to provide a new offering. This was 
articulated by the CEO of the firm when he said, 
 
“In 2005, I decided to form the business. I was 38 at the time. I had been frustrated 
with building contractors changing designs of buildings I had developed. They were 
using the argument that there were no companies able to provide the equipment I 
suggested. It seemed that the only way to get the building industry to adopt my ideas 
was to set up a company and offer equipment ourselves.” 
 
The same trend of creating value using the sintering solution was observed in DeltaCool. The 
firm sought to offer improved performance and efficiency, reduced energy consumption and 
reduced environmental impact with its solid-state cooling technology. According to the 
inventor, “[w]ithin the solid-state cooling, this [technology] is one of the most promising and 
potentially would be a disruptive technology for cooling industries. We are looking at 
dramatically reducing the energy consumption with lesser cost to the environment.” 
 
When creating a sintering solution, a USO needs to be visionary, as potential customers may 
not explicitly ask for combined solutions because they were comfortable finding desired 
solutions from different providers. Creation of a sintering solution is a highly proactive 
approach whereby a USO creates an opportunity to satisfy multiple needs with one proposition. 
Instead of envisioning how the market would unfold, the USO exploits its resources and 
capabilities to fulfil customers’ unmet needs. 
 
 Regulatory Manoeuvring 
USO’s ability to manoeuvre regulations was another catalyst for value creation. Regulatory 
enforcement proved to have a significant effect on how value was created as it could pave the 
way for technological adoption. Conversely, a new technological solution could also become 
a springboard for imposing new regulations. The importance of regulations was even more 
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pronounced in the cleantech industry as regulatory enforcement usually led to a change of habit 
among the customers. According to one of the investors interviewed, 
 
“They're [cleantech businesses] mostly written by regulations. The market itself is 
almost always a function of the regulation. You can call it access to the market or 
whatever, but, the reason that many cleantech companies exist is because there is a 
regulation requiring something to happen.” 
 
DeltaCool’s CEO also stated that, “[g]enerally speaking, the change of legislation helps us 
enormously.” 
 
Since new technology could stimulate new regulation and new regulation could prompt new 
technology, most USOs did not only reactively respond to enforcement of a new regulation; 
they went further, proposing a new regulation that favoured their value proposition and rode 
the wave of regulatory reform, which was still in the solidifying phase. To manoeuvre 
regulations and create value, USOs in the case studies 1) proposed new regulations; and 2) rode 
the wave of regulatory reform. 
 
a)    Propose new regulations 
New regulations trigger competition in the regulated industry and stimulate new product 
development. Proactive USOs did not wait for a regulatory change to take place but influenced 
and proposed regulations that favoured their offerings. For example, according to the 
AlphaVent website, “[A]lphaVent’s CEO sat on the advisory board and was involved in the 
drafting of Building Bulletin 101 Guidelines on ventilation, thermal comfort and indoor air 
quality in schools.” AlphaVent clearly showed how the barrier to market entry stemming from 
market resistance could be overcome through the introduction of new regulations. The USO 
took the lead, selling ventilation systems that complied with the new regulation for which it 
lobbied. 
 
Stakeholders across cases repeatedly emphasised the importance of regulation for accelerating 
new technology. This was captured in a statement made by one of the investors in BetaRecycle 
who said, 
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“Cleantech companies are all struggling with regulations. They’re all potentially 
global. Many of them are cash strapped because the cleantech sector has never been a 
hot spot for venture capital but they can’t persuade regulatory change…It’s a fallacy 
to think that they exist because people want to save the planet.” 
 
The investor implied that a change in regulation is crucial for galvanising technological 
adoption, without which a difficult market would remain in inertia. A similar comment was 
made by BetaRecycle’s CEO, 
 
“If there is a change in law and policy then it’s a different story… It will become a 
market-driven thing, but it is a market that there are such immense flaws that they do 
require policy and law intervention in the beginning or otherwise it just doesn’t start. 
The inertia and the business of burning stuff on the ground is just way too much.” 
 
The creation of value for BetaRecycle was partly held back by the absence of necessary 
regulations regarding mandatory segregation of PAL to push the technology forward. Despite 
this challenge, the firm continued to pressure regulators to commit to regulatory reform. This 
was mentioned by one of BetaRecycle’s partners who mentioned, “[o]ur goal is to get 
commitment and buy-in from the whole value chain, including from the local authorities and 
regulators. This is essential to ensure the broad-based adoption and implementation of what 
we are developing for flexible packaging in a circular economy.” 
 
b)    Ride the wave of regulatory reform 
Most USOs in the case study created value by complying with new regulatory requirements. 
Commercialisation of the technologies developed by AlphaVent, GammaSolar and DeltaCool 
was partly enabled by regulations related to energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
Interestingly, these firms did not wait for regulatory change. Rather, they sensed the potential 
for regulatory reform and took advantage of the situation, riding the wave of regulatory reform 
in the cleantech industry. 
 
AlphaVent, for example, followed the developments of Directive 2009/125/EC of the 
European Parliament, which established a framework for eco-design requirements for energy-
related products, including ventilation systems for buildings. The firm developed its 
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technology in parallel with upcoming regulations. When the new regulations officially came 
into effect, the USO thrived by offering natural ventilation solutions. This was described in the 
interview with AlphaVent’s CEO, 
 
“When choosing the right target market, we hired a student to come and help us just to 
investigate different sectors… We went and dug out industry reports, which were the 
sectors that were buoyant, that were growing and ones where the regulations were 
appropriate for our kind of offering and where regulations were potentially changing 
that would help us.” 
 
Likewise, BetaRecycle proactively explored regulations that would allow it to become a 
leading firm. As the CEO noted, “[E]uropean packaging regulations translate into various 
national laws in the EU. All of this will definitely help BetaRecycle to grow in the future.” The 
USO exploited regulatory reform as a platform to accelerate its technology. According to 
Bloomberg39, “[B]etaRecycle focuses on providing specialist solutions and addressing 
environmental and regulatory challenges across industrial, commercial and municipal sectors 
to deliver value from waste to its customers.” 
 
In the case of GammaSolar, regulatory incentive regimes for photovoltaic installation were a 
primary driver of the establishment of the USO. The USO made a strong case for adding value 
to the customer while benefitting the economy and the environment. Although the USO 
struggled to deliver value when the industry was slowing down, GammaSolar exploited 
regulators’ efforts to combat rising carbon emissions and efforts to wean the global addiction 
to fossil fuels. DeltaCool on the other hand, scrutinised regulations related to low carbon 
cooling and energy efficiency when developing its prototype. In particular, the USO followed 
regulations that set the maximum allowable electricity consumption for a cooling appliance. 
DeltaCool gained stronger traction when such regulations were enforced. 
 
All the studied USOs developed technological solutions in a way that favoured changing 
regulations. Realising the increased emphasis regulators placed on environmental concerns, 
they extrapolated the benefit of new technological solutions to trigger or respond to these 
                                                
39 Bloomberg company overview. Available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=30197594  
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regulations. Therefore, USOs developed a technology that harmonises technological 
advancement with environmental resilience and, at the same time, acted proactively regarding 
regulatory reform. 
 
 
First-order category Quotes 
Create transcending 
solution 
 
“Our product is the result of the smallest, the lightest, and the cheapest. It meets the 
requirements of the appliance manufacturers, and we're working, let's say, with the 
three novelties that you would probably pick.” – DeltaCool’s director of business 
development 
 
“We are dealing with the pressing problem of the future. The need might not be clear 
now but when the time has come, this technology would make its way.” 
BetaRecycle’s Chairman 
 
Create sintering 
solution 
 
“AlphaVent has developed a completely new way of ventilating buildings that have 
the potential to reduce heating bills by as much as 50% while drastically reducing 
energy consumption. The natural ventilation technology concept exploits the heat 
produced by people, lights, IT and even sunlight, avoiding the wasteful use of 
radiators.” – AlphaVent’s website 
 
“Through years of experience in this industry, we manage to offer our customers a 
complete, integrated energy autonomous solution.” – GammaSolar’s CEO 
 
Propose new 
regulation 
 
“Our patented technology is allied to smart controls and superb engineering has 
changed that [how a building is ventilated] forever. The benefits of mixing ventilation 
are now so clear that it has been written into regulations, a testimony to evidence we 
can show you of making it work.” – AlphaVent’s CEO 
 
“It’s now up to the local authorities and the waste handling contractors to start buying 
this technology from us so they can recycle it. So, one way of leveraging the 
technology is to infuse this in thinking, not just to the customer but also to the 
regulators ... The major problems that even the segregation is non-existent, just like 
Mexico. Even the municipal local authorities, they just don't care, they don't see the 
value of this kind of new technology. It's horrible, absolutely horrible!” – 
BetaRecycle’s CEO 
 
Ride the wave of 
regulatory reform 
 
“At the turn of the century, European companies were hit with regulations forcing 
them to pay more attention to the amount of packaging that they were putting into the 
market.” – BetaRecycle’s CEO  
 
“There’s a weak signal from the market. You have to be able to intercept before you 
know. You need to be clear about the legislation in force. Now in Europe for example, 
you are only allowed to sell fridge of least A+ energy efficient.” – DeltaCool’s CEO 
 
Table 5-3: Additional selected quotes for the first-order categories 
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5.4 Value Capture through Pragmatic Kinesis 
When USOs’ technology was immature, they were forced to generate sufficient revenue to 
fund operations. When the technology was ready for the market, USOs were expected to create 
an attractive mechanism for charging customers that would retain a percentage of the value. 
The findings indicated that both goals were achieved through an approach termed pragmatic 
kinesis40 that is intended to capture value by being flexible and sensible when moving towards 
profit. 
 
When value is created, a reward does not necessarily follow. Logically, the higher the value 
that is created, the higher the value that is expected to be captured. However, in the case studies, 
not all firms that effectively created value also effectively captured value. All four USOs were 
able to create significant value for their target customers, but only AlphaVent and BetaRecycle 
were successful in capturing the value they created. Nevertheless, all USOs constantly 
exercised diversified but pragmatic revenue models that allowed them to grow profitably.  
 
Across cases, USOs actively strived to pragmatically generate enough value to operate and 
grow profitably. They did this in two ways: 1) heterogeneous revenue streams; and 2) 
customisation–cost balance. The data structure for the aggregate dimension, termed pragmatic 
kinesis, is presented in Table 5-4. 
 
First-order category Second-order theme Aggregate dimension 
Explore auxiliary revenue streams  
Heterogeneous revenue streams 
 
 
Pragmatic kinesis 
 
(approach taken to capture value 
and respond to financial pressure 
by being flexible and sensible 
when moving towards profit) 
 
Enter substitute markets 
Employ customisation strategy 
Customisation–cost balance 
Employ cost efficiency strategy 
Table 5-4: Data structure for the aggregate dimension of pragmatic kinesis 
 
 
 Heterogeneous Revenue Stream 
A heterogeneous revenue stream is the result of proactive diversification of income sources 
depending on where revenue or profit can be obtained. The purpose of a heterogeneous source 
                                                
40 Kinesis is a biological term that refers to the undirected movement of an organism in response to an external stimulus. 
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of income is to enhance financial security and, in the case of USOs, primarily to avoid running 
out of funds during the pre-commercialisation stage. As a new and under-resourced firm, USOs 
across cases did not rely on the core revenue stream when profit is still uncertain and the market 
is increasingly competitive.  
 
The way USOs across cases attempted to have multiple sources of income can be traced in two 
events which were by exploring more widely the different methods that can be employed to 
generate income and by investigating the alternative markets. Two mutually reinforcing ways 
in which USOs generated heterogeneous sources of income were by 1) exploring auxiliary 
revenue streams and; 2) entering substitute markets. 
 
a) Explore auxiliary revenue streams  
The findings across cases implied that USOs with early-stage and complex technology required 
a long time to enter the market due to the technical complexity of the technology and imperfect 
description of the market. To generate sufficient income during the transition from ideation to 
commercialisation, all USOs survived financially through supplementary sources of income 
such as grants and research-related activities. For example, according to the AlphaVent 
website, before the firm could sell its full range of ventilation systems, “[A]lphaVent started 
with consultancy and retail projects to local primary schools and there is a substantial pipeline 
of new projects for which AlphaVent is actively engaged in supplying e-stack systems to 
commercial buildings.” 
 
Other USOs also spent their early years obtaining research grants, testing material and 
consulting with clients for revenue before the commercialisation stage. For example, when it 
was founded, BetaRecycle received proof of concept funding from Cambridge Enterprise Seed 
Funds to further develop the recycling process. According to the inventor, “[t]he proof of 
concept funding made a massive difference in the development of our recycling process, as it 
gave us valuable leverage.” 
 
GammaSolar’s inventor also noted that supplementary revenue streams in the form of grants 
and material evaluations were crucial for the USO to survive financially: 
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“Our OPV business was surviving mainly through doing grants and some evaluation 
of materials site work. So, they (entrepreneurs) had quite a number of grants and they 
are very good at raising grant money to help them do some of the fundamental research 
and materials evaluation without always needing equity to do it. And that’s how the 
company moves forward a bit…because it’s so early-stage and we haven’t got to 
maturity point yet. You can sort of see how that happened.” 
 
DeltaCool’s inventor also emphasised the importance of obtaining supplementary sources of 
revenue, especially when technology is not ready for commercialisation. He argued that the 
USO initially survived due to research grants and consultation work. However, he envisioned 
that the primary source of income would eventually change once the technology reached 
maturity. This was neatly encapsulated in the interview when he said, 
 
“Well, historically, let’s say our source of revenues is grants. So, we raise some capital 
from investors, and what we’ve done is we have basically matched that capital against 
grant funding…At this point, the technology’s not quite ready for that sector, so we 
raised a few revenues through consulting, sort of looking, sort of getting people to pay 
us to teach them about the technology. I would say that most revenues came from the 
automotive sector, there’s a lot of interest in our technology there... It’s not a lot of 
money, but it’s brought in some revenues. That’s in some sense free money, and also a 
very useful tool to enable collaboration with multiple partners. But now we’re at a point 
where actually our revenue picture is going to change somewhat.” 
 
Based on the evidence, it seems necessary for a USO to pursue a different and indirect kind of 
revenue stream prior to realising its long-term value capture strategy. Upon entering the 
commercialisation stage, AlphaVent, as a case in point, continued to generate income by 
employing auxiliary or non-core revenue streams. The strategy proved useful for enhancing 
the margins of the core revenue stream. An article published by Business Weekly on 11th 
September 201541 stated: 
 
                                                
41 Source: https://www.businessweekly.co.uk/news/cambridgetorchbearers/fitzgerald-breathing-new-life-building-design 
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“While the primary focus of the [AlphaVent] business was to develop, and 
commercialise natural ventilation systems derived from a patent it had filed at the 
university, the company also had a secondary revenue stream from design consulting; 
however, the main focus was to get the equipment manufacturing side established.” 
 
As knowledge-intensive businesses, research grants and consulting activities appeared to be 
effective ways for USOs to monetise their intellectual assets. The revenue from these activities 
was put back into the business to support the firm’s operations prior to commercialisation.   
 
b) Enter substitute market 
When generating sufficient revenue to induce profitable return, USOs with less differentiated 
products, like GammaSolar, struggled to capture value in existing markets. As a result, 
GammaSolar entered non-traditional markets in which OPV was not mainly commercialised. 
In other words, GammaSolar scrutinised untapped markets for its technological solution. In 
this way, the USO efficiently captured value while engaging in indirect competition with 
incumbent companies. This was articulated by the inventor: 
 
“I don’t think we have a strong, unique asset. We are not the only one who is doing this 
[commercialising OPV]. There are many others who are doing what we are doing. To 
be able to sell, we need to look more widely across markets, beyond what the 
competitors are doing.” 
 
Although GammaSolar had not reached the stage at which income could be generated from the 
technological solution, the USO had actively explored beyond the traditional market and 
attempted to exploit its technological solution as a complement to existing solutions in non-
traditional markets. In doing so, the USO effectively created a new market category. A new 
market category exists when two or more products are perceived to be substitutes for each other 
to satisfy market demand.   
 
Rather than trying to capture value only from off-grid users, GammaSolar offered its integrated 
energy-autonomous solution to a broader range of other markets, such as the Internet of Things, 
retail and healthcare. In the retail market, for example, the USO offered new solutions for 
engaging on-shelf displays, stock tracking, point-of-sale advertising and pricing signage. In 
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this way, the USO positioned itself between the traditional off-grid market and untapped retail 
market. This was exemplified in a statement made by one of the inventors: 
 
“To be able to grow, the company does run through where the markets are. An 
interesting market, rather, generally described would be things that there is a market 
for the powering of autonomous senses or objects that there’s quite a large market for 
it. There’s a marketed option for plastic solar. Retail signage, smart homes, wireless 
sensing.” 
 
GammaSolar made the right decision to enter a substitute market, especially since the entire 
OPV industry was experiencing severe cost pressures, which resulted in small margins. 
Although the USO was still in its infancy, unfavourable market conditions prompted the USO 
to look for another way to commercialise its technology and capture value. According to the 
former CEO, 
 
“The market for lighter weight solar panels that are plastic based and has not got away, 
it’s very attractive, but it’s not really. I think it will come, but it’s not what’s there at 
the moment. The industry was battered by the collapse in sentiment about renewable 
energy as gas became very cheap. There’s spectacular bankruptcies in the solar 
industry. GammaSolar have to find a different way to do things.” 
 
By entering a substitute market, the USO managed to capture value in a different space and 
avoided convergence with incumbent corporations’ space. This strategy allowed the firm to 
generate income by remaining far from a mature market and competing technologies. 
 
 Customisation–Cost Balance 
Along with a heterogeneous source of income, a USO captures more value through a 
customisation strategy without undermining its ability to scale. Since customisation often 
incurs a high cost, such a strategy is counterbalanced with a cost-efficiency strategy. In this 
way, a USO captures value by responding to customers’ willingness to pay as well as the 
market prices of old and competing technologies. Adopting a dual approach to value capture 
has a profound effect on USOs’ flexibility to generate income through different ways of 
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encasing the technology in its products, such as by charging premium price through 
customisation whilst reducing costs through efficiencies measures.   
  
In striking a balance between product personalisation and its high cost, USOs harmonise 
seemingly opposite approaches to monetise their technological solutions. The two dominant 
strategies utilised by USOs for value creation in this study were 1) a customisation strategy 
and/or; 2) a cost-efficiency strategy. The former is concerned with capturing value from 
customers through personalisation, and the latter is concerned with capturing value based on 
standardisation and cost-efficient production that results in competitive pricing.  
 
a) Customisation strategy  
To capture value, USOs across cases were attuned to potential customers’ different needs and 
willingness to pay. All USOs in the case studies adopted customisation strategies to add value 
for the customer and capture additional value for themselves. To satisfy the growing demand 
for choice, the USOs were careful to ensure that the complexity added to the standard offering 
was worth the incurred cost and would not decrease profitability. By capturing value for 
different customers, USOs charged premium prices for personalisation. 
 
AlphaVent, for example, diversified its offering to suit different customers’ needs but still 
retained its generic proposition (i.e. to offer a better ventilation system for buildings). By doing 
so, the USO provided its customers with options they truly valued. As the CEO put it, “[w]e 
now have more different products to suit different needs, but the actual kind of thing that we 
offer our customers is the same.” The USO’s customisation strategy was successful as a result 
of the disparate ventilation challenges that arose in poorly ventilated buildings.  
 
Similarly, BetaRecycle offered a bespoke solution that involved designing and manufacturing 
recycling plants based on clients’ specifications. BetaRecycle’s website stated that 
“[B]etaRecycle can design and manufacture plants according to our clients’ individual 
requirements. As a modular process, the plan can be economically operated at a variety of 
scales, allowing for local treatment.” BetaRecycle’s previous chairman also stressed the 
urgency of satisfying customers’ needs through different ways of selling its products: 
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“…I’m fairly sure that some customers would rather lease than buy and some 
companies might rather manufacture themselves than buy it from us, so I think the 
market is there. It’s the business model that needs iteration. It’s not only what we want, 
it's what they want, and it’s driven by the market appetite towards our offering.” 
 
Realising the extra value that can be obtained through a customisation strategy, GammaSolar 
supplemented its standardised OPV with customised OPV in the hope of capturing higher value 
amidst still at the prototyping stage. The USO engaged in a tiered approach to value capture in 
which higher-end customers were provided tailored products and services to match the value 
they represent. GammaSolar’s website mentioned that, 
 
“GammaSolar can supply standard and customised OPV modules for indoor energy 
harvesting or for outdoor, off-grid applications…We can advise on the best size and 
specifications. We can customise the performance and appearance of our OPV modules 
to suit most applications.” 
 
Done correctly, a customisation strategy could make competition difficult as USOs tailor their 
offerings to individual preferences. The trade-off between the value of customisation and high 
cost are counterbalanced by charging a premium price. In doing so, USOs achieve significant 
profit margins. A customisation strategy can also serve as a tool for understanding 
what customers want, which allowed the studied USOs to control their production in a way 
that enhanced long-term profitability. 
 
b) Cost-efficiency strategy 
One of the challenges faced by USOs regarding value capture to commercialise new 
technological solutions was setting a reasonable price point that would entice payment from 
customers and in the same time capture enough value for the USO. Given limited control over 
the market price and high prototyping expenditures, it is difficult for a USO to offer products 
at a competitive price. In the case studies, the USOs pursued cost-efficiency strategies as 
stepping stones to scaling up, reducing costs, offering competitive prices and, eventually, 
capturing value. 
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To compensate for the high cost associated with the customisation strategy, a cost-efficiency 
strategy was adopted to produce more homogenous or standardised products through a 
simplified supply management chain and production efficiencies. In an effort to ensure that the 
firm would end up with a product that has benefits and a price point customers would value, 
DeltaCool performed a market assessment. It suggested that if the firm wanted to sell its 
products, it should not charge customers more than USD 100 per engine, although the cost of 
production was much higher. Therefore, the firm engineered its manufacturing process to meet 
the set price. This was encapsulated in a statement made by the Director of Business 
Development: 
 
“Because the market price is the price made by the market, internally their process to 
insert this vacuum was more than 100 dollars... Our economic proposition is that, 
throughout the world, you are talking about 200 million fridges sold every year. We 
need to be able to manufacture at scale and at lower cost, and sell our engine for less 
than 100 dollars. So, being able to offer 80 dollars per fridge is what got the interest 
from fridge manufacturers to work with us.” 
 
With a monopoly on PAL waste handling in a niche market, BetaRecycle could potentially 
charge a premium price for its technology. Despite this untapped pricing power, the USO was 
still unable to charge customers in a profitable way because of the weak market signal for its 
offering. As a result, BetaRecycle shifted its focus to achieve cost efficiency through a simpler 
value chain so that the USO could offer an attractive price to customers.  
 
All the studied USOs applied their technological solutions to products with reasonable prices 
that could capture the maximum value for the customers and USOs. The USOs prioritised not 
only optimising a technological solution but also offering an affordable solution. Therefore, 
they designed products at a cost that ensured a sufficient profit margin by charging customers 
cost-effective prices. As proclaimed by BetaRecycle;s CEO, “[t]he margins in environmental 
services are very small, and there is little taste for environmental processes which are 
expensive. That is why we try to scale and make our process as cost-efficient as possible.” 
 
For global USOs, like GammaSolar, a cost-efficiency strategy results in product 
standardisation, which allows a larger customer base to be served. Through a partnership 
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forged in T Project, GammaSolar managed to reduce the cost of production and offer European 
customers a competitive price. As stated in an article published on 4th March 2016 on 
phys.org42, the reduction of cost was vital for moving towards the commercialisation pipeline: 
 
“The T Project was a success for GammaSolar as it made a significant contribution to 
the reduction in manufacturing cost of the plastic solar cells…It is an essential step 
towards the commercialisation of GammaSolar’s OPV based on technology developed 
and produced in Europe.” 
 
Cost efficiency to capture value enhances the likeliness that a USO can offer reasonable prices 
for its products. By reducing the cost per unit and increasing the total output, a USO can also 
boost its competitive advantage by achieving cost competency and benefits from economies of 
scale. The cost-efficiency strategy also helps address the high cost of customisation, which 
may decrease profit.  
 
First-order 
category Quotes 
Explore auxiliary 
revenue stream 
 
 
“DeltaCool have been clever at garnering non-dilutive grant funding and have, so far, 
consistently found solutions to the performance setbacks encountered in developing a 
novel technology.” – DeltaCool’s lead investor 
 
“That time [the prototyping stage], we sold some commercial projects, a few during 
that period.” – AlphaVent’s CEO 
 
Enter substitute 
market   
 
 
“As we looked for the potential market, we quickly saw that it has vastly saturated and 
we need to find application somewhere else.”  – GammaSolar’s inventor 
  
“For retail, if you want to power a device up in a retail outlet that might be displaying 
some promotional information, it's too expensive to plug it into the mains. This is an 
attractive market to have something which already harvests light.”  – GammaSolar’s 
Director of the Board/inventor 
 
Employ 
customisation 
strategy 
 
 
“As each [AlphaVent] project generates potentially different challenges, AlphaVent 
offers a design consultancy to customise the company’s overall system installations. 
This enables them to work within a building’s architectural restraints and avoids the 
possibility of temperature stratification that can lead to undesirable cold or hot zones.”  
– Bloomberg 
 
“The company [GammaSolar] has a clear position in the value chain as a 
manufacturer of solar cells on a roll for supply to tier-one OEMs that integrate solar 
                                                
42	Source: https://phys.org/news/2016-03-technological-breakthrough-cheaper-flexible-solar.html 
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cell modules into end products for their selected markets. The robustness, low weight, 
flexibility and ease of customisation combine to make the product a significant step up 
from existing solutions for the intended markets.” – GammaSolar’s partner 
 
Employ cost-
efficiency strategy 
 
 
“So, for an air conditioning system for a house, residence or even for a car you are 
talking about a cooling capacity so the cooling power required at least 5,000 W. For a 
fridge, you’re talking about 50 W. So, you are talking about a factor one thousand and 
looking at the technology. You know we started small, it’s a modular approach. So, 
we thought we would be more successful to match the budget that would reach 50 
watts instead of 5,000 W target.” – DeltaCool’s CEO 
 
“The costs and challenges of ventilation vary from project to project, but natural 
ventilation can usually be a cost-effective option.” – AlphaVent’s website 
 
Table 5-5: Additional selected quotes for the first-order categories 
 
 
5.5 Network Management through Deliberate Temperament 
When a USO transitioned from an academic network to a commercial network, many conflicts 
arose among stakeholders because of divergent values and unmet expectations. USOs across 
cases dealt with these tensions through deliberate temperament43, an approach that aims to solve 
tensions among stakeholders by aligning stakeholder’s expectations, which results in a 
mutually beneficial outcome and lessens initial conflicts. Deliberate temperament was crucial 
for balancing the trade-off between the expected benefit and the amount of risk undertaken by 
the USO. 
 
The conflicts observed in the studied cases are due to differing interests, values, motives and 
cultures. As a new firm, a USO cannot easily avoid such conflicts because they occur mostly 
among long-standing stakeholders with strategic importance to the USO’s commercialisation 
and growth. Due to this, the conflicts cannot be sidestepped or ignored. Additionally, USO 
entrepreneurs were precluded from preventing future conflicts as they were not usually evident 
before their occurrence.  
 
Therefore, rather than envisioning the future and avoiding conflicts, the USO entrepreneurs 
examined in this study made informed judgments about stakeholders’ motives and attempted 
to negotiate solutions that could satisfy opposing needs. This was done through 1) collaborative 
                                                
43 In the field of acoustics, temperament refers to adjustments to the tension of the strings of a musical instrument to properly 
align the intervals between their tones so that the instrument is in tune and dissonance is minimised. The adjustments result in 
a desired pitch. 
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partnerships and; 2) a compromising approach. The data structure for the aggregate dimension 
of deliberate temperament is presented in Table 5-6. Key quotes mapped to the data structure 
are discussed in the following sections, and additional quotes are provided in Table 5-7 at the 
end of this section. 
 
First-order category Second-order theme Aggregate dimension 
Forge co-operation  
(with non-competitive partners) Collaborative partnership 
 
Deliberate temperament   
 
(approach to manage stakeholders 
by aligning stakeholder’s 
expectations, which results in a 
mutually beneficial outcome and 
lessens conflict) 
 
Forge co-opetition  
(with competitive partners) 
Trade-off incompatible values 
Compromising approach 
 
Tolerate divergence of values 
Table 5-6: Data structure for the aggregate dimension of deliberate temperament 
 
 
 Collaborative Partnership 
Despite discrepancies related to value, interest, motive and culture, USO stakeholders across 
cases were observed to collaborate. Here, collaboration refers to working together to achieve a 
shared goal. Through collaboration, all involved parties recognise the need to work together to 
create value and suppress current or potential tension. In contrast to compromise, collaboration 
produces mutually satisfactory results. The level of assertiveness and co-operation achieved 
through collaboration is slightly higher when collaborating than when compromising. 
 
USO stakeholders that work collaboratively obtain greater resources, recognition and rewards 
when competing for finite resources. USOs tend to be assertive about their needs and co-
operate with other stakeholders. In the case studies, collaborative results were achieved through 
1) co-operation with non-competitive partners; and 2) co-opetition with competitive partners. 
 
a)    Forge co-operation with non-competitive partners 
Co-operation is a collaborative tool that USOs across cases usually forged with non-
competitive partners. Conflicts that were resolved with co-operation were mostly conflicts of 
interest and value that stemmed from incompatible goals or beliefs. Rather than letting the 
conflict further polarise stakeholders, USOs proactively turned conflict into co-operation by 
merging their goals with those of stakeholders to seek win-win solutions.  
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In most cases, USOs with new technologies were challenged by sceptical and risk-averse 
stakeholders who had different beliefs regarding how the technology would accelerate. For 
example, although the FMCG companies were not ready to adopt BetaRecycle’s technology, 
both parties agreed on a strategic alliance to co-finance the establishment of a commercial 
plant. In return, the the FMCG companies were allowed to use BetaRecycle’s ecolabel to 
educate consumers about the recyclability of their packaging. As stated in an article published 
by Cambridge Science Park News44 on 28th July 2011, “[B]etaRecycle, a leading provider of 
recycling and environmental technology solutions, announces that it has partnered with 
Company K to support the construction of the first commercial-scale plant.” 
 
Despite the clashing beliefs about the utility of BetaRecycle’s technology, co-operation 
between the USO and FMCG companies resulted in a cross-marketing partnership; 
BetaRecycle allied with FMCG companies offering products that complemented (but did not 
compete with) its product offering. Both parties streamlined their goals to build the commercial 
plant.  
 
In the case of DeltaCool, the USO co-operated with white goods companies who initially had 
opposing interests and values regarding their technology. When DeltaCool first introduced its 
technology, the majority of white goods companies were not interested in it. However, as the 
benefit of the technology became clearer, DeltaCool managed to convince the companies to 
collaborate. Co-operation forged between DeltaCool and the white good companies enabled 
the integration of the USO’s magnetic cooling technology into industrial applications. This was 
articulated by the Director of Business Development who said, 
 
“We experienced some fight with a company owned by W; they wanted to kill us. Then 
there’s Company P. We gathered consensus that gas compressor for fridges has 
reached the technological plateau. We came in with new ideas which are not something 
that has already been explored, after that then they were interested to talk with us. They 
are now partners.” 
 
                                                
44 BetaRecycle Pratners with Company K on its First Commercial Plant. Available at: 
http://cambridgesciencepark.staging.engineserver.co.uk/enval-partners-with-kraft-foods-on-its-first-commercial-plant/  
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Through co-operative partnerships, conflicts among stakeholders were dealt with mutuality and 
more constructively. Across cases, disputants that worked co-operatively to negotiate a 
solution were more likely to develop a relationship of trust and develop mutually beneficial 
options. Co-operative relationships also allowed USOs to not only access resources but also 
resolve occurring and emerging conflicts. 
 
b)    Forge co-opetition with competitive partners 
Co-opetition is a collaborative tool usually forged with competitive partners to achieve a 
mutually beneficial outcome. Competitors co-operate with each other to create higher value 
compared to the value achieved when creating it without interaction. Through co-opetition, 
companies with partially congruent interests interact and explore the knowledge of new product 
together.  
 
AlphaVent’s success in leading a profound transition from mechanical to natural ventilation 
systems undermined the leading mechanical ventilation companies. This friction could lead to 
rivalry between firms in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage. Rather than continuously 
competing, AlphaVent and its competitors teamed up to offer their customers a full range of 
both powered and natural ventilation systems. Through this approach, AlphaVent 
complemented its competitors’ strengths and won a market segment that neither AlphaVent 
nor the competitor could penetrate alone. As written in an article published by Cambridge 
Enterprise on 10th February 201145, “[A]lphaVent forged a major collaborative project with a 
leading UK ventilation company in the first real partnership between the natural and 
mechanical ventilation industries.” 
 
BetaRecycle created an opportunity to align the goals of competing companies through the 
establishment of B Consortium, which was comprised of organisations with a vested interest 
in the success of BetaRecycle. Through the B Consortium, the USO streamlined its supply 
chain and enhanced its economies of scale. Despite competition among waste handlers, the 
consortium allowed the financial risk of technological development to be spread between 
different players at different stages of the supply chain. According to the CEO of BetaRecycle, 
 
                                                
45 Source: https://www.enterprise.cam.ac.uk/news/breathing-buildings-announces-major-collaboration-project/ 
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“The B Consortium brings together key players who are set to benefit from changes in 
waste management in their supply chain, to fund development, spread risk and put 
public pressure on waste handlers. This novel collaboration produces positive results 
for all stakeholders, despite competition between them.” 
 
Similarly, DeltaCool envisioned that small companies would team up with larger companies. 
The USO entrepreneur also believed that failure to optimise materials was primarily attributed 
to failure to merge the goals of competing companies. This was reflected in the CEO’s 
interview: 
 
 “I think in the European context, what we’re seeing is the trend of smaller companies 
that are teaming up among them and even with larger industry. So, I think that explains 
why ten years ago, the market for material wasn’t quite optimised.” 
 
Co-opetition initiated by USOs led to significant synergy that not only allowed for better firm 
performance but also resolved conflicts between competitive partners. Proactive USOs took 
this as an opportunity to survive and generate profit without stealing their partners’ customers 
or damaging their credibility.  
 
 Compromising Approach 
Across cases, the USOs compromised with stakeholders regarding the negotiated outcome by 
giving up part of their demand to reach an equitable agreement or mutually acceptable middle 
solution. Unlike a purely win-win solution, compromising did not focus on fair standards for 
settlement, instead splitting the difference between disparate solutions. The approach turned 
divergent values into strengths by compensating for risks taken and rewards achieved.  
 
In some cases, compromise appeared to be the best or only viable solution to deal with conflicts 
among stakeholders regarding, for example, royalty splitting and product design. The analysis 
revealed that USO entrepreneurs compromised with scholars, TTOs, investors and customers 
and vice versa. This proactive measure resolved disputes immediately, which was crucial for 
avoiding derailment of the technology commercialisation process. It also prevented conflict 
from escalating in the future. To arrive at a compromise, USO entrepreneurs and stakeholders 
1) traded-off between incompatible values; and 2) tolerated divergence of values. 
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a) Trade-off between incompatible values 
Value trade-off is one way to deal with conflicting stakeholders with incompatible desires. It 
involves the loss of one quality, quantity or property in return for other gains. It usually ends 
with a binding contract that ensures the consent of all parties to the provisions.  
 
In most cases, disputes concerning the equity and royalty terms initiated by a TTO were one 
of the major sources of conflict that provoked tension between scholars, licensing officers and 
entrepreneurs. This strife was resolved by recognising an agreeable return from commercial 
development of the new technology. For example, in the case of AlphaVent, the inventor, 
investor and TTO agreed to commercial terms that allowed the TTO to hold a share of the firm 
through an equity-only agreement while the USO enjoyed royalty-free, exclusive commercial 
rights to the university-owned technology. This was described in the interview with the CEO: 
 
“It was a case of then figuring out what the right kind of arrangement was for the 
company to access and have right to the IP, which was further complicated at the time 
by the fact that the university didn’t have exclusive rights to the IP because our funder, 
Investor X also had rights to it. The agreement between Investor X and the university 
was that if there was any IP that was generated by the research that Investor X had 
funded, that Investor X would have worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free rights to the 
technology. Then Cambridge University can do whatever else they want with it. I fought 
obnoxiously hard for this [licensing agreement].” 
 
By engaging in value trade-off, the conflicting parties are usually only partially satisfied. In 
the case of a licensing agreement, each party gains a reasonable (but not necessarily equal) 
share of the available ‘pie’. This type of solution was crucial for enabling new technology 
commercialisation, particularly when stakeholders’ engagement was desired or they could not 
be easily removed from the network. This type of solution was exemplified when BetaRecycle 
gave up the company’s royalties to the TTO and expected financial support for patenting. 
BetaRecycle’s inventor described the trade-off during his interview:  
 
“In the case of royalties coming to the inventors, I was going to get two-thirds to their 
one third. In the case of a split in the company ownership, if a company were going to 
be founded, it would be 60 me, 20 the co-founder, 20 the university. So, as much as I 
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knew it was a negotiation simply because I owned a substantial part of the IP myself, 
at the same time I didn’t have a penny to go and patent this myself. So, I said, ‘Look, if 
Cambridge provides me with the money to patent this thing that will cost some money, 
I don’t have anything tangible, why not?’” 
 
To be able to trade-off incompatible values, the USOs across cases carefully considered how 
their decision would impact the other party. Although a compromise-based solution can only 
achieve partial satisfaction, it was still useful for resolving seemingly valid demands posed by 
key stakeholders with a different values, interests, motives or cultures. 
 
b) Tolerate divergence of values  
Tolerance of different values refers to one’s willingness to accept a value that differs 
substantially from his or her ideal. Unlike value trade-off, tolerance is usually uncountable and 
is mildly inclined towards accommodating the other party. Tolerating differences is the result 
of acknowledgement, respect and appreciation for different ways of perceiving things. Similar 
to value trade-off, USO entrepreneurs may only achieve partial satisfaction as a result of 
tolerance-based solutions. USOs that exhibited tolerance usually did not achieve immediate 
rewards but reaped longer-term gains. In addition, tolerance of difference values not only 
resolved conflicts but also accelerated the pace of commercialisation. 
 
Inventors in USOs usually had strong opinions about product design that did not necessarily 
align with the entrepreneur’s vision or the customers’ need. The inventor and USO 
entrepreneurs overcame such conflicts by acknowledging, prioritising and tolerating the 
customers for whom the value was created. As a result, most inventors altered the way in which 
technological designs were optimised and co-created value with the customers. For example, 
BetaRecycle developed its technology by tolerating the different values of customers. As the 
BetaRecycle’s inventor proclaimed, “[w]e have had to tailor what we offer to the market as 
time has gone on. And we were deliberate, fairly flexible about what we were going to offer. It 
all depends on what they [the customers] want.” 
 
Similarly, the entrepreneurs involved in GammaSolar also tolerated customers’ values even 
though these values did not fully align with theirs. To some extent, the USO involved 
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customers in the optimisation of its technological solution by providing samples to potential 
customers in exchange for useful feedback. GammaSolar’s CEO stated, 
 
“So, we have now reached the point where we do have customers who tell us what they 
want and it’s actually moving forward really quite well and exciting. So, we got to that 
point. You could argue that we could’ve got there earlier but we are where we are but 
now, we are in a position where we got real customer paying us money to develop 
samples that they are going to try in the field and if that’s successful it’s going to scale 
to volume. It is never too early to get the customers involved.” 
 
Tolerance occurred not only among external stakeholders but also internally within the USO. 
For example, BetaRecycle’s previous chairman, who came from an academic background, 
tolerated differences in motivation and culture between himself and the new chairman, to 
whom he was willing to give up the chairmanship: “[I] was very much in favour of passing the 
chairmanship over to somebody much more experienced in that area, and that’s the current 
chairman. Given his experience and motivation, I was very happy to pass on the 
chairmanship.” 
 
In summary, in the USO context, where diversity in values may interfere with how the 
commercialisation process unfolds, stakeholders with different aspirations tolerate differences 
of value to allow for expansion of the network that drives commercialisation. USOs across 
cases did not blindly tolerate differences to move forward; rather, they provided valid 
arguments to defend their tolerance and understand the extend they could tolerate. Intolerance 
of differences is one of the causes of laggard commercialisation. 
 
First-order 
category Quotes 
Forge co-operation  
(with non-
competitive 
partners) 
 
“When we were building the power plant, three brand owners actually gave us a 
donation to help us with the cost of it. And they've been very supportive, because for 
them, they can turn around to the public and say we're doing something now. As a 
result, they enjoy healthy market reputation.” – BetaRecycle’s CEO 
 
“It [the collaboration between DeltaCool and white goods companies] was not easy 
but we start to realise that we tend to achieve more by working together.” – 
DeltaCool’s CEO 
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Forge co-opetition  
(with competitive 
partners) 
 
 
“Most buildings require a combination of both mechanical and natural ventilation for 
the different room types involved. We passionately believe in delivering the right 
answer for a client – since this usually involves both mechanical and natural 
ventilation, the industry needs a supplier offering clients the best of the best in both 
areas. We are really excited to be working with Company N to enable procurement of 
building-wide ventilation solutions.” – AlphaVent’s CEO 
 
“For many clients developing commercial buildings such as schools and retail outlets, 
considering a ventilation strategy has always meant a choice between powered or 
natural ventilation. Thanks to this partnership… we can now offer customers a 
complete solution.” – AlphaVent’s partner 
 
Trade-off between 
incompatible values 
 
 
“…You need to position your new technology as the opportunity to create new 
markets. Eventually you are going to displace the old technology but you will never 
win trying to fight against them. So always try to find the correct path avoiding 
confrontational, always try to find the middle ground.” – DeltaCool’s Director of 
Business Development 
 
“We've got investors with very different aspirations and it is very hard to manage. So, 
you need to have investors as best you can make it with a very common aligned 
interest.” – AlphaVent’s CEO 
 
Tolerate divergence 
of values 
 
 
“One of the beauties of being in touch with the end user is they simply tell you what is 
needed. Often these adaptations can be provided through partners or with small 
changes to the offer, but sometimes they highlight a whole new strand that can be 
added to the product or service. We strongly encourage innovation around our 
solutions from both partners and customers.” – GammaSolar’s CEO 
  
“We have the product for the commercial plans operating and the offering that we had 
six months ago and the one that we have now is completely different, in this particular 
case, because of the price of commodities and customers’ need.” – BetaRecycle’s 
CEO 
 
Table 5-7: Additional selected quotes for the first-order categories 
 
5.6 COPE Principles for Business Models Development 
The results of the fourth-round coding using the template analysis approach validated the 
relevance of the emergent categories to the four premises borrowed to explain business model 
development. This thesis abbreviates the four principles as COPE46 (i.e. take control, create 
opportunities, forge partnerships, embrace contingencies). The COPE principles appeared to 
be applicable for explaining how business models were developed. Most importantly, the 
COPE principles also align well with the emerging categories observed in earlier rounds of 
                                                
46	COPE, an abbreviation of the principles that drive business model development. The word ‘cope’ itself means ‘to face and 
deal with problems, or difficulties, especially successfully or in a calm or adequate manner.’ 
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open coding analysis. The results of thematic template analysis are presented in Table 5-8, 
which shows selected events that occurred across cases and across business model components 
in which COPE principles were observed. The following section summarises the COPE 
principles observed to enable business development in the case studies.  
 
Take control – USOs across cases took active control over their resources and capabilities to 
move forward in the commercialisation pipeline. They focused mainly only on what they had 
power over, not things that were out of their control. The USOs also tended to make fewer 
predictions and based decision making on the sets of individual means available to the ventures. 
They then focused on working to achieve an outcome that could be created using these means. 
By taking control over its means, USOs across cases became more pragmatic as it influences 
outcomes and creates opportunities using limited resources in creative ways. By taking charge 
of its resources and capabilities to develop a business model, USOs did not expend effort on 
things that cannot be controlled. 
Create opportunities – USOs endogenously created and took advantage of new opportunities, 
which might not have existed previously, to pursue commercialisation. They also strived to 
influence exogenous forces at the disposal of partners to create new opportunities. Rather than 
pursuing opportunity objectively in a readily available market or waiting for an opportunity to 
emerge, the entrepreneurs in the case studies strove to be more proactive and made an effort to 
bring their new technologies into commercial reality. The exigency of opportunity creation for 
USOs determined the adoption of their technology. 
Forge partnerships – Across cases, partnerships were crucial for accessing resources, aligning 
expectations and resolving conflicting values. In addition, they helped reduce uncertainty and 
enabled joint co-creation of value. Interestingly, USOs built partnerships not only with self-
selecting stakeholders but also with individuals who were not initially interested in 
collaborating with the USOs. Through interaction with these stakeholders, the USO 
entrepreneurs convinced stakeholders to become involved in the business model development 
process. Indeed, the business model development process was open for and contingent upon 
the involvement of other people and organisations as committed stakeholders. 
Embrace contingencies – Across cases, contingencies were expected and dealt with by 
remaining flexible rather than adhering to existing goals. In some cases, the USOs managed to 
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convert unexpected events into opportunities. USO entrepreneurs leveraged unexpected events 
for the benefit of their firms. Instead of making ‘what-if’ scenarios to deal with worst-case 
scenarios, entrepreneurs interpreted contingencies as potential clues for commercialisation of 
their technology. Figure 5-2 illustrates the relatedness of the business model components to the 
COPE principles that drive the development of business models.  
 
Figure 5-2: The interrelatedness of business model components and COPE principles
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C
O
PE 
principle/Value 
com
ponent 
Principle 1: C
 
(take C
ontrol) 
Principle 2: O
 
(create O
pportunities) 
Principle 3: P 
 (forge Partnerships) 
Principle 4: E 
(Em
brace contingencies) 
Value proposition 
and value creation 
 (H
ow
 did the U
S
O
 
use C
O
P
E
 principles 
to craft propositions 
and create value?) 
 
 
§ 
AlphaVent took full authority over 
its IP (w
ith less intervention from
 
the TTO
 and the funder) to create a 
novel proposition and m
ade a 
cogent argum
ent to influence the 
decision regarding the royalty-free 
licensing agreem
ent 
 
§ 
BetaR
ecycle adm
inistered its ow
n 
value creation m
echanism
 w
hen 
the inventor w
as still halfw
ay 
through his postdoctoral research 
 § 
G
am
m
aSolar shifted its em
phasis 
and revam
ped the w
ay value w
as 
created by placing m
ore em
phasis 
on understanding the m
arket’s 
needs  
 § 
D
eltaC
ool took the lead in value 
creation w
ithin the field of cooling 
devices and broke aw
ay from
 
conventional m
aterial optim
isation 
activities 
 
 
§ AlphaVent created the opportunity 
to becom
e an advocator of the 
natural ventilation system
 and 
accelerated its technology w
hen the 
firm
 first piloted its technology in 
schools  
 
§ BetaR
ecycle created a new
 
opportunity in a different m
arket by 
conducting investigations beyond 
conventional w
aste recycling and 
proposing a m
ethod for recovering 
PAL m
aterials, w
hich w
ere not 
previously entirely recyclable 
 
§ G
am
m
aSolar crated a new
 
opportunity by generating value 
through its R
2R
 technology to 
m
anufacture robust O
PV m
odules  
 
§ D
eltaC
ool created a new
 
opportunity by exploiting the 
governm
ent’s interest in reducing 
the U
K’s greenhouse gas em
issions 
through the creation of a new
 
generation of low
-carbon cooling 
devices 
 § 
AlphaVent partnered w
ith architects 
to understand the gap in the m
arket 
and co-create a novel solution to 
naturally ventilate buildings 
 § 
BetaR
ecycle partnered w
ith W
R
AP 
to fund a trial that validated the value 
em
bedded in its proposition 
 § 
G
am
m
aSolar partnered w
ith 
C
om
pany T to co-create value by 
developing its prototype 
 § 
D
eltaC
ool partnered w
ith C
om
pany 
B to co-create a suitable cooling 
device to be em
bedded into its 
products  
 
§ AlphaVent created value in a lean 
m
anner w
hen the firm
 w
as affected 
by the recession 
 § BetaR
ecycle m
ade its proposition 
m
ore financially interesting by 
em
phasising the usefulness of 
m
aterial recovery (not just the 
recyclability of PAL) w
hen the initial 
proposition did not translate into 
sales 
 § G
am
m
aSolar created value through 
custom
isation of O
PV w
hen the price 
of solar energy decreased 
 § D
eltaC
ool stopped prototyping and 
sw
itched to a different niche to design 
a m
agnetic cooling device w
hen the 
initial m
aterial could not be further 
optim
ised 
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 Value capture  
 (H
ow
 did the U
S
O
 
use C
O
P
E
 principles 
to capture value?) 
   
 
§ 
AlphaVent decided to continuously 
capture value through a non-core 
channel (consultancy) despite the 
success of com
m
ercialisation of its 
ventilation system
 
 
§ BetaR
ecycle decided to include 
after sales service in its proposition 
(to capture m
ore value) 
 § 
G
am
m
aSolar separated into 
G
am
m
aSolar1 and G
am
m
aSolar2 to 
capture value separately and m
ore 
effectively 
 § 
D
eltaC
ool m
anaged its tacit 
know
ledge and intellectual capital 
and offered a consultancy service to 
capture value 
 
 
§ AlphaVent diversified its offerings 
and tapped m
ultiple unm
et needs 
for ventilation to capture m
ultiple 
types of value 
 § 
BetaR
ecycle created new
 
opportunities through several 
revenue m
echanism
s  
  
§ G
am
m
aSolar entered substitute 
m
arkets to capture alternative value 
 
§ D
eltaC
ool used its funds to develop 
additional products through ongoing 
R
&D
  
 
 
§ 
AlphaVent partnered w
ith com
pany 
N
 to capture value in both the natural 
and pow
ered ventilation industries  
 
§ 
BetaR
ecycle partnered w
ith three 
FM
C
G
 brands to obtain sufficient 
funds to establish its first com
m
ercial 
plant 
  § 
G
am
m
aSolar partnered w
ith C
arbon 
Trust, R
hodia and IP G
roup plc to 
secure funds for the prototyping 
stage  
 § 
D
eltaC
ool partnered w
ith C
arbon 
Trust to access funds for its 
operations 
 
 
§ AlphaVent applied com
petitive prices 
to increase profitability w
hen the firm
 
w
as hit by the recession 
 § BetaR
ecycle diversified its revenue 
stream
 to include recycling of 
industrial scrap (instead of used PAL) 
w
hen the financial crisis caused a 
collapse in the price of the com
m
odity 
 § G
am
m
aSolar captured value in a 
different and untapped m
arket (w
hich 
did not require the technology to be 
fully developed) after the collapse in 
the price of solar energy 
 § D
eltaC
ool captured value through an 
alternative channel to fund its 
operations after delays in the 
prototyping stage 
Value netw
ork  
 (H
ow
 did the U
S
O
 
use C
O
P
E
 principles 
to m
anage its 
netw
ork?) 
  
 § AlphaVent term
inated its sales 
function agreem
ent w
ith its third-
party partner due to slow
 sales 
grow
th 
 
§ BetaR
ecycle took responsibility for 
replacing the chairm
an and 
term
inating non-perform
ing 
personnel in the com
pany 
 § G
am
m
aSolar took charge of the 
potential range of com
m
ercialisation 
opportunities and technological 
partnerships w
ith interested parties  
  
§ D
eltaC
ool selected its partners to 
include influential w
hite goods 
com
panies so it could expand its 
value netw
ork 
 
 
§ AlphaVent w
orked w
ith regulators to 
influence the enforcem
ent of 
regulations regarding natural 
ventilation  
 
§ BetaR
ecycle proactively extended 
its netw
ork through establishm
ent of 
the B C
onsortium
 
 
§ G
am
m
aSolar created a new
 
opportunity to expand its netw
ork by 
becom
ing a partner in TR
EASO
R
ES 
(an EU
-funded project concerned 
w
ith cheaper production of O
PV)  
 
§ D
eltaC
ool created a new
 
opportunity to expand its netw
ork by 
sharing the results of the firm
’s R
&D
 
at sym
posium
s and conferences 
around the w
orld 
 
§ 
AlphaVent w
orked collaboratively 
w
ith com
pany V and w
as later 
acquired by com
pany V 
 
§ 
BetaR
ecycle partnered w
ith the 
university’s C
hallenge Fund, w
hich 
invested in the firm
’s prototype 
through a convertible loan 
 § 
G
am
m
aSolar partnered w
ith the EU
 
and becam
e part of M
U
JU
LIM
A (a 
collaborative research project 
involving experts and nine EU
 
universities) 
 § 
D
eltaC
ool partnered w
ith the U
K’s 
largest seller of refrigerators in a 
m
ajor pan-European consortium
 
exam
ining energy efficiency from
 
farm
 to plate 
 
§ 
AlphaVent w
orked w
ith its law
yer to 
deal w
ith patent infringem
ent issue 
and gained a healthy reputation 
upon w
inning a patent dispute 
 
§ BetaR
ecycle actively advocated the 
pressing need for PAL segregation 
w
ith interested parties in the public 
(not just local authorities and 
regulators)  
 § G
am
m
aSolar extended its 
partnership w
ith SolarAid, a KickStart 
Sustainable Energy Fund, to provide 
IndiG
o system
s to rural, off-grid areas 
w
hen the initial prototyping stage w
as 
delayed 
 § 
D
eltaC
ool expanded its partnership 
w
ith stronger partners in the cooling 
industry upon receiving a w
eak 
m
arket signal and high resistance to 
the technology 
Table 5-8: Results of thematic template analysis of the COPE principles
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5.7 Conceptual Framework for USO Business Model Development  
The previous sections have detailed the findings of the four rounds of analysis. This section 
presents a conceptual framework that integrates the findings. To describe the context of the 
emergent framework, it is essential to first reiterate the overarching purpose of this study: to 
advance the understanding of how a USO develops its business models for commercialising 
university technology. Past literature on strategic management and academic entrepreneurship 
addressed this issue only partially. Scholars agree that 1) a USO devises a business model that 
is viable enough to put its product or service in the marketplace; 2) a USO’s business model is 
developed through iterative trial-and-error and experimentation; and 3) the business model 
development process faces challenges that are unique to USOs, such as market resistance, 
financial pressure and conflicting stakeholders. 
 
The first insight obtained from the coding analysis revealed the three approaches to business 
model development to overcome challenges namely, 1) value proposition and value creation 
through flow-field control; 2) value capture thorough pragmatic kinesis; and 3) value network 
management through deliberate temperament. The second insight was that the business model 
development process hinged upon the COPE principles. This provided a basis for a general 
understanding of how a USO develops its business model by 1) taking control over its 
capabilities and resources; 2) proactively creating opportunities; 3) forging partnerships with 
non-competitive and competitive stakeholders; and 4) embracing unexpected contingencies. 
 
To further enhance our understanding of the approaches to business model development, the 
findings were integrated and overlaid as a graphical depiction of a conceptual framework that 
illustrates the fundamental concepts and their interrelatedness. The findings are articulated as 
a schematic model (Figure 5-3), and the development of business models for commercialisation 
of new university technology is graphically depicted as an opened black box. It provides new 
insights into the illustration of the opaque black box previously shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
In Figure 5-3, the USO business model development process is illustrated as an iterative 
process that configures the right business model across the business model components which 
also corresponds to the exogenous challenges. It starts with the discovery of new commercially 
viable technology in the university laboratory that is commercialised through a USO. Then, a 
USO deals with high market resistance by enriching the technological benefits and 
  124 
manoeuvring regulations to allow a proposition to be crafted and value to be created. Next, 
financial pressure is dealt with by devising a heterogeneous revenue stream and balancing 
customisation with cost to capture value. Finally, conflicting stakeholders are managed through 
collaborative partnership and a compromising approach. By seeing these three sub-processes 
as having goals and outcomes to be achieved along the way, it is possible to picture the process 
constructively and systematically rather than haphazardly. These approaches are interlinked 
but do not proceed linearly or sequentially. Instead, most of these processes coincide with each 
other.  
 
As a USO develops its business model iteratively through the three measures, USO 
entrepreneurs make decisions based on the COPE principles. As previously mentioned, COPE 
principles provide a basis for general understanding of how a USO develops its business model 
by 1) taking control over its capabilities and resources; 2) proactively creating opportunities; 
3) forging partnerships with non-competitive and competitive stakeholders; and 4) embracing 
unexpected contingencies. These principles are the heart of business model development and 
provide a constructive way to think about the business model development process.  
 
The graphical representation in Figure 5-3 provides a context for summarising and interpreting 
the empirical findings. The theoretical and practical implications of the conceptual framework 
will be discussed further and in greater depth in Chapter 6.
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Figure 5-3: The conceptual framework for business model development
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5.8 Chapter Summary  
This chapter aimed to substantiate the findings obtained from the four cases to identify common 
patterns and, in doing so, answer the research question: how does a USO develop its early-
stage business model for commercialising its technology? Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, 
respectively, outlined the evidence that led to the three main approaches to business model 
development: 1) value creation through flow-field control, 2) value capture through pragmatic 
kinesis and 3) network management through deliberate temperament. Section 5.6 presented the 
COPE principles derived from the findings of template analysis. The conceptual model in 
section 5.7 graphically summarised the key findings of this research. The next section will 
interpret and describe the significance of the findings in this chapter in light of the extant 
literature. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter will interpret the findings in more depth in comparison to prior studies about the 
problem under investigation. It is divided into four main sections. Section 6.2 thoroughly 
discusses the three interlocking, iterative and mutually reinforcing mechanisms for business 
model development based on the aggregate dimensions derived in the analysis. Next, section 
6.3 and section 6.4 discuss the significance of the COPE principles and the emerging 
conceptual framework, respectively. In each section, the findings are linked with the dominant 
theories as either supporting, supplementary or contradicting evidence. Following that, the way 
in which the findings add to the existing knowledge is highlighted. Finally, section 6.5 
concludes the discussion chapter. 
 
6.2 Three Mechanisms for Business Model Development  
The overall aim of this research was to understand how a USO develops its business models 
for commercialising university technology. Logical synthesis of the findings revealed three 
interlocking, iterative and mutually reinforcing mechanisms for business model development: 
1) value proposition and value creation through flow-field control; 2) value capture through 
pragmatic kinesis; and 3) value network management through deliberate temperament. Flow-
field control is an approach that aims to craft a proposition and create a valuable offering while 
overcoming market resistance, by taking active control over a firm’s resources and capabilities. 
Pragmatic kinesis is a measure taken to by a USO to capture value and respond to financial 
pressure by being flexible and sensible enough to move towards profit. Lastly, deliberate 
temperament is intended to manage conflicting stakeholders by aligning stakeholders’ 
expectations to produce a mutually beneficial outcome.  
 
These mechanisms explicitly revealed the approaches to business model development across 
all value constituents collated as an interlocking system and iterative process (i.e. each value 
component is achieved through continuous experimentation, they are mutually dependent and 
inextricably linked). Any change in one component would trigger an immediate change in an 
interlinked component. These findings are consistent with earlier work concerning the 
interdependencies of business model components (e.g. Morris et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 2008; 
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Zott & Amit 2010) and learning by trial-and-error (e.g. Chesbrough 2010; Holloway & 
Sebastio 2010; Sosna et al 2010; Trimi & Berbegal-Mirabent 2012). 
 
Although previous literature acknowledged the interdependencies of business model 
components, it did not tend to gain a deep understanding of the dynamics between components 
in response to external challenges. In contrast, this study obtains a more detailed understanding 
about the establishment of the business model in response to unique challenges. This insight is 
particularly crucial for providing a rich and nuanced account of the development of the business 
model in a real-world setting, where a USO should commit to addressing a unique set of 
obstacles while developing its business model (Mustar et al. 2006; Lubik & Garnsey 2016). As 
claimed by Alrich and Fiol (1994) and Mustar et al. (2008), many firms fall into the trap of 
rushing into development of its business model before truly understanding the threats they must 
overcome. Hence, the findings in this thesis offer credible insight into how a USO manages 
business model development based on uncertainty and risk rather than an ideal set objective, 
which can be flawed. 
 
The three mechanisms of business model development also brought greater empirical visibility 
to Zot and Amit’s (2010) conceptualisation of business model design as an activity system 
perspective. The mechanisms explicated the content and structure of business models as well 
as how the business model development process is governed. By breaking down the specific 
activities performed by a USO to create value, capture value and manage its network, greater 
understanding of the process was offered, which enhanced the conceptual clarity of the activity 
system perspective. This insight also responded to business model scholars’ call for a common 
language for business model development (e.g. Hedman & Kalling 2003; Morris et al. 2005; 
Johnson et al. 2008) to help reduce the proliferation of silos (Writz et al. 2016). 
 
With regard to the interrelatedness of business model components, this thesis demonstrated 
that each value component is equally important and mutually reinforces the overall process of 
business model development. It added to the classic literature on business model development, 
which usually placed greater emphasis on value creation in comparison to value proposition, 
value capture and value network (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; Amit & Zott 2001; 
Zott & Amit 2010; Johnson et al. 2008). The finding also supports Bigdeli et al.’s (2016) 
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argument that the interactions between core components of business models lead a USO to 
achieve financial sustainability and operational scalability. 
 
Although extant business model literature purported the importance of an iterative process of 
alignment of new technology and the market, how the iterative process unfolds remained 
muddled; some works attempting to clarify the iterative process appeared to be in conflict with 
each other. For example, Teece (2010a) hints that a firm should work on its technology before 
identifying its customer segment, whereas Smilor et al. (1990) claim that the market needs to 
be identified first because it is far more crucial than technological factors in regards to the 
USO’s performance. Other scholars suggested that the business model development process 
should begin with the establishment of the value proposition (e.g. Johnson et al. 2008; Zott & 
Amit 2010; Cortimiglia et al. 2016).  Taken together, these works appeared to advocate for a 
sequenced process of iterative business model development.  
 
Whilst the findings in this thesis support the importance of value proposition and the 
expediency of technology-driven and market-driven commercialisation, there is less obvious 
evidence for a sequenced business model development process; in fact, the cases demonstrate 
the non-linearity and complexity of relationships between business model components. The 
only evidence that could shed light on the issue is; in the process of developing a business 
model, a USO should exert more control over its resources and prioritise those that the firm 
controls. That being said, it seems logical for a USO to optimise its technology prior to 
solidifying the market. However, the notion still does not endorse the strict sequencing of a 
business model development process because if the USO has achieved high TRL upon its 
establishment, it could immediately focus efforts on identifying the market in which the 
technology should be commercialised in. This insight reiterates Schumpeter’s (1983) view that 
the entry point to value creation is either technology or market needs.  
 
The evidence in the case studies supported the importance of technological and market drivers 
in technology commercialisation. The finding also ascertains that sequencing in the process of 
business model development is not necessary. This aligns with Reymen et al.’s (2017) 
argument that the business model development process should not strictly employ rules 
because how business models are developed is contingent on the USO’s market and 
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technological conditions. The findings also support Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) view 
that the business model development process does not necessarily follow the traditional ladder 
to growth, in which the value proposition is defined first, the customer segment is characterised 
next, and the key resources, activities, and other key business model components are 
determined last.  
 
Although the current thesis juxtaposed scholarly views about sequencing and business model 
structure (e.g. Smilor 1990; Johnson et al. 2008; Teece 2010a; Zott & Amit 2010; Cortimiglia 
et al. 2016), it does not imply that the process should be approached haphazardly. Here, the 
three mechanisms of business model development can be viewed as having their own 
outcomes, and hence, could coincide or be established at any point during the 
commercialisation journey.  
 
Previous literature argued that a firm needs to focus on its highest-value technology when 
pursuing commercialisation (e.g. Chesbrough 2010; Teece 2010a). The results of this thesis cast 
new light on this issue, highlighting the importance of identifying as many applications of the 
technology as possible beyond its core benefit prior to the prototyping stage. Since failure to 
optimise a technology is inevitable, a USO could switch to the alternative application or quickly 
adapt to meet customers’ unforeseen needs if the first proposition fails. In most cases, USOs 
embrace such contingencies by adjusting some or all components of the technology while fitting 
into the market. Similarly, trial-and-error processes can allow multiple successful applications 
to emerge from the same technological invention, which increases its potential returns (Nerkar 
& Shane 2007; Sosna et al. 2010; Reymen et al. 2017).  
 
Most mainstream literature explained the business model development process using business 
terms and, sometimes, jargon that may not relate to some audiences’ previous experience, thus, 
have limited cognitive impact. In contrast, the present thesis analogised findings from 
aggregate dimensions into three metaphors, using simple language that is relevant to managers 
to describe a complex phenomenon47. Metaphors make the strange familiar and allow a large 
                                                
47 ‘One way to embrace common sense is to use analogy and metaphor in scientific descriptions’. In: Daft, R.L., 1983. Learning 
the craft of organizational research. Academy of Management Review, 8(4), pp.539-546. 
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audience to more easily understand new ideas. In the strategy and management field, many 
theories use metaphors as names for first-order categories (Stubbart 1989). Given this, the 
metaphors used in this thesis add to existing perspectives and can be easily understood as a 
mental model of the business model development approach and its value components. The 
following section will interpret and highlight the significance of three mechanisms of business 
model development in more depth. 
 
 Value Proposition and Value Creation through Flow-Field Control  
In the face of high market resistance and the liability of newness, market ambiguity and 
technological uncertainty, the USOs in the case studies exerted endogenous force on what is 
within their control and elicited exogenous force from their partners to create value. The 
significance of this finding lies in USOs’ ability to be more controlling when creating their 
own opportunities to create value and respond to market inertia without relying solely on 
support from an external network. USOs also tended to prioritise utilisation of resources and 
capabilities within their control over those that need to be gathered from external stakeholders.  
 
As a new and small firm, a USO is always seen as under-resourced firm, beset with liability of 
newness and technological immaturity (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009; Karlsson & 
Wigren 2012). Most scholars have contended that the challenges associated with value creation 
can be mitigated by the expansion of networks and partnerships (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 
2002; Morris et al. 2005; Rasmussen 2006). In addition, it has been argued that network 
integration leads to resource integration. Although network integration and expansion for value 
creation were observed in this study, another workable strategy for value creation was 
identified: taking control and prioritising existing means prior to seeking them externally. This 
is a new insight with profound importance for the commercialisation of USO technology 
because in the USO setting, network expansion usually leads to conflict between the USO and 
external stakeholders. By prioritising and controlling the resources and capabilities over which 
a USO has authority, potential conflicts are minimised and the firm can develop creative ways 
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to create value. Two predominant ways to achieve this are by enriching the benefits of the 
USO’s technological solution and manoeuvring regulations.  
 
Technological benefit enrichment 
In the quest to increase the benefits of its technological solution, a USO solves the customer’s 
problem before it becomes obvious. Scholars have long argued that competitive advantage in 
any firm is achieved through creative creation of new value (Zott & Amit 2010; McAdam et 
al. 2017; Velu 2017). Such literature referred to Schumpeter’s (1934; 1983) classic theory of 
creative destruction, which claimed that innovation is the source of value creation. The findings 
of this research not only validate Schumpeter’s view but also, most importantly, broaden the 
notion by showing which type of innovation for value creation could galvanise business model 
development. In the USO context, the firm crafts a transcending solution and a sintering 
solution to create more value for its customers.  
 
A transcending solution enables a USO to be more pragmatic in creating value in response to 
market resistance. As previously discussed, customers have different levels of awareness and 
willingness to solve a problem by employing a USO’s technological solution. Due to this, a 
USO needs to create value by attending to an unmet need that might exist but is hidden or that 
does not exist at all. As contended by Chakravorti (2004) and Demil and Lecoq (2010), market 
disequilibrium presents an opportunity to exploit resources and offer new value propositions. 
Building on that, the current thesis proposed a transcending solution as one way for USOs to 
face market disequilibrium, create value and propose new offerings.  The finding also enabled 
comprehension of Doganova and Eyquem-Renault’s (2009) argument concerning how a 
business model allows entrepreneurs to explore a market and plays a performative role by 
contributing to the construction of the techno-economic network of an innovation. 
 
Most mainstream literature has accentuated recommendations for value creation by identifying 
gaps in the market and addressing them (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; Zott & Amit 
2008; Lubik et al. 2012). The current thesis found evidence that such suggestions, although 
useful, will only lead a USO to converge with competitors that are looking to address the same 
apparent problem. The understanding about how value is created by escalating customer’s 
expectation of a better product are not well embodied in the literature, hence, represent an 
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interesting insight for the USO value creation. In this study, a sintering solution was used as a 
metaphor to describe one of the ways in which a USO could create value.  
 
In a sintering solution, multiple propositions are combined to offer novel value to the customer. 
Unlike a bundling strategy (Hedman & Kalling 2003; Zott & Amit 2007; Zott & Amit 2010; 
Bohnsack et al. 2014), a sintering solution does not merely combine different offerings and 
turn it into a new package. Rather, it is a novel solution created by a USO that does not lose 
sight of the core value of its IP. This is crucial because one of the purposes of a USO is to 
monetise IP. Jolly’s (1997) argument that technology is not always what sells a product did not 
directly apply to the USO context because the firm is bound by licensing agreements requiring 
it to monetise its IP via a technological solution to solve customers’ problem. 
 
The source of value creation predominantly discussed in the literature is associated with direct 
economic value (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; Ndonzuau et al. 2002). Another source 
of value creation that has received scant attention in the literature but was observed in the case 
studies is social and environmental value. This is in parallel with Fini et al.’s (2018) argument 
stating that technology commercialisation is an enabler for societal impact. Bocken et al. 
(2015) also claimed the value of shifting social pressures to new offerings could facilitate the 
realisation of competitive advantage. Given the context of the cleantech industry, which often 
requires a change in routine (Chakravorti 2004) and modification of cognitive space (Anderson 
& Gatignon 2008), social and environmental value are important ways to enhance the value of 
technological solutions.  
 
Regulatory manoeuvring 
Another striking finding of this thesis is the utility of regulation for creating value. A USO, as 
an entrepreneurial firm, needs to be able to strongly push for technology adoption, which can 
be achieved through regulatory enforcement. In the case studies, stakeholders across cases 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of regulation to accelerate new technology. In contrast, 
none of the previous scholars researching the business model in commercialising new 
technology in the USO context have make enough distinction about the efficacy of regulatory 
exploitation for value creation. The only aspect of regulation discussed in the literature was 
concern about the effect of regulatory red tape on the progress of commercialisation (Druilhe 
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& Garnsey 2004) and regulatory approval on product launching (Bigdeli et al. 2016). Although 
not specifically referring to USOs, Gaus and Raith (2016) argued that universities’ specific 
legal regulation of IP has a strong influence on the incentive structure of business model 
development. 
 
Looking more broadly at the business model literature, scholars have agreed that regulation 
could act as a driver of compelling value creation strategies (e.g. Casadesus-Masanell et al. 
2010; Bocken et al. 2015). According to Bocken (2015), business model innovations for 
sustainability may not be economically viable at the start but may become so due to, for 
example, regulatory changes. Regulatory enforcement explains the widespread uptake of some 
USO technologies, whereas regulatory nonexistence causes poor incentive to adopt several 
others. Although business model scholars underscored the importance of regulatory 
intervention for business model development, they have not explored how regulatory 
enforcement paves the way for technological adoption. In the case studies, to manoeuvre 
regulations, USOs propose new regulation and ride the wave of regulatory reform. 
 
By proposing new regulation that favours its offering, the USO pushes for technology adoption; 
the new regulation triggers competition in the regulated industry and stimulates the 
development of new products. The USO may take the lead in commercialisation of new 
technology that complies with the new regulation for which it lobbied. For some USOs, the 
creation of value has been partly held back by the absence of necessary regulations to push the 
technology forward. New regulation, on the other hand, gives the USO a way to fix customers’ 
problem and implicates governance or regulatory control. In this sense, technological adoption 
is more driven by regulatory requirements or accounting for compliance. It also escalates the 
benefit of the created value and convinces the customer that the problem is worth solving using 
the USO’s offering. 
 
The analysis accentuated that a USO rides the wave of regulatory reform but only those that 
proactively sense the potential for regulatory reform reap the benefit of being a leader in sales. 
In the case studies, all USOs developed technological solutions in a way that favoured changing 
regulations. Realising the increased emphasis put on environmental concerns by regulators, 
they expanded the benefit of new technological solutions to proactively trigger or respond to 
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these regulations. Therefore, the USOs developed a technology that harmonises technological 
advancement with environmental resilience and, at the same time, proactively act to achieve 
regulatory reform. Likewise, when realising a business case for sustainability, firms take 
advantage of a world characterised by tightening regulations, diminishing resources, climate 
change, and technological change to achieve global effects (Casadesus-Masanell et al. 2010; 
Bocken et al. 2015). 
 
By bringing the well-researched role of regulation in business model development into the 
USO field, this thesis advances the understanding of possible methods of value creation. The 
findings of this study are important not only for validating the role of regulation in business 
model development but also, most importantly, prompting USO entrepreneurs to more 
carefully consider utilisation of regulation as part of their value creation agenda. Since 
regulation drives adoption of technology and vice versa, this study offers a new range of 
strategies for value creation through regulatory utilisation, which have not been well explored 
to date. 
  
Overall, value creation through flow-field control casts new light on existing knowledge about 
how a USO could craft a proposition and create value amidst market resistance. By escalating 
the customer’s expectation of a better product and through a regulatory push, a USO could 
create its own opportunity and take charge over the business model development process rather 
than being impulsive. In this approach, a USO does not need to predict an uncertain future 
(Kim & Mauborgne 1999); rather, it needs to focus its efforts on influencing the future using 
the means available to it. Throughout the quest for value creation, the USO’s network is 
expanded discreetly and partnerships are forged when necessary. 
 
 Value Capture through Pragmatic Kinesis  
As widely asserted in the literature, a USO resembles a platform for commercialising new 
technologies and represents a source of wealth creation (Fini et al. 2017). However, how a 
USO captures wealth is not well defined. Although the literature has cautioned that created 
value is not necessarily captured (e.g. Amit & Zott 2001; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002), 
firms still neglect to specify their methods of value capture (McGrath 2010). As demonstrated 
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in the case studies, some USOs create substantial value from new technology without being 
able to fully capture the value they created.  
 
The findings of this research fill the aforementioned gaps by providing evidence-based insights 
into several ways a USO could capture value in the face of financial pressure through an 
indirect, pragmatic and flexible approach defined as pragmatic kinesis. Although an indirect 
approach to reach a complex goal has been discussed in the management literature before48, no 
business model literature has specifically documented the importance of such an approach for 
capturing value from new university technology. The findings of this study provide an 
alternative explanation of value capture strategy beyond the parsimonious notion of how 
incremental technology should aim to capture value from the existing market (Pattnaik & 
Pandey 2014) and radical technology commercialisation should aim to capture value in a new 
market (King & Tucci 2002). This is important as cleantech USOs have to deal with a long 
development time and are forced to use more capital in comparison to other types of firms 
(Maine & Garnsey 2006). 
 
Two approaches that bridge value creation and value capture in the case studies are a 
heterogeneous revenue stream and balance of customisation strategy and production cost. Both 
approaches are deemed to be useful for expanding the understanding of the value capture 
strategy, which is often reduced to narrow discussions of pricing strategy (e.g. Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom 2002; Teece 2010a). 
 
Heterogenous revenue streams 
Heterogeneous revenue streams are materialised by having diversified revenue source and by 
entering substitutes market. The academic entrepreneurship literature has well acknowledged 
that USOs have diversified sources of funding and revenue streams (e.g. Vohora et al. 2004; 
Shane 2004; Garnsey & Leong 2008). Such sources may include seed capital, government 
grants, venture capital, angel investments and funds of the founder. Despite this, most literature 
                                                
48	‘Many goals are more likely achieved when pursued indirectly.’ In: Kay, J., 2011. Obliquity: Why our goals are best 
achieved indirectly. London: Profile Books. 
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has only discerned the type of revenue stream being pursued by a USO without thoroughly 
specifying the intervention needed to achieve it. This research is valuable because it 
demonstrates that USOs devise multiple revenue streams by more widely exploring the 
different methods that can be employed and different markets that can be explored to generate 
additional income. Building upon Bigdeli et al.’s (2016) argument, this research argues that 
USOs employ an indirect approach that results in transformation of the cost structure and 
revenue stream.  
 
Generally, a heterogeneous revenue stream compensates for USOs’ long lead time to market 
(Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009). To grow profitably, a USO needs to devise an approach 
that entices payment and prepares the market (Jaworski et al. 2000). One source of revenue at 
the early-stages of USO growth observed in this study is research grants. Although an inventor 
can make use of university facilities to reduce the expenditure on infrastructure while creating 
an innovative and productive base, research grants are still not sufficient to guarantee a 
sustainable income (Druilhe & Garnsey 2001). Consulting is another revenue stream that was 
crucial for the survival of the USOs in this study. As knowledge-intensive businesses, 
consulting activities appeared to be one of the most effective ways for USOs to monetise their 
intellectual assets on the side. The revenue made through these activities was put back into the 
business. 
 
As the literature claimed, the purpose of having a heterogeneous source of income is mainly to 
enhance financial security and, in the case of USO, to avoid running out of funds while still in 
the pre-commercialisation stage (Vohora et al. 2004; Lubik & Garnsey 2016). Interestingly, 
this study found evidence that non-core revenue streams are also important for capturing value 
after the commercialisation stage. This thesis thus uncovers a previously underexplored use of 
non-core revenue streams for capturing value for a USO, particularly post-commercialisation.  
 
Another important observation of this research is that not all USOs commercialise radical 
technology; those with incremental and less differentiated products struggle to capture value 
in existing markets (Mustar et al. 2008). To avoid directly engaging with incumbent firms, 
these USOs enter and capture value from substitute markets instead. This strategy fits with 
USOs’ aspiration to break free from competing firms and, hence, create new demand and 
  
 
 
138 
capture value where it was non-existent (Kim & Mauborgne 1999). This strategy also allows 
customers to see themselves benefitting from solutions outside their obvious and conventional 
applications. The findings of this research shed light on the conditions that might be 
conducive for USOs with less differentiated technology to capture value.  
 
Previous scholars argued that USO could capture greater value by serving larger market 
segments in larger industries (Bigdeli et al. 2016). While this notion holds true in some of the 
case studies, substantial evidence also demonstrated that a USO could reap benefits and capture 
value in smaller markets with less competition. The current research brings another perspective 
to value capture that involves entering not only a larger market but also a substitute or smaller 
market. This finding aligns with Kim and Mauborgne’s (1999) stance that firms must be 
strategic when disengaging with a competitive market.  
 
Furthermore, capturing value from a large and established market may force a firm to sell 
products at the market price, causing it to gain a smaller percentage of its revenue from 
monetisation of the new technology (Feldman & Klofsten 2002). This threat may be less 
obvious for non-entrepreneurial firms, but for a USO, entering a large market entails a high 
risk to its survival. Overall, the finding that a USO has diverse revenue sources and enters 
substitute markets aligns with the findings of entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Navis & Glynn 
2010). 
 
Customisation–cost balance  
Customisation strategy has been widely discussed in the business model and technology 
commercialisation literature as one way to capture value (Morris et al. 2005; Osterwalder & 
Pigneur 2010; Bohnsack et al. 2014). As observed in the findings, customisation strategy is 
deemed appropriate for fending off competition and allows a firm to charge its customers a 
premium price. By targeting a niche market for specific applications and providing a 
customised offer, a USO could capture more value (Druilhe & Garnsey 2004). Customisation 
strategy also serves as a useful approach to understand customers’ preferences, which allows 
the USO to tailor its production in a way that enhances long-term profitability. This finding 
supports Bower and  Christensen’s (1996) argument that a firm could capture substantial value 
by addressing customers’ distinctive and changing needs. 
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Despite this, customisation could also constrict growth and lower profit margins as a result of 
cost complexity (Oliver et al. 2004). Customisation strategy conflicts with the economies of 
scale agenda, forcing a USO to consider a trade-off between the strategies. In the business 
model and technology commercialisation literature, there has been not enough investigation to 
understand how the drivers of customisation cost that limit a firm’s ability to access economies 
of scale can be minimised. The trade-off between customisation and cost is another valuable 
finding of this study. 
 
Building upon Strobacka et al.  (2013), the findings clarify the approach taken by USOs to 
capture value by balancing the needs for product customisation and standardisation. This thesis 
showcases how USOs could adapt two conflicting value capture strategies through 
simultaneous customisation and standardisation, harmonising the dualistic value capture 
mechanisms. The analysis argues that both approaches are compliments rather than substitute. 
In balancing the advantages of customisation with the economies of standardisation, a USO 
interacts with potential customers to extract information about both the standard and 
idiosyncratic elements of their preferences (Gambardella & McGahan 2010). Without 
undermining standardisation opportunities or economies of scale, a USO engages in a tiered 
approach to value capture in which higher-end customers are provided tailored products and 
services to match the value they represent. USOs diversify their offerings to capture different 
customers’ needs but retain a generic proposition. By doing so, they provide customers valued 
options without compromising economies of scale.  
 
Velu and Stiles (2013) argue that a firm can cognitively and economically integrate two very 
differently configured models that serve the same customers simultaneously. This research, 
however, finds that a USO could employ two conflicting value capture strategies to generate 
profit margins. This insight crystalises the arguments by Bohnsack et al. (2014) that the 
appropriate business model can increase the market attractiveness of a technology, improve the 
full value capture of an innovation and lead to a competitive advantage. By taking control over 
the levers of duality, a USO could successfully trade-off between the value of customisation 
and the cost of complexity through standardisation of the products being commercialised.  
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In summary, USOs with complex offerings, revolutionary technology and upscale products 
that are challenged with myriad financial pressures employ circuitous measures to establish 
product awareness, brand recognition, market creation and, eventually, value capture. 
Pragmatic kinesis enables robust understanding of USOs’ value capture strategies, particularly 
when the firm’s short- and long-term value capture strategies and the need to respond to 
financial pressure are intertwined.   
 
 Value Network Management through Deliberate Temperament  
In this thesis, deliberate temperament contributes to the limited understanding of management 
of conflicting value network. Traditionally, business model scholars have highlighted network 
expansion for value co-creation and value capture (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; 
Morris et al. 2005; Nenonen & Strosbacka 2010; Rasmussen et al 2011). Academic 
entrepreneurship scholars, on the other hand, affirm that USOs’ quest to commercialise new 
technology is associated with conflicting objectives amongst key stakeholders, which may 
adversely impact the firm’s growth trajectory (Siegel et al. 2003; Vohora et al. 2004). Despite 
this, scholars in both fields have been relatively silent about the management of conflicting 
stakeholders when business models are developed. 
 
One possible way to minimise the adoption of conflicting logics in the management literature 
is pre-emptively screening problematic stakeholders to prevent the conflict from taking place 
(Jaworski et al. 2000; Pache & Santos, 2013). While this is a valuable recommendation, 
evidence from the case study reveals that some USOs, especially those with less entrepreneurial 
experience, do not have the capability to screen their stakeholders. Similar to the findings of 
Goel and Karri (2006), this study found that entrepreneurial firms are more likely to be over-
trusting and tend to trust more than is warranted. Most conflicts in the management literature 
appeared to be latent in nature. Additionally, in most cases, a USO could not easily escape 
conflicts because they involve long-standing stakeholders with strategic importance to the 
USO’s commercialisation goals. As observed in the case studies, collaborative partnerships 
and a compromising approach are two measures that help USOs to deal with unavoidable 
conflicts.  
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Collaborative partnership 
In the pluralistic environment of USOs, conflicts are dealt with in mutuality and constructively 
through collaborative partnerships. This finding is similar to Bocken et al.’s (2015) argument 
that a sustainable business model is built on collaboration and sharing rather than aggressive 
competition. Bocken (2015) also contended that, with the rising pressure of global 
sustainability, collaboration between firms and other key stakeholders is becoming more 
important. By transforming strife into teamwork, collaborative partnerships represent workable 
alternatives to the win–lose method, whereby tension is resolved in a more harmonious manner 
with more motivated and satisfied stakeholders. 
 
Through co-operation and co-opetition, a USO manages conflicting stakeholders by turning 
misaligned goals into collaborative partnerships. The findings demonstrate that successful 
external collaboration in a networked environment should aim to achieve common goals and 
involve some form of co-operation or collaboration (Zot et al. 2011). Likewise, business model 
scholars have argued that business model development is contingent on co-operation, 
partnership, and joint value creation (Magretta 2002; Mansfield & Fourie 2004; Mäkinen & 
Seppänen 2007; Miller et al. 2014). The current thesis extends this notion by demonstrating 
how collaborative partnerships are key for aligning conflicting goals and, hence, resolving 
tension.  
 
When developing a viable business model, a USO must determine how its value proposition 
responds to all the expectations of stakeholders who create value and for whom value is created  
(Baden-Fuller & Morgan 2010; Lehoux et al. 2014). Appelhoff et al. (2015) argued that 
entrepreneurial firms that base their actions on their own means usually trigger conflict 
among their stakeholders. Similar finding is evident in the case studies. Business models 
relied heavily on the commitment of a network of partners to create value and generate 
profitable revenue streams. The current thesis further delineates Lehoux et al (2014) findings 
arguing that collaborative approach is key in resolving tension that results from stakeholders’ 
expectations.  
 
Failure of USOs to pursue collaborative partnerships to resolve conflicts may damage 
relationships and reduce organisational effectiveness. However, not all resolved conflicts end 
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in mutual collaborative partnerships. Realistically, some form of the conflict may not result in 
getting all the stakeholders needs met along the integrative dimension at all. In such a 
circumstance, a USO and its stakeholders may be better off negotiating their needs through 
compromise.  
 
Compromising approach  
The findings of this study reveal that compromise is key in the USO networked environment, 
where each stakeholder’s role is interdependent. Compromise between competing demands is 
achieved by navigating tension to reach a common goal through mutual concessions. To deal 
with conflicting stakeholders, USOs make informed decisions to trade-off between 
incompatible values and tolerate divergent values to reach a compromise. 
 
This research agrees with Suchman’s (1995) argument that conflicting stakeholders could co-
exist despite tension, ultimately leading to normative change, compromise and legitimisation. 
It also answers the call to overcome conflict when stakeholders have disparate objectives and 
ambiguities concerning commercialisation (Markman et al. 2008). Another important question 
on which the finding sheds light concerns the condition under which a USO needs to 
compromise. Based on the cases, compromise is necessary when the decision is urgent and 
rigidity would not progress the USO’s commercialisation. As much as the USO and 
stakeholders would like to take control over the negotiated outcome, both parties need to 
consider splitting the difference of the negotiated terms. Generally, conflict results in a 
compromise and normative change in which different, even seemingly opposed, ideological 
elements are reconciled (Etzkowitz et al. 2000). 
 
In the USO context, conflicts are not desirable but inevitable (Miller et al. 2014), mainly due 
to the varying motives of stakeholders with different roles (Siegel et al. 2003). TTO officers 
typically do not want to have conflicts with the researchers on whom they are dependent for 
deal flow and invention disclosure (Mustar et al. 2008). Through compromise, USOs, TTOs 
and other stakeholders could enhance their long-term survival and strengthen their 
relationships despite their different values. The findings also support the general notion that a 
compromising approach does not only soften the edges and decreases conflict but also, most 
  
 
 
143 
importantly, aims to maximise the impact and commercial success of USO technology 
commercialisation by addressing the root of the conflict. 
 
Scholars argue that it is important to separate academic and commercial activity to avoid 
conflicts of interest and cultural barriers due to conflicting goals (Argyres & Liebeskind 1998). 
However, as the USOs usually have little or no personal experience in the business field, 
separating these activities is tough. USOs are dependent on the development of good working 
relationships within their academic and commercial networks. By compromising, a USO and 
its stakeholders achieve the best outcomes of negotiation and avoid undesirable outcomes. As 
the cases demonstrate, compromising sometimes may be the only way to reach a decision that 
would not further lag commercialisation process. Each stakeholder’s beliefs need to be 
respected so that compromises can be sought wherever possible. A compromising approach is 
also a form of mature decision making. 
 
All in all, a collaborative partnership and compromising approach is key for enabling network 
management and expansion in a way that facilitates the technology commercialisation process. 
Unresolved conflict could escalate into ongoing battles and confrontational attitudes, delaying 
a USO’s growth; scholars like O’Shea et al. (2005) have affirmed that tension is detrimental to 
the commercialisation progress. This thesis provides insight into how tensions are dealt with, 
arguing that deliberate temperament is a valuable approach to management of USO 
stakeholders with conflicting values and objectives. 
 
6.3 COPE Principles for Business Model Development   
In this thesis, the COPE principles are advanced as a set of parameters that a USO needs to 
consider when developing its business model. The principles represent a cognitive tool for 
understanding how business models are established, which may help USOs navigate the 
turbulent journey of commercialisation. It builds on and explicates the effectual logic proposed 
by Sarasvathy (2001) and the concept of opportunity creation advanced by Alvarez and Barney 
(2007). As claimed by Amit and Zott (2001), a cross-theoretical perspective is required to 
understand the business model development process because no single theory can fully explain 
the value creation potential of a venture. Therefore, this thesis combined both of the 
aforementioned theories. The COPE principles provided a new direction for theoretical 
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development and empirical studies in entrepreneurship by linking business model 
entrepreneurial cognition, opportunity co-creation and organisational outcomes. The principles 
were also a response to the lack of construct clarity associated with business strategy (see Porter 
2001). The next section will elaborate on the way in which each principle adds to our 
knowledge about USO business model development.   
 
 Principle 1: Take Control 
The case studies pursued in this thesis reveal the importance of a USO taking control over its 
resources and capabilities to develop a viable business model. By doing so, a USO could avoid 
over-predicting the future, instead influencing the future by making the most of its resources 
and capabilities. The approach also economizes USOs’ efforts and resources when developing 
a business model by concentrating them where they are more important.  
 
Sosna et al. (2010, p.384) warrant that “business model development is an initial experiment 
followed by constant revision, adaptation and fine-tuning based on trial-and-error learning.” 
Likewise, this thesis has argued that one of the purposes of business model establishment is to 
enable a firm to achieve its desired results iteratively in an unpredictable but controllable 
environment. Also, an extended explanation of how to fine-tune the process of business model 
development by taking charge of a USO’s resources and capabilities was provided. 
 
The principles of effectual logic—taking control, paying less attention to prediction and making 
do with available resources (Dew & Sarasvathy 2002)—are often useful for a USO without a 
clear market direction. By adopting these principles, a USO could optimise its technology prior 
to solidifying its market position. USOs’ ability to demonstrate their technologies’ functionality 
would help to prepare them for the market since it is difficult to conceptualise a product without 
demonstrated functionality.   
 
The analysis posited that technology-based products are never going to be perfect as the 
technology is continually improving. By taking control over only the resources and capabilities 
within its authority, the USO can get the first version of its product into the market and then see 
how customers respond to it. From investors’ point of view, technology prototypes could 
demonstrate the feasibility of a USO’s idea and lower the risk of investment, therefore 
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increasing the probability that a USO will be funded (Jolly 1997; Shane 2004; Siegel & Wright 
2015). Moreover, in alignment with effectuation logic, a USO is more capable of controlling 
its own technology but may not be sufficiently credible to fully condition the market (see 
Sarasvathy 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew 2005).  
 
Effectual logic is based on the ability to control more and predict less. Knowing what can be 
controlled and taking charge over it is imperative for the development of a viable business 
model. A USO that takes control also takes responsibility for its future without over-predicting 
it. This insight contributes to the developing stream of empirical research that investigates 
entrepreneurial decision making under conditions of uncertainty (Wiltbank et al. 2006; Dew et 
al. 2008).  
 
 Principle 2: Create Opportunities 
The opportunity creation principle offers a way to enhance understanding of USO business 
model development that is distinct from that found in the effectuation debate. Opportunity 
creation stance is supplemented into the effectual logic and has been advantageous in 
addressing the lack of human agency in developing a business model. The principle affirms 
that a viable business model is developed proactively rather than reactively. While most 
literature has discussed effectual logic in tandem with causal logic, this thesis provided stronger 
grounding for the theory by explicating the effectuation discourse and supplementing it with 
the concept of opportunity creation. It did not accept effectual logic as is but strengthened the 
theoretical grounding prior to employing it to inform the investigation. In doing so, a 
paradigmatic shift occurred in the effectuation discourse that enhanced the pragmatism of the 
established theory.  
 
The principle of opportunity creation hinges on the actions of the entrepreneur to create 
opportunities and assumes that opportunities do not necessarily exist independently of the 
actions taken by entrepreneurs to create them (O’Cornor & Rice 2013; Zahra 2014). This 
understanding links the business model and opportunity enactment which enhances the 
theoretical grounding. Since the principle of opportunity creation overlaps with the principle 
of taking control, both represent an exciting opportunity to explain how a USO creates and 
captures value despite its weak entrepreneurial credibility at an early-stage of growth.  
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Academic entrepreneurship scholars have long characterised USOs as having weak 
entrepreneurial credibility (Pirnay et al. 2003) and disadvantaged with the liability of newness 
(Rasmussen et al. 2011). USOs are expected to overcome challenges and transition from one 
phase of growth to the next (Vohora et al. 2004) by becoming more proactive (Clarysse et al. 
2004). Given this situation, creating opportunities is a highly appropriate technique for firms 
with weak entrepreneurial credibility that need to make decisions. It also informs the extent to 
which a USO, despite having weak entrepreneurial credibility, could influence the business 
model development process. 
 
Creating opportunities is part of the business model foundation and complements the discovery 
approach employed in previous literature (e.g. McGrath 2010). Previous academic research 
referred to business models as organisational structures that take advantage of a commercial 
opportunity (Teece 2010a; Amit & Zott 2001; George & Bock 2011). Business model 
innovation is also commonly represented as a firm-level process to exploit new opportunities, 
and frameworks that assess strategic flexibility in the context of opportunity identification and 
exploitation are of particular interest. George and Bock (2011) see business models as 
opportunity facilitators. Building upon effectual logic, Chesbrough (2010) contend that the 
business model is the result of experimentation that generates new data, which may point 
towards previously latent opportunities. To a great extent, theses scholars associate business 
model development process to the stance of opportunity creation.  
 
From a slightly different angle, the current thesis employed opportunity creation as a way to 
better explain the process of business model development in the USO context. By considering 
opportunity creation as an independent principle, the thesis added to the understanding of the 
technology commercialisation that involves market creation (Jaworski et al. 2000). This insight 
is crucial because objectively pursuing opportunities in a readily available market appeared to 
be less valuable than proactive market orientation (e.g. Jaworski et al. 2000; Narver et al. 2004). 
Realistically, entrepreneurs do not only aim to satisfy the existing market needs but sometimes 
must first create a market that may not existed a priory. By doing so, the future is considered 
something that a USO cannot fully control but can be influenced by creating opportunities. 
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The principle of opportunity creation is key for understanding that the success of 
commercialisation can be influenced by USOs instead of waiting for opportunities to ready 
itself. It also clarifies how reasons to adopt new technology can be invented through 
opportunity creation. In the constant search for new opportunity and empowerment, proactive 
USOs tend to do and achieve more. Firms that create and seize opportunities have different 
outlooks about commercialisation pursuit. This understanding allows a USO to better 
improvise means to achieve ends or alter their ends, or do both, in processes that may combine 
opportunity discovery and creation.  
 
 Principle 3: Forge Partnerships 
Forging partnerships with external stakeholders is key for development of a viable business 
model. In the analysis, the imperative of partnership was present in all value components. It 
was through partnerships that USOs gain access to resources, reduce uncertainty and shape the 
direction of the firm, and value is created and captured through relationships with networked 
partners and influenced by alliance activities. These findings parallel scholars’ view that the 
business model development process extends beyond the firm (Zott et al. 2011), expands firms’ 
know-how (Holloway & Sebastio 2010) and catalyses co-creation of value (McAdam 2017). 
 
Within the effectual logic debate, partnership has been deemed important for attracting new 
funds and defining new direction (Sarasvathy et al. 2008). Partners with complementary skills 
and assets are willing to share in the upside to encourage engagement in opportunity creation. 
As argued by Sarasvathy (2001), effectual logic rests on the ability of the entrepreneur to 
interact with and involve other stakeholders in the venture creation process. By employing the 
partnership principle to understand business model development, the thesis offered further 
clarification of the notion that business model development depends on the involvement of 
other people and organisations as committed stakeholders. As rightly argued by Venkataraman 
et al. (2012), stakeholders are individuals who dedicate their own resources to co-create new 
ventures with entrepreneurs.  
 
However, with more partnerships and network expansion comes the risk of more conflicting 
objectives. The case studies revealed that partnerships could also bring about a different set of 
challenges and risks for a USO. In response, some USOs were more selective in forging 
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partnerships and making sure that potential partners have mutual interest in bringing 
technology to the market by carefully picking their frame of reference within the market and 
utilising stakeholder’s involvement. From the lens of opportunity creation, the essence of 
opportunity agency provides a supplementary explanation of value network selection. It is 
through selective acquisition of stakeholders that a firm fabricates a new market (Alvarez & 
Barney 2007). In this regard, value network recruitment is seen as an endogenous process that 
is partly controllable (Sarasvathy 2001) through means of selection (Alvarez & Barney 2007), 
which can be done without assuming stakeholders’ trust (Goel & Karri 2006). This is crucial 
when dealing with the commercialisation process, which is inherently fraught with tension due 
to symmetrically aligned stakeholder commitments (Siegel et al. 2003; Shane 2004).  
 
However, the ability to choose network members disaccords with Sarasvathy (2001) and 
Sarasvathy et al.’s (2008) notion theorising that effectual transformation is determined through 
a self-selecting network rather that a purposive selection process. This resonates O’Connor & 
Rice (2013) view on effectuation’s limitation in evaluating potential network members. 
Stakeholders morph the original idea into one to which a whole network of stakeholders are 
committed (Sarasvathy et al. 2008). Read et al. (2009) argue that a market is created as an 
outcome of the interaction between network actors through non-predictive control of 
stakeholders’ commitment.  
 
In an ideal situation, a USO would screen its network and only forge partnerships that matter. 
Although a USO could screen its partners to avoid potential conflicts, getting embroiled in a 
conflict during commercialisation is inevitable because most conflicts are latent in nature (i.e. 
potential conflicts may not be spotted until they happen). In addition, some conflicts are 
unavoidable completely as they involve longstanding partners that are crucial to a USO’s 
progress. When that happens, the USO takes a collaborative and compromising approach to 
address it. 
 
In summary, by embedding the principle of forging partnerships in business model 
development, this thesis adopted an interesting angle that views partnership as an antecedent 
to network expansion, a method of value co-creation, a source of conflicting objectives and a 
potential solution to conflicts. The findings regarding effectual logic have crucial ramifications 
  
 
 
149 
on how USOs take charge to restrict stakeholders’ membership and strategically solve conflicts 
through partnership. 
 
 Principle 4: Embrace Contingencies 
Being able to embrace unexpected events throughout the technology commercialisation 
process is crucial for developing a viable business model. Since mistakes are inevitable, a USO 
embraces contingencies that arise from uncertain situations by remaining flexible rather than 
becoming tethered to existing goals. A USO keeps the decision making sufficiently open to 
leverage unexpected events for the benefit of the firm (Chandler et al. 2011). Instead of creating 
what-if scenarios to deal with worst-case scenarios, USOs interpret contingencies and surprises 
to look for new opportunities to commercialise their technology. This principle is well suited 
for entrepreneurship processes that are characterised by uncertainties and risks. 
 
Since new technology and market alignment are highly iterative, USOs tend to experiment with 
different values, face unforeseen turns and, sometimes, reach a dead end. This finding reveals 
that a USO should terminate its goal and modify its strategy once it is no longer economically 
beneficial to pursue the initial proposition. While persistence is an immensely valuable trait for 
reaching a USO’s goal, maintaining a faulty strategy in pursuit of a worthwhile goal will not 
contribute to a USO’s commercialisation success. This demonstrates that effectual logic 
pragmatically leverages contingencies (Sarasvathy 2001; Sarasvathy et al. 2008), shedding light 
onto the point at which USOs to an alternate proposition.  
 
The observations of the current thesis also show that successful commercialisation is 
characterised by the need to make decisions and take action in the face of uncertainty (e.g. 
Sarasvathy 2001; Alvarez & Barney 2005). The findings of the current thesis make this 
relationship explicit by demonstrating that a decision to widen the scope of a venture leads to 
an increase in the use of effectual decision making, such as flexibility to adopt a technology in 
multiple potential markets. 
 
USOs were observed to learn from failed experiments, make the best of unpleasant situations 
and improve their conditions by exploring new avenues to exploit their technology. Owing to 
the inability to control the future (Sarasvathy 2001; Sarasvathy & Dew 2005), it is often easier 
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for a firm to change its technological application than to change the market’s preference. 
Although it is highly case-specific, a USO should not keep using a business model that is no 
longer profitable because a USO’s response to early failure can critically affect how the 
experimentation process unfolds. 
 
In summary, the findings of the current thesis supported and further explicated scholarly views 
about effectual and iterative business model development (e.g. Schneider & Speith 2013; 
Andries et al. 2013; Reymen et al. 2017). As Perry et al. (2012) highlight, the next stage of 
theory development in effectuation research requires empirical researchers to build a more 
detailed understanding of the utility of effectuation. This thesis extends prior research by 
explaining shifts in the use of effectual logic supplemented by the concept of opportunity 
creation to identify the starting and exist points of the iterative new technology and market 
alignment.  
 
Apart from advancing the COPE principles as a way to understand business model 
development, the current thesis combined findings from the grounded approach and COPE 
principles to devise an integrative framework for business model development in response to 
the unique challenges USOs face. The next section will discuss the framework developed in 
this study. 
 
6.4 Conceptual Framework for USO Business Model Development  
This thesis proposes an empirically and theoretically grounded conceptual framework for 
business model development. The framework has multiple strengths and sheds light on the 
partial understanding of the issue. First, the framework is receptive to the challenges faced by 
USOs at multiple TRLs. Rather than building the foundation of the framework on ideal, 
unrealistic, set objectives, the framework offers a more plausible explanation of business model 
development based on the challenges facing a USO. Second, by synthetising findings from 
both successful and less successful attempts at commercialisation, the framework offers an 
inclusive way to explain business model development. In summary, the framework proposed 
in this thesis promotes USO governance through adaptation of turbulent settings (Clarysse et 
al. 2011; Rasmussen et al. 2011; Lubik & Garnsey 2016). 
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Although past literature has been instrumental in informing some generic parts of the 
framework foundations, it has not provided details regarding how the business model 
development process unfolds. Generally, the framework supports and extends three main 
conceptual premises advanced by previous scholars. First, the framework reinforces the notion 
that a business model is a tool to drive the commercialisation of new technology (e.g. 
Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002). Second, it demonstrates how a USO’s business model is 
developed through iterative trial-and-error and experimentation (e.g. Sosna et al. 2010). Third, 
the framework acknowledges that the business model development process is challenged by 
pitfalls that are unique to USOs, such as market resistance, financial pressure and conflicting 
stakeholders (e.g. Lubik & Garnsey 2016). Thus, the proposed framework clarifies and reveals 
the inner workings of the business model development process, which previously could be 
viewed only in terms of its inputs (new technology coming out of the university laboratory) 
and outputs (the resultant business model). 
 
The three mechanisms of business model development embedded in the framework explicate 
how business models dynamically interrelate. This notion supports a more pragmatic way of 
delineating the business model development process through a dynamic rather than static view 
(e.g. Casadesus-Masanell et al. 2010). As thoroughly discussed in the previous section, 
effectual logic supplemented with the concept of opportunity creation have been the theoretical 
underpinnings that strengthen the robustness of the framework. In that sense, the framework 
directly responds to critiques that business model development lacks theoretical grounding (see 
Porter 2001; Hedman & Kalling 2003). At the heart of the framework, the COPE principles are 
proposed to be the foundation of the business model development process across three different 
value components. The principles capture the salient aspects of effectuation logic (Sarasvathy 
2001) and the concept of opportunity creation (Alvarez & Barney 2007). The COPE principles 
also qualify as a desirable theory because they are accurate and simple (Yin 2014; Makadok et 
al. 2018), enhancing the likelihood that they will be applicable to a wider set of phenomena49. 
 
In short, the framework proposed in this thesis adds another layer to the understanding of 
business model development in the USO context, which features USO-specific challenges, and 
                                                
49	A sound theory can be evaluated through its accuracy, simplicity and/or generalisability. 
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leads to understanding of what facilitates USO activity. It also provides a platform for empirical 
and theoretical findings in the business model discussion whilst carefully acknowledging the 
contextual factors of a USO. 
 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the findings in relation to the existing literature. It interpreted the 
key findings of this thesis, covering the three interlocking, iterative and interdependent 
mechanisms of business model development, the COPE principles and the emergent 
framework. The chapter has also demonstrated how the findings consistently fit, supplement 
or extend the existing body of knowledge. The next chapter will conclude the thesis by 
outlining the key findings and implications for theory and practice. It will also present the 
limitations of this research and outline recommendations for future research. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter aims to recap the arguments made in the preceding chapters in a broader context 
and highlight the key implications of this research. It begins with section 7.2, which briefly 
reiterates the key findings of this research. Next, section 7.3 and section 7.4 present the 
theoretical and practical implications of the completed research, respectively. Section 7.5 
outlines the research limitations and, lastly, section 7.6 recommends potential areas for future 
research. 
 
7.2 Overview of Key Findings 
This research was initially guided by the following research question: How does a USO develop 
its early-stage business models to commercialise new technology? This question was answered 
by describing the main specific approaches taken by USOs to develop their business models 
while also responding to challenges across the three components of business models. The 
analysis revealed three key findings.  
 
First, a USO’s business model was developed through three interlocking, iterative and mutually 
reinforcing mechanisms: 1) value creation through flow-field control, 2) value capture through 
pragmatic kinesis and 3) value network management through deliberate temperament. Flow-
field control is an approach that aims to craft a proposition and create valuable offering while 
overcoming market resistance, by taking active control over a firm’s resources and capabilities. 
Pragmatic kinesis is a measure taken by a USO to capture value and respond to financial 
pressure by remaining flexible and sensible enough to move towards profit. Lastly, deliberate 
temperament aims to manage conflicting stakeholders by aligning stakeholders’ expectations, 
which results in a mutually beneficial outcome. 
 
Second, the thesis advanced the COPE principles as the foundation for the business model 
development process. The principles are based on four premises borrowed from effectual logic 
(Sarasvathy 2001) and the concept of opportunity creation (Alvarez & Barney 2007) (i.e. take 
control, create opportunities, forge partnerships and embrace contingencies). The COPE 
principles are also used as the operationalisation guideline in discovering the three mechanisms 
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for business model development (i.e. value creation through flow-field control, value capture 
through pragmatic kinesis and value network management through deliberate temperament).   
 
Finally, all key findings were integrated into a comprehensive conceptual framework that could 
guide the USO business model development process. The framework revealed the inner 
workings of the business model development process, which could previously be viewed only 
in terms of its inputs (new technology coming from the university laboratory) and outputs (the 
resultant business model).  
 
7.3 Theoretical Implications 
The theoretical implications resemble a rationale for the theoretical contribution (Ågerfalk 
2014). As discussed in the preceding chapter, this research contributes mainly to the business 
model literature and, to some extent, provides useful insights for the academic entrepreneurship 
literature as well as the ongoing debate regarding effectuation logic. The novelty of this 
research lies in the originality, uniqueness and in-depth empirical evidence gathered to 
substantiate the measures taken by USOs to develop their business models for commercialising 
new technology. Hence, the main theoretical contribution of this thesis is its explication of the 
effectual logic supplemented by the concept of opportunity creation to advance the 
understanding of the development of business models for commercialising new university 
technology. The next section will present the extent to which this new understanding can 
improve existing knowledge in three streams of literature. 
 
 Implications for the Business Model Literature 
In this thesis, business models were the unit of observation on which the level of analysis was 
focused. The findings of this research hence have implications for future work on business 
models. There are at least six theoretical implications of this research for the business model 
literature.  
First, the overall findings of this thesis offer a critical logical shift to a more systematic 
understanding of business model development. Specifically, the new set of principles, 
metaphors and conceptual framework introduced in this research respond to scholarly inquiries 
to improve the clarity, contingencies, and outcomes of the business model construct, which 
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have been inadequately addressed in the business model literature (see Foss & Saebi 2017). 
The findings also subtly yet critically reflect the inner workings of initial business model 
development rather than how such models evolve, change or undergo innovation. This study 
introduces approaches to business model development that could support previous conjectures 
about business model evolution (e.g. Demil & Lecoq 2010; Velu 2017) and business model 
innovation (e.g. Johnson et al. 2008; Sosna et al. 2010).   
Second, by investigating business model development in the USO setting, this thesis expands 
the utility and roles of business models across conventional organisational boundaries. In other 
words, it shifts from a knowledge frontier, extending the business model discussion to a 
specific yet essential empirical setting in which it has been rarely explored. By doing so, it 
exemplifies another crucial empirical setting in which an understanding of business models is 
desired. Additionally, through empirical execution, the findings of this research also enhance 
the visibility of current wisdom—which has been mostly investigated conceptually—about the 
role of business models in technology commercialisation (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 
2002; Chesbrough 2003; Johnson et al. 2008; Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 2009; Baden-
Fuller & Haefliger 2013).  
 
Third, this research provides a stronger theoretical grounding for business model literature. 
Traditionally, empirical research about business models has lacked theoretical grounding 
because it has been mostly discussed independently from established theories (Hedman & 
Kalling 2003; Teece 2010a). By corroborating decision-making logics with effectuation 
theory, more insight is provided into the complexities and intricacies of empirical reality. The 
findings also serve as a call to the criticism about the loose theorising between business model 
and revenue generation strategy (See Porter 2001). Subliminally, this thesis supports the 
increasing appreciation of the strategic management concept explained through the established 
theoretical lens.  
 
Fourth, the thesis more closely links multidisciplinary theories that previously existed in 
isolation despite their important potential connection. The conventional wisdom in the business 
model literature is that a business model is established through an iterative process. However, 
how the iterative process unfolds is still only partially understood. This thesis casts new light 
on the issue by including the entrepreneurship literature within the discussion. Although the 
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understanding of business model development promoted in this thesis is, so far, only validated 
to work in the USO setting, the concept of controlling, creating opportunities, forging 
partnerships and embracing contingencies could guide how business model experimentation is 
pursued (e.g. Sosna et al. 2010; Andries et al. 2013).  
Fifth, this research constitutes a theoretical extension of the work on boundary-spanning 
transactions between a focal firm and its ecosystem of partners (see Zott & Amit 2008). In 
particular, the findings of this thesis go beyond firm-centric and customer-focused value 
creation, which improves our understanding of the connective mechanisms, dynamics and 
conflicts involved in business model development (e.g. Reymen et al. 2017). It outlines the 
essential details of a firm’s value proposition for various stakeholders as well as the activity 
system the firm uses to create and deliver value to its customers. By investigating issues 
concerning the distinctive motives among stakeholders and soliciting recommendations for 
conflict resolution, this thesis adds a new perspective on how conflicts that occur in a 
networked business model development process can be resolved.  It also contributes to the line 
of reasoning that forging partnerships not only provides access to resources but also minimises 
anticipated and unavoidable conflict. In that sense, the findings of the thesis have added to 
previous work on networked business model development (e.g. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 
2002; Mansfield & Fourie 2004; Palo & Tahtinen 2013). 
Finally, the analysis of the findings enhances the visibility of the functional form of business 
model components. This thesis deeply investigates the interdependent business model 
components by treating them individually. Although previous conceptual discussions about 
business models have usually broken the concept of business models into several components, 
empirical comprehension in the reviewed literature mostly explains the business model 
development process as a block. By unpacking the underlying building blocks, this research 
enables more detailed analysis, provides a more robust view of each component and further 
clarifies the interdependencies of all the business model components.  
 Implications for the Academic Entrepreneurship Literature  
Academic entrepreneurship was employed as the context of investigation of this research. 
Specifically, USOs represented the unit of analysis or entity being studied at the organisational 
level. This thesis has at least four implications for the academic entrepreneurship literature.  
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First, the findings constitute an advance in the analysis of the determinants of a USO’s 
successes and failures in commercialisation beyond conventional mechanisms such as 
university patenting and licensing (e.g. Link & Scott 2003), incentives (e.g. Lockett & Wright 
2005) and entrepreneurial characteristics (e.g. Gümüsay & Bohné 2018). The business model 
is a crucial dimension of entrepreneurial strategy for USO commercialisation success that has 
been vastly acknowledged in practice but has received limited attention in the academic realm. 
The thesis also reveals that the USO’s crucial role in maximising the returns on IP (Lockett & 
Wright 2005) and, subsequently, regional economies (Fini et al. 2017) can be enhanced through 
a well-developed business model. In the university context, the value of new technology may 
not be fully materialised through a licensing arrangement (Franklin et al. 2001). In response to 
this, the findings offer a possible way to enhance the value of a new technology through the 
development of a viable business model. 
 
Second, by employing established theories to explain USO technology commercialisation, this 
thesis adds and strengthens the theoretical grounding for university technology transfer in 
general. Effectual logic and the concept of opportunity creation supplement previous theories 
used to explain university technology commercialisation, such as Vohora’s USO creation 
process perspective (Clarysse et al. 2011), Penrosian’s resource-based view (Demil & Lecocq 
2010), the dynamic perspective (Dmitriev et al. 2014), path dependence (Bohnsack et al. 2014) 
and lean start up (Still 2017).  
 
Third, by having a multidisciplinary (not discipline-based) focus, the study offers a 
comprehensive description and connection between academic entrepreneurship and business 
model strategy formulation. This is crucial for enhancing the understanding of the complex 
relationship between a new university technology and the market.  The findings of this research 
also offer a valuable insight into the business model stream to explicitly address some of the 
ongoing concerns about academic entrepreneurship literature, such as conflicting motives 
among stakeholders (Siegel 2003) and insufficient financial return to fund operationalisation 
of the pre-commercialisation stage (Vohora et al. 2004). Additionally, by maintaning the spirit 
of networked stakeholders, the findings shift the focus of academic entrepreneurship studies to 
the dynamics of different stages and players in the commercialisation pipeline and away from 
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the conventional commercialisation process, which promotes a static or linear go/no go process 
(e.g. Hindle & Yencken 2004).  
 
Finally, since the analytical set-up of this research is receptive to the unique challenges of 
USOs, the case studies yield credible measures of the realisation of value from new university 
technology. It was argued by the business model scholars that only a relatively small number 
of studies are focused on understanding the development of business models for 
commercialising university technology. This was partly caused by USOs’ prevalent failures, 
which eventually resulted in data scarcity (Mustar et al. 2008). Additionally, the unique 
challenges faced by a USO when commercialising its technology seem to be overlooked in the 
literature (Lubik & Garnsey 2016). By employing credible data with multiple case profiles, 
treating a USO as an entirely different category of firm and scrutinising its challenges to 
develop a business model, this thesis offers constructive recommendations for business model 
development. Further, by using empirical examples from both successful and less successful 
case studies, the comparative analysis in this research offers a more integrated understanding 
of why USOs generally succeed or fail to develop a business model viable enough to generate 
income, grow profitably and become sustainable in the long run.  
 
 Implications for the Effectuation Literature 
In this research, Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectual logic, supplemented by Alvarez and Barney’s 
(2007) concept of opportunity creation, was employed as the main theoretical underpinning of 
the findings. The thesis goes beyond theory testing and refines both concepts. Through attempts 
to explain and understand the USO phenomenon within the limits of assumptions, this thesis 
offers four important implications for effectuation theory.  
 
First, the thesis builds upon and repackages effectual logic into a new theoretical vision that 
unravels the mechanisms of business model development in the USO context. Specifically, by 
supplementing effectual logic with the concept of opportunity creation, this research enhances 
effectuation theory and makes it more relevant to human agency (Zahra 2014) and reflects 
on the dynamics of entrepreneurial processes (Shane 2004). The understanding that USOs are 
able to create their own opportunity has consequences when added to the theory of 
entrepreneurial action, which is an alternative to the predominant view of entrepreneurs as 
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discoverers of existing opportunities (e.g. Reymen et al. 2017). The compatibility of both 
theories also provides a fresh perspective on new artefact creation and, in this case, business 
model development beyond what was already widely discussed within effectual logic literature.  
Second, the finding concerning proactive network selection reveals hidden inconsistency in 
effectual logic when applied in a setting with conflicting stakeholders. Given this, the findings 
offer an alternative method for network self-selection, which has been the core component of 
effectual logic and mostly believed to be the best practice (O’Cornner & Rice 2013). This thesis 
argues that, in the USO context, network self-selection does not necessarily need to be an 
impulsive process of discovery (e.g. Sarasvathy & Dew 2005). Rather, it can be improved and 
proactively managed. This finding does not only refine effectual logic but also encourages the 
rethinking of relationships between effectual principles.  
Third, the thesis offers a new direction for research that utilises effectuation and causation 
reasoning as foundational theory. Most research employing Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation 
and causation discuss both logics in tandem. From a slightly different perspective, this thesis 
shows how valuable insight can be gathered by digging deeply into effectual logic. It adds to 
the most common empirical conclusion: a firm starts with effectuation and gradually employs 
causation as it moves closer to its objective (e.g. Sitoh et al. 2014; Reymen et al. 2017) 
Finally, the execution of this research enhances the eminence of effectual logic to reflect the 
underlying reality of the phenomenon in the strategic management and academic 
entrepreneurship streams of literature. The finding shows consistencies between the 
developmental states of multiple research streams. By extending the applicability of effectual 
logic to understand the dynamics of strategic decision making when developing a business 
model, the thesis strengthens the specific relevance of effectuation to the entrepreneurial 
setting. Likewise, the decision-making process is an important element in the organisational 
process of entrepreneurial firms (Alvarez & Barney 2005), but it has rarely been extended to 
the university context.  
7.4 Practical Implications 
As highlighted in the first chapter, general lessons concerning USO business model 
development are rarely shared beyond organisational boundaries, hindering wider managerial 
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implications. This research offers several contributions pertinent to practitioners. Since the 
commercialisation of academic research through USO creation has been a high priority for 
policy in many countries, this research relates to the repercussions of USO strategies pursued 
by USO entrepreneurs and technological policy advocated by USO stakeholders. The next 
section describes the practical implications of this research specifically for USO entrepreneurs 
and stakeholders and more broadly for other firms.  
 
 Relevant Findings for USO Entrepreneurs 
First, given the ambiguous path to commercialisation, USO entrepreneurs may find the 
conceptual framework and the guiding principle proposed in this research useful for 
development of their initial business models. The framework should serve as a conceptual 
toolbox and offer a common language to assist cognition and lead to the development of 
organisational interventions that facilitate business model development. This may have 
further implications for the design and execution of strategies for USO commercialisation, 
which could improve the commercial underachievement facing many USOs.  
 
Second, when defining their value proposition and creating value, USO entrepreneurs may 
need to exert more control over their resources and capabilities. The evidence in this thesis 
hints that the business model development process can and should be influenced or managed 
by USO entrepreneurs. The findings further affirm that, although technological and market 
ambiguity is inevitable and the future cannot be controlled, USO entrepreneurs could still 
create value in a way that influences how the future would unfold. The notion shifts our 
understanding about the trial-and-error process, which is not necessarily a stochastic event but 
something that can be proactively influenced through the actions of the USO entrepreneur.  
 
Third, in capturing value, a USO entrepreneur needs to be creative and flexible to sense 
possible ways of generating revenue in the face of financial pressure. The case studies in this 
thesis sought to recommend several workable strategies for generating revenue in a way that 
would also respond to the distinctive challenges faced by USOs, such as multiple revenue 
streams and the customisation–cost strategy. Since many attempts to commercialise new 
technology take longer than they should, result in marginal profit or end in failure (Mustar 
et al. 2008), these strategies for value capture may be useful for USOs to consider. 
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Fourth, regarding conflicting stakeholders, the evidence in this thesis encouraged USO 
entrepreneurs to carefully screen their stakeholders prior to soliciting partnerships without 
over-trusting or over-predicting. However, many types of conflicts are inevitable and USO 
entrepreneurs may lack experience in screening their partners. In such situations, USO 
entrepreneurs should attempt to adopt mindful attitudes towards potential tensions among 
stakeholders with conflicting motives and cultures. When resolving conflicts, USO 
entrepreneurs may need to first seek common ground and forge partnerships. If such an 
approach does not work, then the USO may need to consider splitting the difference and 
negotiate to achieve a compromise. This measure could be instrumental for reducing the risk 
of continuous conflict that might plague the USO’s journey to commercialisation.   
 
Lastly, the thesis carefully considered myriad challenges and common pitfalls faced by USOs 
led by both experienced and inexperienced entrepreneurs. The thesis also highlighted the need 
for tailoring a business model that accounts for the nuances and complexities of the market and 
technological uncertainty. Most USOs that do not account for these caveats are trapped in 
oversimplified commercialisation strategies that eventually fail. Given this, USO entrepreneurs 
may want to familiarise themselves with common challenges facing the business model 
development process. Through familiarisation of anticipated challenges, USO entrepreneurs 
could deliberately attend to the difficulties ahead of them. This pre-emptive measure may also 
enable entrepreneurs to operate in otherwise chaotic environments, which are typical in the 
early-stage of growth of USOs, when both the technology and market are highly uncertain. 
Previous literature on USO business model development did not sufficiently consider these 
loopholes and, hence, may arrive at a false impression of what a USO may become despite 
market opportunities, novel business ideas, adequate resources and talented entrepreneurs 
(Morris et al. 2005). 
 
 Relevant Findings for USO Stakeholders 
USO stakeholders include a wide array of practitioners with a stake in the USO and common 
interest in enhancing university technology commercialisation. They include university 
management, TTOs, investors, partners and policymakers. The findings of this research 
provide these stakeholders with relevant insights regarding their respective roles in USO 
commercialisation.  
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First, the thesis urges more inclusive collaboration with USO stakeholders, which could help a 
USO to better comprehend the challenges and opportunities ahead of it. In particular, the 
evidence in this thesis has repeatedly underscored that successful university technology 
commercialisation is the result of synergistic collaboration between different stakeholders. 
Therefore, all the stakeholders need to break different silos. More importantly, the burden of 
commercialisation should not shouldered only by USO entrepreneurs but collectively by 
stakeholders both from academic and commercial networks. All expectations regarding 
stakeholders’ vested interest in technology commercialisation should be balanced with their 
roles in improving the probability of commercialisation success. In doing so, the stakeholders 
may become more responsive in facilitating the USO business model development process.  
 
Second, within the university setting, university management should consider a wide range of 
mechanisms to create a conducive ecosystem for academics hoping to commercialise their 
research. Supportive mechanisms should focus not only on the formation of USOs but also, 
most importantly, on their sustainable growth. TTOs need personnel with the appropriate skills 
to support the early—and most crucial—stage of USO growth in creating and capturing value 
from latent technology. Since patented technology may not necessarily translate into wealth, 
TTOs may reflect on the fact that IP needs to be sustained by a viable business model because, 
instead of being a USO’s best asset, IP could also be the USO’s worst liability. The case studies 
reveal that USOs supported by less bureaucratic regulations are more likely to survive and 
prosper. Additionally, when supporting a USO’s commercialisation pursuit, a TTO and the 
university management need to pay more attention on the technology’s societal impact rather 
than just focusing on value creation solely based on the economic value. 
 
Finally, since governmental support does not seem to have eliminated all the barriers to 
commercialisation of university technology, policymakers may need to reflect on existing 
policy that affects the survival of USOs. Although, policymakers have acknowledged that 
poorly devised business models are a key bottleneck hindering university technology 
commercialisation, interventions are still fragmentary. By adding extra urgency to the issue, 
policymakers should revise the existing policy, craft a new policy instrument that could help 
the USO diminish the time to market, enhance profitability and convert USOs into dynamic 
high-growth firms. Policymakers could also target resources throughout all TRLs and perhaps 
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map the USOs’ performance over time. This approach could enhance USOs’ resilience and 
durability, enabling them to grow in tough environments. 
 
 Relevant Findings for Other Firms 
The practical implications of this study are related to a sample of decisions made by USO 
entrepreneurs. Compared with other entrepreneurs beyond the USO setting, USO entrepreneurs 
are likely to have less business experience and usually deal with new technologies and 
uncertain markets. Therefore, it can be argued that this study’s findings may have useful 
implications for the wider population of novice entrepreneurs or managers striving to adapt 
their business models in environments with high market and technology uncertainty.  
 
Despite the specific characteristics of USOs, other firms, like technology start-ups or 
entrepreneurial firms, have some similarities to USOs. For instance, these firms are normally 
technology-driven, small, have a high business risk and aim to produce innovative products. 
The results of this study may thus be applicable to these firms. In addition, the COPE principles 
proposed in this thesis can be generically applied to the broader set of concerns related to the 
challenges faced by small firms beset with liability of newness. In summary, since the business 
model has quickly become a key instrument in technology commercialisation, this thesis 
provides a valuable opportunity for practitioners to advance their existing knowledge of the 
measures that need to be considered when developing a business model to bring new 
technology into commercial reality.  
 
7.5 Research Limitations 
Owing to the nature of an inductive case study, this research was exposed to at least four 
common methodological limitations. This section presents the limitations of this research and 
measures taken to minimise them.  
 
Limited Generalisability of Findings  
Limited generalisability of findings is a typical criticism of case studies, and this research is no 
exception. There is a high potential for the findings to result in idiosyncrasies, making it 
difficult to extend them to a broader organisational, industrial and spatial context. Given the 
uniqueness of the challenges faced by USOs and the fact that the cases are cleantech-focused 
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and location-specific, it may be difficult to extend the findings to radically different types of 
firms in different industries and locations. However, the findings may be extended to other 
entrepreneurial firms experiencing similar obstacles or USOs in other locations with similar IP 
policies. To enhance generalisability within the USO context, all cases were carefully selected 
so that each case features a distinctive profile and could predict theoretical replication 
(contrasting results for anticipated reasons) rather than literal replication.  
 
Less Accurate Inter-coder Assessment Results 
The data analysis relied heavily on the researcher’s interpretation supplemented by four 
assessors’ feedback which might be biased due to individual subjectivity. Limited samples 
were used during the inter-coder assessment, i.e. 21 randomly selected interview quotes, 21 
categories, six themes and three aggregate dimensions. Due to this, the inter-coder assessment 
results might not fully reflect the real coding process conducted by the researcher. Additionally, 
the Q-sort technique employed in the inter-coder assessment may be exposed to bias due to 
assessors’ time constraint and misunderstanding. This limitation was minimised by planning 
the assessment carefully and by providing the assessors with clear instructions. All assessors’ 
results were also discussed after each assessment.  
 
Limited Causal Inferences  
This study was conducted in a cross-sectional, or snapshot, manner, which allowed many 
variables to be compared simultaneously. Validation of the findings of cross-sectional case 
studies, however, does not allow valid causal inferences, unlike validation of longitudinal 
cases. This shortcoming was minimised by conducting in-depth interviews, performing 
detailed analysis and cross-case comparison to corroborate both current and past events. 
Retrospective questions were also included in the interviews so that the cross-sectional findings 
could become a series of snapshots that represent the whole event.  
 
Bias and Preconception 
To some extent, the researcher’s background and position inevitably influence the angle of 
investigation, the methods that are judged most adequate, the findings that are considered most 
appropriate and the framing of conclusions. In this research, bias and preconception were 
minimised by fostering reflexivity (i.e. attending systematically to the context of knowledge 
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construction, especially to the effect of the researcher on every step of the research process). 
The current research also sought to integrate collective feedback to allow data triangulation by 
engaging more people in dialogue regarding, for example, by conducting the inter-coder 
assessment exercise. These measures have led to the development of complementary as well 
as divergent understandings of a study situation, which are useful for unpacking any alternative 
beliefs, values or perspectives. Most importantly, inclusive triangulation allows assumptions 
to be revealed and contested.  
 
7.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
This research generated several propositions for follow-up studies. The following section 
presents three areas that deserve to be explored in more detail in future work.  
 
Longitudinal Operationalisation in a Broader Context 
Further research using larger samples of USOs from different universities, industries and 
locations is needed to extend the current findings to a broader context, thus enhancing 
generalisability, one of the previously identified limitations. Additionally, since this study is 
cross-sectional, more longitudinal research on the upstream and downstream stages of 
commercialisation, preferably for longer periods, could bring causal inferences to the process 
of business model development.  
 
External Stakeholders’ Role  
This research has suggested that external stakeholders have a striking impact on how business 
models are developed despite conflicting motives and values. However, this issue has not been 
explored in detail. Hence, further research could investigate how the range of external actors 
who have conflicting vested interest (e.g. customers, suppliers, distributors, competitors, 
investors, universities, government agencies) could influence the business model components’ 
development over time.  
 
Reinforcement of Framework Validity 
This thesis proposed a conceptual framework to serve as a theoretical perspective with which 
to examine the process of business model development in the USO context. Another interesting 
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direction to extend this work is to reinforce framework validity by testing the conceptualisation 
in other entrepreneurial firms, such as technology start-ups.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis denotes an attempt to address the theoretical and managerial 
implications for the business models in commercialising university technology: one of the most 
challenging issues facing USOs today. The overview of the completed research and linkages 
between chapters is presented in Figure 7-1. As evidenced in this thesis, the reconciliation of 
business models and university technology commercialisation literature represent a new stream 
of knowledge which has already attracted scholarly interest to dismantling issues of significant 
importance to the business model and technology transfer scholars. It is hoped that this 
completed research could become a germinal step towards inspiring future work with more 
rigorous enquiries that could bring this stream of knowledge to the cognisance of the 
mainstream literature. 
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Figure 7-1: Completed research and linkages between chapters
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix A: Chronologic timeline 
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 TIM
ELIN
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A
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 O
N
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R
ITIC
A
L EVEN
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EFO
R
E 2006- D
EC
 2010) 
Events/year 
B
efore 2006 
Year 1 (2006) 
Year 2 (2007) 
Year 3 (2008) 
Year 4 (2009) 
Year 5 (2010) 
IDEATION/  
 INCORPORATION 
Ideation 
-AV’s inventor fleshes out idea 
on natural ventilation system
 - 
traditional natural ventilation 
strategies are just not up to 
scratch and com
es up w
ith a new
 
approach. 
 
-AV’s inventor validates idea at 
D
epartm
ent of Engineering, 
U
niversity of C
am
bridge. 
 
  
  
  
  
IP/ 
licensing 
-AV applies for IP-passive stack 
system
. (The IP is filed in 2006 
and granted in Europe in 2012). 
-AV, the funder, TTO
 
acknow
ledge the com
m
ercial 
term
s that allow
s the funder and 
the TTO
 to hold share in the 
com
pany through an equity only 
agreem
ent. 
-AV is given royalty-free, 
exclusive com
m
ercial right to the 
university technology. 
 -AV and funder agree right up 
front that either AV or the funder 
w
ill be the com
m
ercial entity of 
the U
SO
. 
-If AV com
m
ercialises, the U
SO
 
w
ould pay ongoing royalty to the 
funder. 
 -AV decides that they w
ill be the 
com
m
ercial entity of the U
SO
. 
-The earlier agreem
ent 
concerning royalty is abolished – 
conflicts w
ith the funders 
aspiration. 
-The e-stack natural ventilation 
system
 is developed and 
patented by the TTO
. 
  
Leadership/ 
incorporation 
-AV’s C
EO
 has business 
experience by jum
ping out of 
academ
ic research in 1997. ‘I 
jum
ped ship com
pletely and 
w
orked for a m
ortgage-strategy 
consulting firm
 nothing to do w
ith 
engineering.’ 
-AV is founded. 
-AV form
s a team
 of highly 
qualified ventilation experts: the 
inventor (lecturer/engineer) 
assum
es the role as C
EO
. 
  
 
  
 -AV changes its nam
e to the 
one that is m
ore relatable to its 
technology. 
PROTOTYPING /  
COMMERCIALISATION 
Technology  
development 
-AV discovers proprietary low
 
energy e-stack m
ixing ventilation 
system
. 
 
-AV aligns feedbacks gathered 
form
 architects to devise the 
technological solution. 
-AV aim
s to devise a solution to 
ventilate buildings w
ith fresh air 
w
ithout freezing buildings 
occupants. 
-AV develops and tests 
prototypes of the e-stack system
 
in labs. 
-AV gathers useful data to 
determ
ine the  algorithm
 for the 
ventilation system
. 
-AV concentrates efforts on the 
proof of concept and validation of 
the technology in the real 
environm
ent. 
 
-AV optim
ises its ventilation 
system
 w
ith energy saving of 10-
50M
W
/hour (saving of 
40M
W
/hour/year, C
O
2  em
ission 
of 10 tonnes/ year. 
-AV com
m
ercially introduces the 
e-stack system
 to the m
arket. 
-AV hits its first sale m
ilestone.  
-AV selects D
orset School for the 
testing of its natural ventilation 
system
. 
-AV launches new
 design tool for 
architects and designers w
orking 
on school’s developm
ent 
projects. 
-AV designs Sunderland 
healthcare facility (U
K's first 
prim
ary care facility rated as 
excellent by BR
EEAM
)  
-AV adds C
AD
 blocks for all the 
e-stack range to products page. 
Strategy 
  
-AV hires students to investigate 
the right target m
arket. 
-AV invests in m
arket research 
and constantly review
s current 
and upcom
ing regulations 
related to ventilation system
. 
 
-AV advocates the claim
 that ‘the 
sim
plest w
ay to reduce fuel costs 
this w
inter is to use the heat you 
already generate yourself!’ 
  
- AV designs Asda ventilation 
system
 to m
anage tem
perature 
fluctuations in colder w
eather 
(the first store in the U
K to 
operate the BB e-stack system
). 
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PROTOTYPING /  
COMMERCIALISATION 
Financial 
 
-An international oil & gas 
com
pany funds £2.5M
 research 
on the proprietary low
 energy e-
stack m
ixing ventilation system
. 
  
  
  
-AV receives £75,000 grant from
 
a VC
 to create a w
ay of recycling 
w
aste heat. 
  
Partnerships 
  
-AV forges partnerships w
ith the 
university through the C
M
I 
Partnerships Program
m
e. 
-AV receives further support from
 
the international oil & gas 
com
pany. 
  
  
-AV enters partnership w
ith 
D
orset School for the testing of 
natural ventilation system
. 
-Lord Sugar visits AV and 
discusses w
ith C
EO
 about the 
support services available to 
businesses in the region. 
-AV strengthens links to the 
Engineering D
epartm
ent at the 
U
niversity of C
am
bridge.  
-AV receives support from
 U
KTI 
to join G
LO
BE 2010. 
Market  
presence 
  
  
  
-AV is listed in The C
lean Tech 
Start-up Index. 
-AV’s C
EO
 is interview
ed in 
M
asterclass in Energy Supply 
and D
em
and. 
  
-AV takes part in G
LO
BE 2010 
-AV’s C
EO
 attends the Business 
Breakfast at N
o 10 D
ow
ning 
Street. 
Awards/  
recognitions 
  
  
 
 
  
-AV is selected to join a C
lean 
and C
ool M
ission 2010 
-AV is identified as U
K 
C
leantech H
ot Prospect by 
W
ired M
agazine. 
-AV is included in Business 
W
eekly's Killer 50. 
-AV is shortlisted for G
reen 
Business of the Year in R
eal 
D
eals, G
row
ing Business 
Aw
ards.   
-AV is included in C
leantech 
C
onnect Top 25 
Challenges 
 
-AV fights hard for a royalty free 
licensing agreem
ent 
-AV faces harsh com
petition in 
the m
arket-com
peting on price 
for equal approved products 
(cannot charge m
uch of a 
prem
ium
). 
 
-Sales m
ade during the first year 
is just enough to survive as a 
new
 firm
 
-AV is hit by the 2008 recession. 
-AV continues to com
pete on 
price. 
-AV steers strictly by the 
previous C
hairm
an to outsource 
sales function. 
  
Regulatory/ 
Societal push 
-E-stack m
ixing ventilation 
system
 is claim
ed to have the 
potential to reduce heating bills 
as m
uch as 50%
. 
 -Provision of energy to buildings 
account for around 40%
 of the 
energy consum
ption in the 
developed w
orld. 
 
-The benefit of m
ixing ventilation 
is w
ritten into regulation-BB101 
G
uidelines on Ventilation, 
Therm
al C
om
fort and Indoor Air 
Q
uality in School. 
-C
leantech businesses are 
ushering in a green-energy 
revolution that m
ay help lift 
Britain out of recession. 
-The proposed changes to Part L 
and Part F of the Building 
R
egulations in 2010 have been 
designed to support the 
G
overnm
ent's Building a 
G
reener Future. 
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N
 2011-D
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 2016) 
Events/year 
Year 7 (2011) 
Year 8 (2012) 
Year 9 (2013) 
Year 10 (2014) 
Year 11 (2015) 
Year 12 (2016) 
IDEATION/  
 INCORPORATION 
IP/  
licensing 
 
-AV is granted patent for passive 
stack system
 in Europe in 2012. 
  
-AV’s patent w
as infringed by a 
com
pany that launched very 
sim
ilar product (they pulled their 
product from
 the m
arket in the 
end). 
  
  
Leadership 
/incorporation 
 
-AV appointed its Business 
D
evelopm
ent M
anager. 
  
  
  
-3 engineers from
 the AV 
venture to Edinburgh in search 
of H
aggis, Kilts and the C
IBSE 
Technical Sym
posium
 at H
eriot 
W
att U
niversity. 
PROTOTYPING /  
COMMERCIALISATION 
Technology 
development 
-AV launches an extension of 
design tool for office and 
schools. 
-AV co-develops (w
ith a global 
ventilation com
pany) a toolkit for 
m
echanical engineers. 
-AV com
pletes the first BR
EEAM
 
'O
utstanding' H
ealthcare project. 
-AV m
akes its units available on 
G
oogle Sketchup 
-AV establishes FAQ
s section. 
 
-AV cham
pions the benefits of 
PC
M
 in the construction of a 
m
ore sustainable built 
environm
ent. 
-AV releases second edition of 
new
 catalogue.  
-AV tests the effectiveness of 
adding PC
M
s to a school built 
using lightw
eight construction  
-AV tests take place at Belvoir 
H
igh School, Bottesford, 
N
ottingham
 w
hich featured R
-
Series e-stack through-the-roof 
ventilation units. 
-AV ventilates the Jam
es D
yson 
Building and C
entre at the 
U
niversity of C
am
bridge  
-Sir R
obert W
oodard Academ
y 
in W
est Sussex is handed over 
to the end client on the 22nd 
D
ecem
ber. 
Strategy 
-AV launches prom
otional 
m
aterial (a new
 educational 
brochure that explains school 
solution and Asda case study). 
-AV visits C
anada and the U
S as 
part of a U
KTI-led C
leanTech 
m
ission. 
-AV sponsors an industry w
ide 
event for H
ealthcare, R
etail and 
Sustainable urban planning and 
design. 
-AV show
cases the collaboration 
betw
een local organisations to 
the Secretary of State for Energy 
and C
lim
ate C
hange. 
-AV outsources sales functions 
w
ith U
S and C
anadian 
com
panies to sell in their 
m
arkets (using royalty based 
m
odel) w
hich ends after a year-
does not w
ork. 
-AV creates a guidance paper to 
help contractors/engineers 
com
ply w
ith the new
 criteria and 
cost targets. 
-AV updates Priority School 
G
uide to reflect the changes in 
the Facilities O
utput 
Specification  
-AV creates a cold draught 
calculator (to help client ensure 
that the occupants of the 
buildings are com
fortable) 
-AV launches YouTube channel 
to discuss natural ventilation 
issues. 
  
  
Financial  
 
 
-AV receives £1M
 investm
ent   
  
  
  
 -AV exceeds revenue forecast 
(2015/16 financial year) of m
ore 
than 30%
 grow
th w
ith average 3-
year sales grow
th of 52.25%
 and 
recorded sales of G
BP 7.8 
m
illion. 
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PROTOTYPING /  
COMMERCIALISATION 
Partnerships 
-AV enters partnership w
ith 
C
om
pany N
 to develop a toolkit 
for m
echanical engineers. 
-AV helps W
illm
ott D
ixon and 
N
H
S South of Tyne & W
ear build 
the U
K’s first BR
EEAM
 
‘outstanding’ health facility.  
-AV com
pletes Barnfield South 
Academ
y's project. 
-AV enters partnership w
ith the 
U
niversity of C
am
bridge to host 
Industry event (to discuss the 
challenges that the construction 
industry is facing) and  C
IBSE 
sem
inar on Low
 Energy N
atural 
Ventilation. 
-AV enters partnership w
ith 
G
overnm
ent to advise on  the 
im
portance of ventilation in a 
educational space. 
 
-AV sponsors prizes for 3 
engineering students of G
irton.  
Arranges an Industry-Academ
ia 
research event on Building the 
W
orld of Tom
orrow
, in 
partnership w
ith Prof C
am
 
M
iddleton from
 the U
niversity of 
C
am
bridge. 
-AV is acquired by a bigger firm
 
(cam
e to the m
arket in 2014 and 
is best know
n for its ow
nership 
of the Vent-Axia brand of 
ventilation products). 
 
Market  
presence 
-AV’s C
EO
 speaks at the 
Enterprise Tuesday 
Buildings w
hich AV w
orked on 
received aw
ards. 
-AV is featured in C
AM
 
M
agazine 59- the culture and 
ethos of the com
pany 
-AV’s C
EO
 speaks to H
&V N
ew
s 
about 'G
reening' a buildings. 
- AV displays e stack at the 
Insite11 event at the BR
E 
cam
pus w
ithin W
ilm
ott D
ixon. 
-AV’s C
EO
 w
as interview
ed by 
H
&V N
ew
s about how
 he set up 
the U
K's fastest grow
ing natural 
ventilation.  
-AV survives during one of the 
longest econom
ic dow
nturns the 
construction industry has seen. 
-AV’s C
EO
 speaks about w
inning 
BR
EEAM
 (H
oughton Prim
ary 
C
are C
entre). 
-AV’s C
EO
 has been called upon 
by the G
overnm
ent to advise on 
the im
portance of ventilation in 
an educational space. 
-AV’s C
EO
 speaks at C
lean 
Tech Innovate 2013  
-AV hosts a Breakfast event w
ith 
C
IBSE. 
-AV’s C
EO
 is interview
ed by  
R
adio 4's-the success of 
Ashm
ount Prim
ary School and 
the BR
EEAM
 O
utstanding 
aw
ard. 
-AV’s C
EO
 w
rites an article on 
avoiding cold draughts for the 
C
IBSE  
-AV supports C
IBSE N
atural 
Ventilation event at U
C
L. 
-AV is invited by M
odern Building 
Services to talk about challenges 
of cold draughts  
H
osts a Breakfast event w
ith 
C
IBSE. 
-AV’s C
EO
 joins a panel of 
experts to discuss m
ixing 
ventilation online w
ebinar 
C
EO
 speaks at a C
IBSE  event 
at U
C
L 
-AV’s C
EO
 is interview
ed by 
N
aked Scientists R
adio  
-AV’s C
EO
 presents  'D
esigning 
natural ventilation for therm
al 
com
fort in buildings' in 
International Energy Agency 
(IEA) Annex-62 Ventilative 
C
ooling Sem
inar at Brunel 
U
niversity London. 
 
-AV im
plem
ents its technology in 
m
ore than 300 buildings in the 
U
K. 
Awards/ 
recognitions 
-AV is shortlisted for the 
C
am
bridge G
raduate Business 
of the Year Aw
ard. 
-AV is nom
inated for the BVC
A 
Portfolio Aw
ards 2011 
-AV is listed in Business 
W
eekly's new
 Killer50. 
-AV w
ins tw
o m
ajor honours in 
quick-fire succession. 
-AV’s C
EO
 is aw
arded the 2011 
Silver M
edal for their 
contributions to driving unique 
engineering. 
-AV’s C
EO
 listed as one of 
C
am
bridge's brightest young 
entrepreneurs  
-AV’s C
EO
 gives M
Ps a 
m
asterclass on natural 
ventilation. 
-AV is nam
ed in Business 
W
eekly's top 50 Killer com
panies 
in the East of England. 
-AV is chosen as finalist by 
BR
EEAM
 for Sustainable 
Buildings 2011/12.  
-AV runs for Sustainia100, in 
R
io. 
-AV w
ins Berti G
reen Accelerator 
program
m
e  
Aw
arded the BVC
A aw
ards for 
com
m
unity and environm
ental 
action in the M
idlands. 
-AV announces in the prestigious 
G
lobal C
leantech 100. 
-AV is shortlisted for the C
IBSE 
Building Perform
ance Aw
ards 
2014. 
-AV is shortlisted in the Private 
Business Aw
ards 2014.  
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PROTOTYPING /  
COMMERCIALISATION 
Challenges 
 
  
  
-AV patent w
as infringed by a 
com
pany that launched very 
sim
ilar product (they pulled their 
product from
 the m
arket in the 
end). 
-AV loses 5 projects totalling 
about £30,000 to the infringer. 
 
 
Regulatory/  
societal push 
 
  
-M
any new
 school are suffering 
from
 overheating and energy 
bills because of problem
s w
ith 
ventilation design.  
-N
ew
 guidance from
 the EFA 
aim
s to address the issue- BB 
explains in April's C
IBSE Journal 
-The N
H
S produces 18 m
illion 
tonnes of C
O
2  every year – AV’s 
technology could be the solution. 
-EFA announces new
 regulations 
governing ventilation in schools, 
signalling the end of BB101-the 
im
portance of the occupants' 
com
fort and the im
portance of 
m
itigating cold draughts. 
-EFA publishes new
 guidance on 
acoustics, lighting and ventilation 
in schools.  
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APPENDIX B 
Appendix B: Interview protocol 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL VER 0.1 (for pilot study) 
 
§ Introductory protocol 
§ SET 1: Generic information 
§ SET 2: Business model development 
 
 
INTRODUCTORY PROTOCOL 
 
Student/interviewer:  Zurina Moktar (Second year PhD student) 
 
Affiliation:   Institute for Manufacturing,  
   Engineering Department, University of Cambridge, UK 
 
Research title:  Business models (BM) in commercialising university technology 
 
Research questions:  RQ1-How does the design and development of BM assists in  
   commercialising university technology?  
   
RQ2- How does a BM integrate internal and external factors in order to enable 
the commercilisation of university technology? 
 
 
Introductory Protocol 
 
Thank you for your agreeing to participate. To facilitate note-taking, I would like to audio record our 
conversations today. For your information, only myself as the researcher on the project will be privy to the 
recordings, which will be eventually destroyed after they are transcribed. In addition, you have to sign a 
form devised to meet the university human subject requirements. Essentially, this document states that: 
 
1) all information will be held confidential; 
2) your participation is voluntary and you may stop at any time if you feel uncomfortable;  
3) I do not intend to inflict any harm.  
 
You have been selected to be interviewed because you have been identified as someone who has a great 
deal to share about the USO. My research project as a whole focuses on BM in commercialising patented 
technology. I do not aim to evaluate your company performance. Rather, I am trying to learn more about 
how a BM can be used as a tool to commercialise patented technology and hopefully learn about the 
configuration of BM elements prior to product or service commercialisation stage. 
 
I have planned this interview to last no longer than 60/90 minutes. During this time, I have several 
questions that I would like to cover. If time begins to run short, it may be necessary to interrupt you in 
order to push ahead and complete the line of questioning. 
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SET 1: GENERIC INFORMATION 
 
 
Objective: To gather generic information about the USO 
Target: USO founder/CEO 
Duration: No longer than 60 minutes 
Mode: Semi structured interview (6 sections, 26 questions) 
Prerequisite: Study all the information about the USO available on the company website 
 
A. USO generic info 
1. Name of the company  
2. Date incorporated (establishment was led by IP or otherwise) 
3. Founding team (e.g. 4 professors + 2 team members)  
- Name, age, background and past experience of founding team members  
4. Stage of the company (Nascent Entrepreneur, New Business or Established Business)  
5. Activity description  
6. Number of employees  
 
 
B. Opportunity identification and development  
1. Approximate date of initial idea  
2. Context of initial idea (e.g. stumbled into an opportunity) 
3. Stage when marketing issues get considered 
4. Approximate date of incorporation  
5. Original research and which department 
6. Type of technology exploited, list of patents (and other protected IP) 
7. Type of industry explored 
8. Specific domain (e.g. virtual marketplace)  
9. Most critical resource for initial opportunity development (e.g. one professor’s industry 
experience)  
10. Source of basic technology and competence (e.g. university research and industry experience)  
 
C. Technology and market development 
1. Major performer of technology development (e.g. founders)  
2. Other performers of technology development (e.g. industrial partners)  
3. Major roles in market development (e.g. founding team)  
 
D. Funding  
1. Has the USO received any type of external funding?  
2. Initial funding (e.g. self-funded)  
3. Major source of funding (e.g. public grants)  
4. Additional funding sources (e.g. industry)  
 
E. Company performance  
1. Estimated time-to-market  
2. Date of first sale  
3. Estimated date of first sale (if no sales)  
4. Date of first customer order  
5. Estimated date of first customer order (if no orders)  
 
F. Additional info/documentation to request  
Business plan, presentations, annual report/other reports, notes, videos, audio, website, press releases 
and other. 
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SET 2: BUSINESS MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Objective: To gather information about the USO’s BM, how it is developed and changed over time  
Target: All board members, by levels 
Duration: No longer than 90 minutes  
Mode: Semi structured interview (4 sections, 24 questions)  
Prerequisite: Study information gathered from the first-round interview. 
 
 
A. VALUE PROPOSITION 
[What the USO aimed and has delivered to its customer, why the customers were willing to pay for it and 
the USO’s basic approach to competitive advantage]. 
 
1. *Could you please briefly describe the stage when the idea about this USO was first fleshed out? 
 
2. When the idea was first fleshed out, what were the benefits you aim to offer to the targeted 
customers? A1. Value/benefits 
 
3. What were the top goals at this early stage? A2. Goals 
 
4. *Could you please briefly describe what happen next after the ideation stage? How was the USO 
established and how did the USO discover the first functional technology? 
 
5. Did the initial benefits you aim to offer to the targeted customers and company goals change 
when you came out with the first functional technology? A3. Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
• Who initiate the change, how did the decision made? 
 
6. *Could you please briefly describe about the stage when the product/service/technology was 
ready to enter the market? 
 
7. Did the benefits you aim to offer to the targeted customers and your goals change when 
technology/product/service is ready to be introduced into the market? A4. Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
• Who initiate the change, how did the decision made? 
 
 
B.VALUE CREATION (AND DELIVERY SYSTEM) 
[How did the USO create and deliver its value to its customer and the source of its competitive advantage]. 
 
1. When the idea was first fleshed out, what were the key resources needed to make your business 
model work? B3. Key resources 
 
2. What were the sources of funding available during that time? B2. Funding 
 
3. What were the key activities that you aim to include at this planning stage? How did the value 
chain look like at the ideation stage? B3. Key activities/value chain 
 
4. When the idea was realised and you came out with the first functional technology, did any of the 
key resources, funding and key activities/value chain change from the previous plan? B5. 
Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
• Who initiate the change, how did the decision made? 
 
5. Prior to the introduction into the market, did any of the key resources, funding and key 
activities/value chain change? B6. Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
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C. VALUE CAPTURE  
[How did the USO generate revenue and profits]. 
 
1. When the idea was first fleshed out, what were the most important costs considered in your 
business? C1. Cost structure 
 
2. What and how you thought your customer could pay for the product/service/technology this USO 
provide? C2. Value capture/Revenue stream 
 
3. When the idea was realised and you came out with the first functional technology, did the 
important costs in your business and the way your customer will pay for the 
product/service/technology change?C3. Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
• Who initiate the change, how did the decision made? 
 
4. When the technology/product/service was ready to be introduced into the market, did the 
important costs in your business and the way your customer will pay for the 
product/service/technology change? C4. Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
• Who initiate the change, how did the decision made? 
 
D. VALUE NETWORK 
[Who are the people involved and what are their roles] 
 
1. When the idea was first fleshed out, what did your customer segments/types/groups of 
customers look like? D1. Customer segment 
 
2. What was the type of relationship you wished to establish and maintain with each of your 
customer segments? D2. Customer relationship 
 
3. Who did you think would be the key partners in your business network? D3. Key partners 
 
4. Did the customer segments, customer relationships and key partners change when you come 
out with the first functional technology? D4. Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
• Who initiate the change, how did the decision made? 
 
5. Did the customer segments, customer relationships and key partners change when 
technology/product/service is ready to be introduced into the market? D5. Change 
• What has been changing? 
• When did the change occur? 
• Why did it change? 
• Who initiate the change, how did the decision made? 
 
6. Anything else you find interesting about the journey of your USO from the ideation stage to the 
commercial deployment not covered abov
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL VER.04 (after pilot study and iterations) 
 
§ SET 1: Protocol for the internal stakeholders (Academic Founder/Board of Director) 
§ SET 2: Protocol for the external stakeholders (TTO/partner/competitor/others) 
 
 
 
SET 1: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR THE INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 
Date, Time, Venue xx, xx, xx 
RQ How does a USO develop BM in commercialising university technology? 
Interviewee’s name xx 
Position xx 
Background  xx 
Objectives 1. To access information about the USO and its formation 
2. To understand how business model is developed in commercialising 
the technology 
3. To identify the enablers and barriers to a successful university 
technology commercialisation 
 
 
1. USO FORMATION, GOVERNANCE, STRUCTURE AND BUSINESS MODEL 
1 What does the USO do? When was the USO established? Where: which lab/which research? 
2 Who was and still is involved? Organisation chart?  
3 Who are the 1) inventors 2) case managers in the TTO and 3) board of directors 4) key partners? 
4 How does the USO currently operate? The stage it is currently at?  
5 What is the USO’s current business model? How did it differ from the initial idea? 
 
2. BUSINESS MODELS DEVELOPMENT IN COMMERCIALISING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 
1 The story from ideation stage (when the technology is just an idea) to current state? 
2 Patents involved? 
3 How did the USO create and deliver value to its customer? What is the source of its competitive 
advantage? 
4 How did the USO encase the technology into a proposition? 
5 Did market resistance affect business model development process? How and why? Solution? 
6 How did the USO generate revenue and profits? How did the USO entice payments from the 
customers? 
7 What type of financial pressure faced? Why? Solution? 
8 Who are the USO’s major stakeholders (from the academic network and commercial network)? 
9 Did the USO face any conflicting value, culture and motives? How and why? Solution? 
10 What were the overall major challenges in developing a business model? Solution? 
 
3. KEY ENABLERS/BARRIERS FOR A SUCCESSFUL UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 
COMMERCIALISATION 
1 Based on your experience, what are the INTERNAL key enablers for a successful university technology 
commercialisation? What could be better? 
2 What are the EXTERNAL key enablers for a successful university technology commercialisation? What 
could be better? 
 
Info/logistics needed from the USO: 
1. Consent to disclose annual IP commercialisation report 
2. Related transactions/documents 
3. Referral to the key partners/stakeholders 
4. Follow up interview (if needed) 
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SET 2: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR THE EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Date, Time, Venue xx, xx, xx 
RQ How does s USO develop BM in commercialising university technology? 
Interviewee’s name xx 
Position xx 
Background  xx 
Objectives 1. To understand the remit of X 
2. To understand the general role of X in facilitating USO technology 
comemrcilisation 
3. To identify the enablers and barriers to a successful university 
technology commercialisation 
 
 
1. INFORMATION ABOUT X 
1 What is the remit of x and whose interest does it represent?  
2 What is x relationship with the USO? How did it first establish? When and why? 
 
2. X INVOLVEMENT IN THE BUSINESS MODEL DEVELOPMENT TO COMMERCIALISE UNIVERSITY 
TECHNOLOGY 
1 Whether it is direct or indirect, to what extend did x facilitate the commercialisation of technology in the 
USO? 
2 How did x facilitate the USO to create and deliver value to its customer?  
3 Do you think market resistance affect business model development process? How and why?  
4 How did x facilitate USO to generate revenue and profits?  
5 Do you think financial pressure affect business model development process? How and why? 
6 How did x facilitate USO to expand its network?  
7 Do you face any conflicting value, culture and motives with the USO? How and why? Solution? 
8 What is your view about the USO journey in comemrcilisaing its technology? 
 
3. KEY ENABLERS/BARRIERS FOR A SUCCESSFUL UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 
COMMERCIALISATION 
1 Based on your experience, what are the INTERNAL key enablers for a successful university technology 
commercialisation? What could be better? 
2 What are the EXTERNAL key enablers for a successful university technology commercialisation? What 
could be better? 
 
Info/logistics needed from the firm: 
1. Related transactions/documents 
2. Referral to the key partners/stakeholders 
3. Follow up interview (if needed) 
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APPENDIX C 
Appendix C: Example of the signed CDA form 
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APPENDIX D 
Appendix D: List of interviewees 
No Code Position Firm 
1 A_A01 Academic founder (A) 
AlphaVent 
2 A_B01 Board of Director (B) 
3 A_T01 
TTO (T) 4 A_T02 
5 A_T03 
6 A_P01 
Partner/Investor (P) 7 A_P02 
8 A_P03 
9 B_A01 
Academic founder (A) 
BetaRecycle 
10 B_A02 
11 B_B01 
Board of Director (B) 12 B_B02 
13 B_B03 
14 B_T01 
TTO (T) 15 B_T02 16 B_T03 
17 B_T04 
18 B_P01 
Partner/Investor (P) 
19 B_P02 
20 B_P03 
21 B_P04 
22 B_P05 
23 B_P06 
24 B_P07 
25 B_C01 Competitor/Other (C) 
26 G_A1 Academic founder (A) 
GammaSolar 
27 G_A2 
28 G_B01 
Board of Director (B) 29 G_B02 
30 G_B03 
31 G_T01 
TTO (T) 32 G_T02 
33 G_T03 
34 G_P01 
Partner/Investor (P) 35 G_P02 36 G_P03 
37 G_P04 
38 G_C01 Competitor/Other (C) 
39 D_A01 Academic founder (A) 
DeltaCool 
40 D_A02 
41 D_B01 
Board of Director (B) 42 D_B02 
43 D_B03 
44 D_T01 
TTO (T) 45 D_T02 
46 D_T03 
47 D_P01 Partner/Investor (P) 48 D_P02 
49 E_01 Former Deputy Director Cambridge Enterprise, UK 
50 E_02 Deputy Director Cambridge Enterprise, UK 
51 E_03 Technology Manager Cambridge Enterprise, UK 
52 E_04 Technology Associate Cambridge Enterprise, UK 
53 E_05 Head of Consultancy Service Cambridge Enterprise, UK 
54 E_06 Head of Marketing  Cambridge Enterprise, UK 
55 E_07 CEO  Cambridge Carbon Capture, UK 
56 E_08 CEO  Biobeat, UK 
57 E_09 CEO  Inotec AMD, UK 
58 E_10 Director  IdeaSpace, UK 
59 E_11 Director of Research  Industrial Sustainability, Institute for Manufacturing, UK 
60 E_12 Former Director  Institute for Sustainability Leadership, UK 
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Informant / USO AlphaVent BetaRecycle GammaSolar DeltaCool Total  
Academic founder  1 2 2 2 7 
Board of director 1 3 3 3 7 
TTO 3 4 3 3 13 
Investor/Partner 3 7 4 2 16 
Competitor/Other 0 1 1 0 2 
Total  8 17 13 10 48 
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